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ABSTRACT 
 
RACIAL INEQUALITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
 
IN MALAYSIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
SEPTEMBER 2010 
 
 
HWOK-AUN LEE, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 
M.SC., SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES 
 
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Robert Pollin 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines racial inequality and affirmative action in Malaysia and 
South Africa, two countries with a politically dominant but economically 
disadvantaged majority group – the Bumiputera in Malaysia, and blacks in post-
Apartheid South Africa. We aim to contribute comparative perspectives and current 
empirical research on affirmative action regimes and dimensions of inequality directly 
pertinent to affirmative action, chiefly, racial representation and earnings inequality 
among tertiary educated workers and in upper-level occupations. We discuss 
theoretical approaches to inequality and affirmative action, with attention to particular 
circumstances of majority-favoring regimes, then survey, compare and contrast 
affirmative action programs and their political economic context in Malaysia and South 
Africa. In the empirical portions, we outline patterns and evaluate determinants of 
racial inequality, focusing on the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.  
 viii
On Malaysia, we find that Bumiputera access to tertiary education has rapidly 
increased, but also observe disproportionate difficulties among Bumiputera degree-
holders in participating in labor markets and in attaining upper-level occupations. 
Bumiputera representation at managerial and professional levels has remained static 
and dependent on the public sector. Econometric results indicate that quality of tertiary 
education impacts on the prospect of attaining upper-level jobs, and that Bumiputera 
are more adversely affected. Lack of data restricts our assessment of racial earnings 
inequality to a deduction that Bumiputera young graduates have experienced relatively 
greater decline in their earnings capacity. 
On South Africa, we find that blacks have steadily increased access to tertiary 
education, although disparities in quality of institutions and in student performance 
persist, which disproportionately and negatively affect black graduates. We observe 
that black representation has increased in upper-level, especially professional, 
occupations, largely in the public sector. We find that white-black earnings disparity 
declined substantially among degree-qualified workers, while not diminishing or not 
showing clear patterns among other educational and occupational groups. 
We conclude by considering, within the constraints of each country’s political 
economic context, implications that arise from our findings. Most saliently, while 
affirmative action raises quantitative attainment of tertiary education and 
representation in upper-level occupations for the beneficiary group, inadequate 
attention to qualitative development of institutions and progressive distribution of 
benefits may attenuate progress toward the ultimate objective of cultivating broad-
based, self-reliant professionals and managers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. 1. Motivation and main tasks 
 Malaysia and post-Apartheid South Africa stand out for having a politically dominant 
but economically disadvantaged majority race group and for instituting extensive 
affirmative action (AA). Colonial and Apartheid legacies of exclusion, discrimination and 
repression entrenched systemic and self-perpetuating forms of disadvantage, resulting in 
severe group under-representation in socially esteemed and economically influential 
positions. Specifically, the under-representation of Bumiputera in Malaysia and blacks in 
South Africa in tertiary education and in upper rungs of the occupational ladder, as well 
as in asset ownership, have compelled extensive state action to redress racial disparities. 
In the wake of racial unrest in 1969 in Malaysia, and in the face of uncertainty in South 
Africa’s transition from Apartheid, both countries expanded or introduced a wide range 
of affirmative action programs. Racial redress is driven by political imperatives and 
prosecuted through race-delineated preferential policies that present potentially 
instructive commonalities and differences. 
This study is motivated by the exceptional scope and scale of majority-favoring 
affirmative action, the socio-political gravity of the programs’ success, and the 
importance of current empirical investigation. There is a dearth of country-specific and 
comparative study of the forms and outcomes of AA in Malaysia and South Africa, 
especially in recent years. Malaysia’s four decades of extensive affirmative action (since 
1971) provide a substantive track record of achievements and shortfalls, the first half of 
 2 
which has been considerably scrutinized. Progress since the 1990s, however, has been 
studied less vigorously, even though some shortcomings in Bumiputera economic 
participation persist or increase, in particular, difficulties among graduates in labor 
market engagement, continual dependence on public sector employment of professionals 
and administrators, and persistent under-representation in management and enterprise. 
These developments raise weighty questions about the efficacy of Malaysia’s policies. 
On the South African side, affirmative action programs, while still nascent, have 
proceeded for over a decade, long enough for progress to be evaluated, and perhaps early 
enough for serious problems to be addressed. Its AA programs, especially employment 
equity and Black economic empowerment, have already become embroiled in 
contentious debate. 
The relevant literature on Malaysia is sparse and, largely due to inaccessibility of 
labor force and income data, has been restricted to racial disparities in household income 
averaged over the group’s entire population. This generality permits limited inferences 
about the implications of the observed inequality trends on affirmative action policies 
(Ragayah 2008, Ishak 2000, Zainal 2001). Another segment of relevant and recent 
research has surveyed progress in since Malaysia’s New Economic Policy, which has 
provided an overarching framework for poverty alleviation, social restructuring and 
affirmative action (Jomo 2004, Khoo 2005)1. While this set of studies instructively 
presents changes over time in racial proportions in education, employment and equity 
ownership, various qualitative outcomes (quality of education, sector of employment) and 
                                                 
1 Jomo (2004) and Khoo (2005) merit a special mention here for incorporating post-2000 data and 
more contemporary policy issues. A number of other studies in this vein have focused on the 
official NEP period of 1971-1990, including Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman (1990) and Faridah 
(2003). 
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interactions between affirmative action programs, especially the transition between 
tertiary education and upper-level occupations, remain largely unexplored.  
 Research on racial inequality in South Africa is fairly extensive, and data are readily 
accessible. A section of relevant literature has computed and compiled inequality 
indicators from various data sources (Leite, McKinley and Osorio 2006, Leibbrandt, 
Levinsohn and McCrary 2005, Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, Seekings and Nattrass 2005). 
Other noteworthy studies can be clustered according to those probing the issue of labor 
market discrimination, which overlaps with affirmative action (Allanson, Atkins and 
Hinks 2002, Burger and Jafta 2006, Rospabé 2002), and some conducting earnings 
regressions in an inter-temporal setting (Bhorat, Lundall and Rospabé 2002, Hlekiso and 
Mahlo 2006). The relative abundance of literature provides helpful reference points, but 
akin to Malaysia, the focus has been predominantly on inequalities aggregated across 
race groups, not specifically on categories targeted by affirmative action. Also, most 
works that delve specifically into affirmative action equate it with employment equity 
and focus on labor market returns, without considering the affirmative action in tertiary 
education and its correspondence with racial representation in targeted occupations.  
Malaysia and South Africa were subjects of some comparative study in the mid- and 
late-1990s, mostly with a view to discern whether South Africa could draw lessons from 
Malaysia on affirmative action, as well as development and redistribution more broadly 
(Emsley 1996, Hart 1994, Southall 1997). As it turned out, South Africa did not adopt 
much of the Malaysian template. However, the passage of time since South Africa’s 
transition has allowed for its own policies to take shape – and, interestingly, for some 
resemblance to grow between both countries. The paucity of recent comparative research 
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adds to the impetus for this study, although this necessarily entails that we find little in 
the literature to serve as a model or baseline framework.  
In recognition of the importance of constructing a general framework for this enquiry 
while appreciating the country-specificity of affirmative action programs and contexts, 
and in view of the lack of preceding research on which to design this study, this study 
sets out five main tasks: 
1. To conceptualize affirmative action and synthesize the theoretical debate at a 
general level, while being cognizant of specific conditions in majority-favoring 
regimes; 
2. To provide a systematic overview of the content and context of AA programs in 
Malaysia and South Africa, and in comparative perspective;  
3. To broadly outline patterns of racial inequality pertinent to affirmative action; 
4. To evaluate the determinants of racial inequality and provide more precise insight 
into outcomes associated with affirmative action;  
5. To discuss the implications of our findings on affirmative action in Malaysia and 
South Africa, and in comparative perspective. 
 
1. 2. Structure of chapters 
 To fulfill the above tasks, this study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 begins by setting 
out the conditions that induce pressures for affirmative action: persistent inter-group 
inequality and systemic disadvantage faced by particular groups. We discuss the 
inadequacies of generalized economic theories in explicating these problems, stemming 
from assumptions of competitive markets and their propensities to dismantle 
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discrimination and promote equal opportunity, and from omission of historical conditions 
in societies structurally divided by race, such as Malaysia and South Africa at the 
inception of affirmative action. While this study recognizes that political imperatives 
drive affirmative action, we also maintain that theoretical opposition to affirmative action 
stands up poorly to real historical experience. The chapter then defines affirmative action 
for the purpose of this study, taking into consideration the diversity of approaches, the 
circumstances of societies with a majority disadvantaged group, and the necessity of 
clarifying common parameters for our cross-country scope. We also engage critically 
with various contentious issues surrounding affirmative action, regarding its racial basis, 
repercussions and alternatives, which are pertinent to policy discourses in Malaysia and 
South Africa. On balance, affirmative action bears both immense potential and pitfalls, 
and constitutes a reasonable and consistent framework for achieving its objective of 
redressing systemic disadvantage. 
Chapter 2 surveys the content and context of affirmative action in our two countries. 
We consider Malaysia and South Africa in turn, then draw out similarities and differences 
between the two. This section aims to inform our understanding of the specific conditions 
under which affirmative action emerged, and draw out key features of the institutional 
framework and political economy that have shaped AA programs. Saliently, the political 
transitions underpinning the institution of affirmative action, the balance of power 
between state and capital, and the magnitude of racial inequality and dynamics of race 
relations broadly influence the degree of centralization of the AA regime, the balance of 
discretionary authority and statutory code as modes of implementation, and the choice 
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between creating racially exclusive institutions versus fostering more equitable 
representation in existing institutions.  
Instructive contrasts and similarities emerge out of this inductive enquiry. Affirmative 
action programs, notably in public sector employment and scholarships, have operated in 
Malaysia since Independence in 1957. Rapid expansion of affirmative action from 1971 
corresponded with expansion of executive state power and reassertion of Malay 
dominance. Thus, Malaysia’s AA has largely grown through discretionary exercise of 
authority and centralized administration, and has in some cases taken the form of 
Malay/Bumiputera-exclusive programs, particularly in tertiary education. In South Africa, 
white dominance encompassed the economy, government and bureaucracy, and 
affirmative action emerged amid a transition to democracy and a principal commitment to 
non-racialism. Accordingly, the country followed a more statutory approach requiring 
compliance with laws overseeing affirmative action, and intervened in a more 
decentralized manner in increasing black representation in previously white-only 
institutions, notably universities and the upper ranks of the public sector. However, while 
the institutional framework broadly differs, Malaysia and South Africa exhibit similarity 
in terms of the important role of the public sector and public enterprises, and licensing 
and public procurement programs, for employment of professionals and managers and 
cultivation of enterprises.  
Chapters 3 and 5 explore patterns of racial inequality pertinent to affirmative action, 
respectively, in Malaysia and in South Africa. We collate statistics informing change over 
time in racial representation in tertiary education and in upper-level occupations, and 
compute earnings disparities corresponding with the above categories. We provide a 
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systematic and current appraisal of the progress of affirmative action in its principal 
purpose of redressing under-representation of the disadvantaged group, and in the 
concomitant objective of reducing racial earnings disparities. While the bulk of existing 
literature refers to income or earnings inequalities aggregated across race groups, this 
study focuses on educational and occupational categories where AA beneficiaries are 
concentrated. To the extent permitted by data availability, we supplement these findings 
with data capturing important qualitative differentiation, especially variations in quality 
of tertiary education and in sector of employment.  
Chapters 4 and 6, following up on Chapters 3 and 5, evaluate the determinants of 
racial inequality. In a first set of regressions, we estimate the independent effects of a set 
of determinants, most pertinently race and education, on the probability of attaining 
managerial or professional positions. A second set, replacing the binary dependent 
variable with earnings, expands on conventional earnings functions by incorporating race 
and education interaction terms. The key results – from the interaction terms – provide 
comparison of the occupational prospects and earnings capacities of tertiary-qualified 
members of the beneficiary group versus tertiary-qualified non-beneficiaries. In the 
occupational attainment regressions, we add further layers to our analyses by 
disaggregating the dependent variable by sector to test if the prospects of upward 
mobility for Bumiputera and blacks differ between public and private sector. 
Chapter 7 places our findings and policy implications in comparative perspective. 
First, affirmative action in education has corresponded with quantitative gains, but 
concerns persist in the quality of benefits received. Access to tertiary education expanded 
in both countries and for all race groups, including the Bumiputera in Malaysia and 
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blacks in South Africa, but within these designated groups, the attainment level of non-
Malay Bumiputera and Africans continue to lag. Regression results emphatically report 
that degree-level qualifications exert the greatest impact on the likelihood of attaining 
upper-level occupations in both countries, and correspond most consistently with 
declining racial earnings disparity in South Africa, where the earnings gap declines more 
robustly between black degree-holders and white degree-holders than between black and 
whites within any other education or occupation category. However, we find evidence 
that quality of education substantially impacts on prospects for occupational advancement, 
and that beneficiary groups are more adversely affected in this regard. This underscores 
the importance to affirmative action of maintaining tertiary education quality alongside 
increasing access, raising questions to Malaysia about the suitability of centralized 
administration and racially-exclusive institutions and caution to South Africa on its 
persistent deficiencies in educational provision to the black population.  
Second, entry of the disadvantaged group into upper-level occupations has progressed 
to some extent in both countries, especially at professional level, but questions remain 
over long term sustainability. The momentum of Bumiputera entry stalled from the 1990s 
in Malaysia. In both countries, this branch of affirmative action depends heavily on the 
public sector. In Malaysian tertiary educated workforce, we find that Bumiputera are 
more likely to attain managerial or professional positions in the public sector, but are 
substantially less likely to do so in the private sector, after controlling for other 
determinants. In South Africa, the probability that degree-qualified blacks, compared to 
degree-qualified whites, are employed as managers or professionals is higher in the 
public sector, but lower in the private sector. These results suggest that the emphasis of 
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affirmative action in the labor market should shift from enforcing generally over-
accelerated targets for group representation, to broadening quality education and 
moderating these targets in accordance with the increase in supply of capable, skilled 
workers. 
Third, Bumiputera and black under-representation is persistently severest in 
management, particularly in operating private enterprise. Malaysia and South Africa have 
broadly deployed similar instruments – public enterprises, licensing and procurement – 
although located within different institutional frameworks. The lack of progress in 
cultivating self-reliant enterprises raises questions on the feasibility and efficacy of these 
programs, while the broad scope for abuse and corruption underscores the pitfalls of AA 
instruments that involve transfer of wealth or claims over rents. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INEQUALITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CONCEPT, POLICY AND 
COUNTRY CONTEXT 
 
 This chapter will survey and discuss conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of 
inequality, specifically persistent inequality between population groups, and approaches 
to affirmative action, with consideration of the conditions in majority-favoring regimes. 
We critically engage with a number of contentious issues surrounding affirmative action. 
We then survey Malaysia’s and South Africa’s affirmative action programs and their 
political economic context, and present our countries in comparative perspective. 
 
2. 1. Inequality, disadvantage and affirmative action: Conceptual and policy issues 
2. 1. 1. Inequality and systemic disadvantage 
The political imperatives of redressing colonial and Apartheid legacies of inter-racial 
disparities superseded theoretical arguments in the formulation of affirmative action 
policies in Malaysia and South Africa. Besides omitting historical and country specific 
dimensions of inequality, generalized theories in the neoclassical tradition also offer scant 
insight to questions of inequality between population groups, especially those delineated 
by race. Nonetheless, it will serve us well to take a step back and survey some theoretical 
approaches to labor market discrimination, income determination, and inequality. In 
particular, this study seeks theoretical frameworks to help explain the persistence of 
inequalities between population groups. Two areas of neoclassical economic theory are 
particularly relevant: discrimination and human capital. 
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Becker’s theory of discrimination must be a starting point for its considerable 
influence on economic thought. He defines discrimination as a departure from objective 
behavior, related to “non-pecuniary, psychic costs of interaction”. People prefer to work 
with others of the same race or culture, and may lack adequate information about such 
persons to make proper assessments of their capabilities (Becker 1971)2. This argument 
for the existence of discrimination rests on the starting point that black and white workers 
are equally productive. Attaching competitive market assumptions, the returns to human 
capital would in the absence of discrimination equalize between blacks and whites. In 
sum, the explanation for disparity reduces to a ‘taste for discrimination’. Moreover, the 
theory predicts that in the long run, discrimination will be eliminated by competitive 
forces in the labor market, since companies that restrict hiring to one group will 
eventually pay wage premiums or employ less productive workers at the expense of more 
productive workers from the discriminated group, and thus become less profitable. 
This conceptualization of discrimination assumes, as mentioned above, that workers 
of different groups have attained equivalent levels of human capital. It also assumes away 
persistent between-group disparities in access to education that characterize many 
societies, especially those with racial divisions. The assumption is patently flawed in 
omitting structural inequalities that prevail disproportionately on certain groups before 
they participate in labor markets, thereby precluding the systemic disadvantages that 
affirmative action seeks to address. The Becker model assumptions, being rather difficult 
to sustain, have been amended, chiefly with the introduction of imperfect competition. 
                                                 
2 Becker maintains, objectively, that a differential between marginal revenue product and 
marginal cost indicates discrimination, and that non-pecuniary costs can be quantified in a 
“discrimination coefficient” representing the value of these costs. If an employer derives disutility 
from an interaction, this translates into a negative discrimination coefficient – hence, lower wages. 
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These amendments posit that some firms have a monopoly in product markets and those 
firms prefer to hire white workers, or white laborers occupy a monopsonist position in 
some labor markets, or racial disparities prevail in access to financial capital (Darity 1982: 
72-73). The diagnoses and solutions, however, remain ensconced in a neoclassical, 
ahistorical, market-centric framework. Addressing the deficiencies more forthrightly, 
Loury (2002) draws an instructive distinction between “reward bias” (post-labor market 
entry) and “development bias” (pre-labor market entry), and asserts that neoclassical 
economics pays inadequate attention to latter.  
The confinement of discrimination to solely post-labor market entry phenomenon is 
emphatically deficient in the Malaysia and South Africa context, where the historical 
problem is that a majority group has received systemically lesser education and economic 
opportunity, and suffered poorer living environments. However, we refrain from the term 
discrimination, since varying – indeed opposing – forms of discrimination have prevailed 
since the administration of majority-favoring affirmative action. Framing persistent 
inequalities preceding labor market entry as systemic disadvantages allows for the 
diminishment of historical and current disadvantage alongside the establishment of 
positive discrimination. 
Human capital theory is embedded in neoclassical underpinnings of rational choice3 
and optimization in competitive markets. At a basic level, and in seminal early works 
such as Mincer (1958), the premise for claiming a causal relationship between 
“productive” individual traits and earnings is obvious enough. It is easy to find empirical 
corroboration for positive effects of age/experience and education/skill on earnings. The 
                                                 
3 Mincer’s (1958: 283) influential work on income distribution pronounces that “[t]he starting 
point of an economic analysis of personal income distribution must be an exploration of the 
implications of the theory of rational choice.” 
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specification of earnings determinants would, in later developments in the literature, 
allow for “environmental inequalities” to control for factors beyond individual traits 
(Mincer 1970: 6-7). Nevertheless, the neoclassical optimization paradigm formulates 
human capital investment as an individual decision to forego current earnings to engage 
in training, derived through a time preference-constrained maximization of permanent 
income4. Higher expected future earnings motivate more investment in training.  
This formulation of earnings determination as an optimization process of acquiring 
human capital is inadequate on various grounds, of which three are especially important. 
First, the assumptions of competitive labor markets, implicitly precluding barriers to 
entry, casts the human capital investment process as voluntary5. In the absence of 
structural barriers to human capital acquisition, lower skill levels and subsequently lower 
earnings become a matter of taste and choice, and to some degree of innate ability. 
However, it is untenable to maintain optimal choice and talent as explanations of earnings 
distribution in the face of persistent poverty and inequality. Extensions of the human 
capital framework bring theory closer to real world conditions by accounting for the 
persistence, or increase, of inequality in societies over time. The incorporation of inter-
generational transmission of inequality, feedback effects of unequal neighborhoods, or 
differentiation in school quality across localities, provide theoretical frameworks and 
empirical bases for perpetuating inequalities (Bénabou 1996, Durlauf 1996). We note the 
contribution of these perspectives, but do not formally incorporate them into this study, 
                                                 
4 Mincer (1970: 6) asserts that human capital models “single out individual investment behavior 
as a basic factor in the heterogeneity of labor incomes.” 
 
5 Another deficit in the theory, which is important but less directly relevant to this study, is its 
reliance on the assumption that individuals have sufficient knowledge of their lifetime stream of 
earnings to calculate rates of return on their investments in education and training (Darity 1982: 
83).  
 14 
since our principal interest is to plot patterns of inequality ex post and to examine 
country-specific policies. Empirical examination of inter-generational inequality will also 
not be possible due to the unavailability of nationally representative panel income data in 
both countries. 
Second, deriving income from possession of human capital is not as straightforward a 
process as neoclassical theory posits. The notion that human capital, embodied in skills 
and capabilities, is a determinant of employment and income is problematic in that it 
omits the role of market filters and bargaining power, and muddles the meaning of capital. 
The contribution of higher education to upward mobility derives not just from knowledge 
and skills, but also from the access granted by the credential of possessing certain 
academic qualifications. In wage bargaining, persons with more human capital are not 
merely more skillful, but are able to exercise greater leverage, whether due to their 
position within the organization or the specificity of their skill. Bowles’ and Gintis’ (1975) 
Marxist critique of human capital theory highlights the departures of human capital from 
the two defining elements of capital: ownership of the means of production and a claim 
on future income. On the first element, they point out that innate or acquired capabilities 
constitute capital only insofar as they increase the capacity to engage on production on 
one’s own. Where capable and educated persons are mere sellers of labor power, their 
capabilities cannot be said to constitute capital. On the second element, the connection 
between capabilities and claims on future income is tenuous, and contingent on various 
factors beyond the individual.  
Third, if labor markets are segmented – i.e. if there are structural barriers to entry – 
then the notion of labor mobility and competitive markets must be reconsidered. More 
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advanced quantitative work seeks to statistically demarcate labor markets (Dickens and 
Lang 1992), but it suffices for this study to critically observe features that may designate 
structural breaks, most pertinently, by occupational level (managerial/professional and 
production/service workers), location (urban and rural), and degree of formalization 
(formal and informal). This approach constitutes a departure from competitive market 
assumptions, with implications on earnings determination and inequality. Segmentation 
of labor markets will require their effects to be controlled for, or analyses to also be 
segmented, i.e. computing descriptive statistics and estimating separate earnings 
functions by segment. Given the histories of racial divisions of labor in Malaysia and 
South Africa, the concept of segmented labor markets must be given due consideration. 
Neoclassical theories of discrimination and human capital are limited in their capacity 
to inform the existence and persistence of inequality and to frame the questions posed in 
this study. The conception of labor markets as competitive interactions of supply and 
demand, motivated by atomistic workers and employers, presents a narrow 
conceptualization of earnings determination and distribution processes. Structural 
impediments to the advancement of certain population groups are invariably historically 
contingent and often lie beyond the realm of individual or household choice. Explaining 
differences in access to education and training requires much more than estimating the 
costs of such acquisition or the lack of financial resources. We must also account for 
spatial and institutional dimensions of inequality, for imperfect social mobility, and for 
political crises or negotiations that have generated intractable pressures for large-scale 
government distributive intervention in Malaysia and South Africa.  
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In sum, this study must account for group disadvantage both pre- and post-labor 
market participation. We employ a broader concept of systemic disadvantage to 
encompass inequalities that are continually manifest and that have propensities to 
reproduce. The notion of disadvantage is sufficient and more appropriate than 
discrimination, as it obviates the problem of disentangling negative/unfair versus 
positive/fair discrimination. 
 
2. 1. 2. Conceptions of affirmative action  
A common thread in definitions of AA, explicitly or implicitly, is the application of 
preference to members of a designated population group. Different approaches, however, 
tend to emphasize one or more aspects of AA, related to the basis, scope and duration of 
group preference. Much of the conceptual debate, drawing on the U.S. experience, 
engages with legal and philosophical aspects of AA (e.g. Beckwith and Jones 1997, Cahn 
2002, Curry 1996). We therefore survey some definitions of AA, focusing on literature 
that draws on economics traditions, then contextualize AA in South Africa and Malaysia 
and propose a suitable and functional definition for this study. We consider to the 
following sources, where affirmative action is: 
 
“group preferences and quotas” (Sowell 2004) 
 
“[regulation of] the allocation of scarce positions in education, employment or 
business contracting so as to increase the representation in those positions of persons 
belonging to certain population subgroups” (Fryer and Loury 2005) 
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“[the] practice of preferential selection of members of under-represented groups to 
widely esteemed positions” (Weisskpof 2004) 
 
“[a] coherent packet of measures, of a temporary character, aimed specifically at 
correcting the position of members of a target group in one or more aspects of their 
social life, in order to obtain effective equality” (ILO 2003) 
 
“special temporary measures… to accelerate the pace of improvement of the situation 
of groups that are at a serious disadvantage because of past or present discrimination” 
(ILO 2007) 
 
“measures to raise the participation of members of an economically disadvantaged 
group in the areas of education, employment and business, where they had been 
historically excluded or under-represented” (Lee 2005) 
 
“[a] form of state-sponsored social mobility” and a “remedial strategy which seeks to 
address the legal, historical exclusion of a majority” (Adam 2000) 
 
 Three perspectives stand out in justifications for affirmative action: discrimination, 
disadvantage and under-representation. Discrimination and disadvantage tend to be inter-
linked, resulting in under-representation, especially in upper education institutions and 
occupations, and ownership of wealth and capital. However, every approach to AA 
emphasizes one or two aspects over the other, with the exception of Sowell (2004) who, 
in claiming to conduct a purely empirical analysis of affirmative action, precludes 
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consideration of historical discrimination or disadvantage. In contrast, the ILO definitions 
make the case for AA on the grounds of disadvantage due to past discrimination (ILO 
2007), which call for measures to accelerate positive change or take corrective action in 
pursuit of “effective equality” (ILO 2003). For Fryer and Loury (2005) and Weisskopf 
(2004), the chief purpose of AA is to increase the representation of under-represented 
groups. Notably, Lee (2005) and Adam (2000), writing respectively about South Africa 
and Malaysia, premise AA on historical exclusion.  
 The scope of AA is specified in some approaches, encompassing education, 
employment and business (Fryer and Loury 2005, Lee 2005). Weisskopf (2004) 
emphasizes the importance of redressing under-representation in “widely esteemed 
positions” – i.e. upper tier universities, and professional and managerial ranks. Barriers to 
entry are especially acute in these areas, but more importantly, these positions confer a 
significant level of social standing and economic influence. Perennial under-
representation of disadvantaged groups can reinforce perceptions within the group that 
the upper rungs of educational and occupational ladders are inaccessible, or perpetuate 
social stigmas towards the capabilities of the group as a whole. 
 Duration of AA is usually not enumerated, although most conceptions of AA 
implicitly set self-disqualifying marks, since the grounds for AA diminish as under-
represented or disadvantaged groups progressively become more represented and less 
disadvantaged. Arguably, expiration timelines (dismantling AA after a period of time or 
after targets are reached) or sunset clauses (e.g. disqualifying members of the designated 
group who have received benefits from further preferential treatment) are vital towards 
attaining equity and efficiency. We return to this debate in the following section. It 
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suffices to note at this stage that the ILO definitions, which we may take to be the most 
generalized across county experiences, stress the impermanence of AA. This emphasis, as 
part of the definition of AA, is evidently a response to potential adverse effects of 
prolonged preferential policies that solidify into new forms of protectionism and 
exclusion6. 
 The range of approaches surveyed above, and their underlying values and normative 
biases, underscore the importance of clarity – and, to an extent, country specificity – in 
outlining the justification and scope of affirmative action. Four issues warrant our 
consideration in composing a definition of affirmative action. First, this study predicates 
affirmative action in Malaysia and South Africa on the prevalence of systemic 
disadvantage faced by racial groups, as a result of historical discrimination or exclusion. 
Preferential policies towards a majority group entail interventions of higher magnitude. 
The scale and scope of programs in Malaysia and South Africa substantially exceed those 
conventionally associated with affirmative action in social science literature (Jain, Sloane 
and Horwitz 2003, Weisskopf 2004, Sowell 2004).  
  Second, historical exclusion of the Bumiputera in Malaysia and blacks in South 
Africa from full education opportunity and economic participation is undeniable, but the 
impediments to have shifted over time, due to affirmative action, as well as economic 
development more broadly. Hence, the premise for affirmative action should 
accommodate such changes, specifically, by viewing disadvantage from a systemic rather 
                                                 
6 The ILO has maintained a fairly consistent position on temporariness of redistributive programs 
in the labor market. Its Convention 111, passed in 1958, stipulated that government measures to 
ameliorate the position of particular groups in society – as a precursor to implementing non-
discrimination legislation – should be reviewed every ten years.  
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than an historical perspective. This is judicious also for the purpose of assessing 
mechanisms or timelines for scaling down affirmative action.  
  Third, affirmative action invariably negotiates a tension between designating 
preference to some and preserving equitable opportunities to others. Malaysia and South 
Africa face such dilemmas, with two distinctive features: the designated group comprises 
a majority race group that is economically disadvantaged but politically dominant, and 
each country’s Constitution lays the foundations for affirmative action along with 
guarantees of equal rights to citizens. These inscriptions of grounds for preferential 
policies embody the sense of economic insecurity of the majority group and apprehension 
over the capacity of self-regulating markets to redress their severe under-representation in 
key areas, while demonstrating their political dominance and circumscribing the terms of 
discourse. The question whether or not to institute AA is effectively precluded in 
Malaysia and South Africa; the politically possible debate, for the moment and 
foreseeable future, concerns the design and conduct of policies. The question of AA’s 
duration may arise, but only occasionally, and rarely substantially. Historical 
circumstances undoubtedly demanded extensive and intensive affirmative action. 
However, systematic preferential treatment can induce exceeding pressures for such 
programs to be perpetuated, which can in turn entrench a system of entitlement, 
patronage and dependency. These detrimental and undermining outcomes reinforce the 
case for grounding AA in group disadvantage, and for balancing the cause of group 
preference against the principle of equality. 
  Fourth, the areas where affirmative action is implemented need to be specified. 
Obviously, the disadvantaged group will be under-represented in the upper rungs of 
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educational and occupational ladders, and in ownership and control of business. The 
spaces for preferential polices may be delineated according to these sectors. However, we 
also want to encapsulate an overarching purpose of affirmative action, which is to 
increase the presence of individuals from a disadvantaged group in positions that elevate 
the group’s position and influence as a whole, while also developing self-reliance. Strict 
proportionality, especially in areas of ownership and employment, are not necessarily 
desirable, especially if a designated group is positioned to make further progress without 
preferential policies. Following from the above discussion, and drawing on portions of 
the definitions cited above, this study conceptualizes affirmative action in Malaysia and 
South Africa as:  
preferential measures to redress systemic disadvantages faced by a population 
group that is under-represented in socially esteemed and economically influential 
positions. 
 
 
 
2. 1. 3. Contentious issues and alternatives to race-based affirmative action 
Affirmative action is contentious and polarizing, from a range of perspectives. At the 
extremes, it is unqualifiedly opposed as a violation of neoclassical market axioms or 
uncritically endorsed as a socio-political necessity. In between, more considered and 
nuanced positions may support AA by recognizing its socio-political imperative while 
acknowledging its limitations and contradictions, or maintain preference for alternatives 
to race-based AA that arguably can attain the same objectives. This section weighs 
various debates, outlining and responding to salient criticisms against affirmative action.  
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2. 1. 3. 1. Market mechanisms versus state intervention 
One area of contention pits the position that markets render discrimination untenable 
over time against the position that state intervention is necessary to counter past 
discrimination with proactive, positive discrimination. Neoclassical economic 
assumptions – chiefly, no structural barriers to human capital acquisition and long run 
unprofitability of discrimination in competitive labor markets – drive the conclusion that 
competitive labor markets over time will facilitate the attrition of negative discrimination 
and the diminishment of unequal pay for equal human capital.  
The neglect of pre-labor market inequality in neoclassical theory, whether due to 
discrimination or persistent structures of exclusion, has been discussed above. However, 
within the neoclassical framework, one could argue that alleviating inequalities in access 
to and quality of education suffices to equip previously disadvantaged groups to 
participate in higher educational and occupational strata, thereby equalizing opportunity 
for self-advancement in competitive markets. This indirect and incremental route to 
redressing under-representation in employment, nonetheless, is clouded by two major 
issues that cast doubts on its adequacy.  
First, the assumption of competitive markets is exceedingly questionable in the 
context of labor markets, where barriers are endemic, such as the role of networks and 
referrals, the practice of employers targeting graduates of elite institutions, or tendencies 
to sustain norms and avert risks, real or presumed (Bergmann 1996). Formally removing 
labor market entry barriers and increasing educational access may create more conducive 
conditions for firms to hire and promote on the basis of capability and merit, increasingly 
overlooking race and gender, but there is no cogent motive facilitating this outcome. 
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Overt or subliminal discrimination may be influenced by racism, ignorance, inertia, or 
stigma towards a particular group, which in turn can be fuelled by lack of visibility of 
persons from that group in prominent and influential positions. This condition poses a 
coordination problem, particularly if there is continually no shortage of qualified labor 
market entrants from advantaged groups. Individual, profit-driven firms will likely be 
disinclined to venture on their own to hire or promote persons from under-represented 
groups, due to perceived risks, real needs for further training or mentorship, or other 
factors.  
 Do free markets necessarily and always employ the ‘best person for the job’? 
Bergmann (1996) points out, with reference to labour market research, that employers 
may discriminate against persons from under-represented groups or be inclined towards 
persons from groups that have established a presence. The effects are acute where on-the-
job experience matters heavily, in which case under-represented persons may be 
continually overlooked by employers who are risk-averse or unwilling to invest in further 
training and mentorship. Breaking out of vicious cycles of discrimination or exclusion 
then requires a coordinated, external push. 
Second, even if formal entry barriers dissipate, the pace of change may not be as fast 
as is socially desirable or politically imperative. Affirmative action responds to political 
pressures, usually converging at momentous transition periods, which generate 
expectations and perhaps set specific targets of substantial, robust and visible change. 
The time required to bridge widespread and complex disparities in educational access and 
quality may eventually, but too gradually, translate into more equitable economic 
participation. Anti-discrimination legislation may compel employers to be more 
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circumspect about overt or subliminal prejudice in hiring and remuneration practices, but 
still does little to require or induce employers to seek out a representative workforce. 
Moreover, even if legislation prohibits discrimination, the monitoring mechanism relies 
heavily on individuals initiating legal proceedings against alleged unfair discrimination, 
which are costly and intimidating to the persons confronting institutions or employers, 
and reactive and dispersed in their occurrence. In contrast, affirmative action by 
definition operates more proactively and in a coordinated manner, being executed by the 
state, which is in a position to balance the objectives of equitable representation and 
opportunity. 
The case for relying on anti-discriminatory legislation, buttressed by the principle of 
equal opportunity, unsurprisingly, does not fare well against the evidence of country 
experiences. AA in the United States initially revolved around prohibiting discriminatory 
practices, but those efforts turned out to be inadequate to increase representation of the 
black minority in tertiary education. Over time, AA came to be associated with the notion 
and practice of positive discrimination (Weisskopf 2004). With reference to historical 
experience, ILO (2007: 10) takes “recognition of the fact that the mere act of ending 
discrimination will never level the playing field once deep-seated and long-standing 
deprivation has occurred”. 
 
2. 1. 3. 2. Race-based affirmative action  
Beneath AA debates often lies a disquiet over designating a population group as 
beneficiary, whether by race or gender, instead of a socio-economic category. 
Designating beneficiaries by race, the argument maintains, commits injustice and 
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inefficiency by not explicitly targeting the neediest in society, i.e. the poor and 
economically disadvantaged. Moreover, granting preference to a formerly disadvantaged 
group denies opportunities to other groups, negating the purpose of fostering integration 
and, some would assert, amounts to ‘reverse discrimination’. In addition, race-based AA 
accentuates group differences, contrary to its objective of attenuating the role of racial 
identity in economic interactions. Class-based or means-tested AA are commonly posed 
alternative to race-based AA (Jain 2006, CPPS 2006b).  
A policy framework that designates beneficiaries in terms of class or means is 
structured such that the neediest in society, regardless of identity, will be accorded 
preference. Among those qualifying for state assistance, members of disadvantaged racial 
or gender or other groups will disproportionately gain by virtue of their predominance in 
low income brackets. Additionally, this attenuates the scope for abuse and allocative 
inefficiency within the designated group, by curbing rentier behavior of elites and 
staunching the flow of benefits to the middle class who can afford tertiary education and 
qualify on merit. These criticisms raise some valid and important concerns, outlining 
fundamental philosophical and practical dilemmas. Framing this debate as a binary 
choice between two schemes of affirmative action, however, falters on two main fronts: 
imprecision and inconsistency on the purpose of AA, and neglect of historical context 
and practical constraints.  
The argument against race-based AA generally claims that the same objective of 
uplifting a race group will be attained by designating beneficiaries according to other 
criteria, particularly socio-economic status. It is true that disadvantaged persons will 
benefit disproportionately more from assistance targeted at low-income households. 
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Nonetheless, the broadening of AA to encompass areas where disadvantaged groups are 
over-represented – i.e. among the poor and socio-economically excluded – is not so much 
proposing alternative solutions as framing an altogether different set of problems. If the 
question of under-representation is accepted as the problem at hand, the focus 
accordingly falls on the precise target group and effective measures to increase their 
proportions in areas where they are under-represented. Class and income inequality 
overlap to a meaningful extent with racial inequality, but are much broader problems 
demanding broader, though no doubt complementary, solutions.  
 Two other inconsistencies are worth noting. First, the critique of affirmative action on 
the grounds of neglect of the needy generally implies that AA fails, in absolute terms, as 
long as some benefits accrue to the middle or upper classes, when the outcome is one of 
relative magnitude. Surely, whether AA excludes all or some of the poor bears 
importance in assessing the efficacy of specific policies. Second, the case against race-
based AA on the grounds that it accentuates group differences finds corollaries in other 
dimensions of inequality that are generally not considered problematic. Conferring 
preferential status on poor, rural, or inner-city persons would accentuate differences 
between rich and poor, urban and rural, or suburban and inner-city, but such measures are 
upheld due to the benefits to bridging these gaps. In the same way that the university 
campuses should not be the preserve of the rich in a stratified society, student bodies 
should not be racially homogenous in a heterogeneous society. The justification for 
providing special means for the poor to gain access, in principle, does not differ from the 
rationale for race-based AA. 
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The premise of equitable group representation is repudiated by some, who maintain 
that it is neither desirable nor achievable. One attempt at pointing out the innocuous 
existence of non-representative workforces is to refer to the concentration of ethnic 
groups in particular sectors or occupations in societies that are fairly cohesive: e.g. in the 
U.S., Korean corner stores and West African taxi drivers (Hermann 2007, Sowell 2004). 
While such niches and business networks thrive and are not necessarily deleterious to 
social relations, they are characterized by horizontal differentiation – concentration of 
some groups in the operation of certain activities – which are much less fractious and 
potentially destabilizing than vertical disparities – predominance of one group at the top 
of the economic hierarchy. This critique of AA conflates two different problems, and on 
the whole provides a weak case against redressing under-representation of disadvantaged 
groups in positions conferring social status and economic influence.  
Preferential treatment to one group unavoidably comes at some expense of other 
groups. However, characterizing positive discrimination as reverse discrimination 
commits a false equivalency, most gravely in cases where past discrimination took the 
form of slavery, denial of basic rights and systemic exclusion, such as in South Africa. 
The argument also generally precludes the potential gains from positive discrimination, 
even while it espouses non-interventionism on the basis of the potential for dismantling 
negative discrimination, which in turn hinges on assumed propensities of market behavior 
outlined and critiqued above.  
Emphatically, transformative national agendas such as affirmative action emerge at 
historical watersheds and in country-specific conditions that give momentum to 
designation of beneficiaries by race. The trajectories and entrenchment of AA programs 
 28 
receives the bulk of deprecatory attention, but a judicious assessment must be mindful of 
the initial conditions to appreciate historical context and practical constraints. The notion 
that race can be overlooked or proxied by socio-economic variables in racially fractured 
divided societies, while attractive, superimposes a future ideal on a present reality in 
which racial identity, disparity, and perhaps stereotypes, are deeply embedded and 
closely experienced. In most cases, the vast majority of the disadvantaged group is ill-
equipped for tertiary education and economically influential positions. The choice in 
preferential regimes lies between socio-economic targeting which would benefit many 
from the disadvantaged group, or race designation which would benefit substantial 
numbers of persons from poor households.  
The question thus becomes, which regime is more effective in delivering both 
equitable representation and productive outcomes? While targeting by socio-economic 
evaluation clearly presents a better framework from an allocative standpoint, practical 
constraints require policies to also factor in the availability of persons capable of entering 
the upper echelons of the labor market, regardless of socio-economic status. 
A counterpoint to this argument might assert that the capable minority – the elite – 
within the disadvantaged group should take the lead in eschewing preferential policies 
and instituting a merit-based system from the start. However, considering again the 
conditions in which AA is instituted, pervaded as it is by uncertainty – even 
circumspection – towards the commitment of education institutions and employers to 
purge discriminatory practices, mandates to increase representation serve at least as a 
safeguard, if not an enforcement mechanism. A moral argument sometimes arises at this 
point: self-interest motivates the advocacy by elites for AA policies from which they are 
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poised to benefit. Such predilections cannot be denied, but this perspective is lopsided. 
Opposition to AA can also stem from self-interest in preserving historical or systemic 
advantage of employers and profitably positioned incumbents. 
One of the applied cases of non-race-based schemes is the adoption in various states 
in the U.S. of a policy accepting a certain proportion of top students of all high schools, 
to counteract ballot propositions banning preferential admissions policies. This regionally 
egalitarian mechanism engenders diversity of student representation, to the extent that 
ethnic groups are concentrated in particularly districts. However, disparities across 
schools in quality of teaching and facilities may propel some under-prepared minority-
group students into distinguished tertiary institutions. Students of low-income families 
may also have less funds to defray education costs, entailing larger commitments of 
public finance (Weisskopf 2004, Fryer and Loury 2005). Of course, the issues do not 
translate directly to more centralized education systems where national, university 
entrance examinations are administered, such as Malaysia and South Africa, but the 
general implication holds, i.e. proportionate regional representation or need-based 
admission can adversely affect the average level of student preparedness for tertiary 
education.  
 In the realm of employment, need-based or class-based AA becomes considerably 
less operable. While education institutes are in a position to factor in family income in 
admissions and financial aid decisions, it is much less clear how employers can be 
induced or obligated to hire or promote persons based on family socio-economic 
background. Adam (2000), while advocating this alternative in place of race-based 
employment equity programs in South Africa, scarcely furnishes details on how class-
 30 
based AA will be implemented. In terms of ownership and control over capital, class-
based AA is the most problematic and prone to abuse, even while dominance of one race 
group at the commanding heights of the economy is a dimension of disparity of immense 
political consequence.  
The debate over race-based versus alternative modes of affirmative action will 
continually elude common ground, and in the absence of counterfactuals, can never be 
fully resolved. Nonetheless, we attempt to find a synthesis from which to proceed with 
this study. Advocates tend to restrict AA’s scope to preferential selection to particular 
positions, while critics subsume a range of inequalities within the ambit of AA, or hold 
current policies accountable for broad socio-economic inequalities. Within the bounds of 
this study’s definition of AA, however, we find race-based programs to be consistent 
with the policy’s objective. 
Historical conditions and practical constraints under which AA is instituted provide 
important context for understanding the designation of beneficiaries by race or other 
population group category. While the policy discourses and political dynamics surely 
vary by country, the prospect of redressing disadvantage and under-representation 
without preferential schemes falls short of societal or political expectations, and relies on 
agents, especially employers, taking risks that they are predisposed against individually. 
AA fills a coordination gap, which is all the more required for an intervention that 
disrupts norms or biases. Policies also follow trajectories and acquire inertia, producing 
outcomes that can be scrutinized retrospectively. No amount of hindsight, however, 
changes the fact that race-based AA has become institutionalized. Criticism of race-based 
AA highlights negative outcomes and unintended consequences, while proposing 
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alternatives on the basis of beliefs in competitive markets and underlying assumptions. 
Advocates draw out positives and raise possibilities that outcomes could be worse 
without AA. 
Given the absence of such counterfactuals, focusing on the practical matters and 
empirical evidence clearly presents a productive direction for AA research to take. 
Arguments over the existence of race-based AA are less germane and helpful than 
arguments over its design and duration. Designating a population group as beneficiaries, 
in spite of obvious limits and drawbacks, provides a more workable framework for 
attaining its intended purpose at a robust pace and within a time horizon. Class- or need-
based AA is permanent and more costly in terms of public funding, vulnerable to the 
same problems of disparity in aptitude of beneficiaries, and unviable in high-level 
occupations, management and ownership. 
It must be recognized that race-based and class-based policies are more complements 
than substitutes. Class considerations can be integrated into selection procedures within 
the designated race group to reinforce the process of redress. On the paramount issue of 
access, completion and quality of basic schooling, reducing disparities is a precondition 
for both race-based affirmative action and alternate schemes to be effective. Expansion 
and improvement of basic schooling alleviates tensions that arise from preferential 
selection into tertiary education. 
High expectations of change, we have noted, inevitably infuse the inception of any 
AA program, compounded by informational deficits and fundamental uncertainty. The 
lack of cogency in the argument that private markets will self-dismantle negative 
discrimination likely corroborates political pressures for positive discrimination. Amid 
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uncertainty, the most direct route of correcting for racial disparities is by designating 
beneficiaries by race. These constraints must be acknowledged. However, they do not 
necessarily nullify the state’s capacity to manage expectations and set prudent, 
incremental goals, e.g. targeting the increase in representation in select occupations in 
correspondence with the designated group’s proportion of the tertiary educated labor 
force, instead of the national labor force or economically active population. There are 
advantages to race-based affirmative action programs, particularly in education and 
employment, as well as pitfalls. The alternatives are often present solutions inconsistent 
with the problem (specifically, class-based selection to redress race-based inequality) or 
impracticable (class-based criteria for selection into employment or equity ownership). 
Ultimately, however, the goal of ‘deracialization’ demands critical attention toward 
cultivating self-dependency of the designated group and scaling back preferential 
selection in due course. The next section fleshes out these issues. 
 
2. 1. 3. 3. Merit and effort, efficiency and dependency 
 Arguments against affirmative action – in general, and not specifically race-based 
programs – commonly assert that interference with competitive markets vitiates the 
fairness and efficiency of ‘meritocracy’ and ‘equal opportunity’. AA also devalues 
accomplishments of members of the designated group who could have advanced without 
preferential treatment, stigmatizes beneficiaries as a group, creates dependence on the 
state, and alienates members of non-designated groups. These issues pose the heaviest 
challenges to AA formulation and implementation. 
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 One response is to probe the supposed objectivity and adequacy of the notions of 
merit and opportunity. The meaning and parameters of merit arise out of a particular 
social context, and thus are not neutral, and indeed tend to perpetuate a status quo. 
Tierney (2007: 389-390) points out that merit fits with a capitalist conception of justice, 
with its valorization of survival of the ostensibly ablest and repudiation of government 
intervention in general as a threat to capitalism7. Assessment of merit is presumed to be a 
measure of intelligence and individual effort, confirmed by one’s peers through unbiased 
and objective criteria, e.g. standardized tests or national examinations. In reality, however, 
privileges disproportionately enjoyed by particular population groups, such as private 
schooling or extra tuition, can set children on trajectories towards reputed tertiary 
institutions and, in turn, opportunities for accelerated career advancement8. Merit-based 
appraisal, furthermore, is typically individual-centered, omitting the person’s social 
context, and present-looking, being based on past to present attainments, not future 
capacities. The dynamic social objective of equitable representation, however, 
necessitates some consideration of potential for learning.  
Another response maintains that a priori postulates about how AA affects incentives 
are unfounded, thus the subject is ultimately a “subtle and context-dependent empirical 
question” (Fryer and Loury 2005: 154). Holzer and Neumark’s (2000: 514) expansive 
literature survey concludes that evidence of discrimination in racial, gender or other 
                                                 
7 Kristol, Irving. 1978. A capitalist conception of justice. R. T. DeGeorge and J. Pichler (eds.) 
Ethics, Free Enterprise and Public Policy, 57-79. Oxford University Press. 
 
8 In the U.S. context, Tierney (1997) points out that ‘legacy’ enrollment, which improves the 
prospects for children of alumni, but defies meritocracy and disproportionately benefits whites 
who had enjoyed privileged access, through exclusion of other groups, into these institutions. He 
also notes the discrepancy of the general approving tenor towards legacy enrolment against the 
widespread criticism of AA. 
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spheres is sufficient to “rule out a facile conclusion that affirmative action must reduce 
efficiency or performance”. The assessment of how affirmative action impacts on 
beneficiaries’ performance is also in an important sense a subjective matter of attitudes 
and perceptions. Some empirical approaches directly ask persons benefiting from AA to 
self-evaluate their experience. Adam (2000) finds, among a sample of preferentially 
selected black business trainees in South Africa, no sentiment that their advancements 
were devalued and as much motivation to put in effort as qualified participants9.  
The aggregate efficiency effects of affirmative action are, likewise, theoretically 
indeterminate. On the one hand, as it is more often argued, discrimination reduces 
efficiency by admitting or promoting lesser qualified candidates to meet distributional 
targets or quotas. On the other hand, and less often recognized, negative discrimination 
and systemic disadvantage also curtail efficiency by, respectively, denying capable 
candidates opportunities and persistently inhibiting the human development of certain 
groups (Holzer and Neumark 2000). To reiterate a point made in the previous section, 
policy-making at the inception of AA grapples with constraints and risks. Another aspect 
of the process involves balancing the efficiency losses of not accelerating redress through 
AA against the losses due to overly aggressive implementation of programs. 
 The meritocracy critique must be placed in the context of alternatives to race-based 
AA, where lines of causation are, as above, mutual and faint. First, complete absence of 
AA may stimulate individual effort and bring about material gains for some in the 
                                                 
9 Adam’s (2000) finding is based on a survey of black aspiring business executives of a project 
enabling under-qualified managerial students from educationally deprived backgrounds to 
compete for entry into an elite training program at the University of Cape Town. On questions of 
perception of being an AA beneficiary, the vast majority did not consider themselves as passive 
recipients but as having rightly earned a place in the program, and contrary to conventional 
wisdom, did not display different approaches to work compared to participants accepted based on 
formal qualification.  
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disadvantaged group. But disadvantaged and marginalized youth may also perceive 
tertiary education and upward mobility as inaccessible, and be discouraged from 
participating. Second, it is unclear how class-based AA will be more effective in 
motivating excellence. This framework may well create disincentives against raising 
income to remain below eligibility thresholds, since one’s class can be changed, whereas 
one’s race cannot. On the other hand, race-based AA might generate competition within 
the designated group (Weisskopf 2004). AA may become associated with stigmas and 
negative stereotypes towards the competency of beneficiaries. However, this line of 
argument often implies that those stereotypes did not exist in the first place (Tierney 1997: 
188). A less vigorous critique may maintain that AA reinforces pre-existing stigmas or 
stereotypes. Still, whether removing AA will whittle away perceptions of the group is 
uncertain. Persistent absence of a disadvantaged group can reinforce pre-existing 
stereotypes. This is also, ultimately, an empirical question.  
 While avoiding absolutist positions for or against race-based affirmative action, we 
must acknowledge that perennial dependence on state-sponsored intervention can impede, 
even imperil, its fruition. Perpetuation negates the goal of attaining self-reliance and 
economic independence, especially as the case for systemic disadvantage diminishes, i.e. 
as AA succeeds. Dependence on state intervention and a sense of entitlement may 
become entrenched among the beneficiary group. We should note that this problem is not 
confined to racial preference, but can also beset other development programs offering 
some form of protection, which can be broadly subsumed under the infant industry rubric. 
Nonetheless, the defense of preferential policies can conceivably be more intense where 
race is the basis of preference, deriving from the strength and resilience of collective 
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political identity, particularly one associated with past discrimination or exclusion. The 
likelihood that AA turns into a permanent institution, and the lack of a precedent of a 
country removing AA (except perhaps white-favoring Apartheid South Africa), reinforce 
the case for total opposition to the policy. The necessity of eventually removing racial 
preference also serves a sharp caveat to advocates, and to countries that are implementing 
the policy for whom complete and instant elimination of AA are not an option. Relevant 
and productive discourse, therefore, should focus on the possibilities for transitioning 
away from racial preference. 
 The complex ramifications of AA on social cohesion and inter-group sentiments must 
be also be noted here, although these phenomena are manifest less tangibly and their 
scope is multi-dimensional and much broader than this study’s focus. Race-based AA is 
impugned for the ways it alienates members of the non-designated group, especially 
those who are denied entry or promotion to positions offered to less formally qualified 
persons of the designated group. The contentions of the non-designated group 
undoubtedly derive from more complex factors than economic opportunity, such as 
cultural and democratic freedom, personal safety and crime, and governance and 
corruption. Nonetheless, this antipathy toward personal injustice is palpable, and if 
protracted and accumulated may generate social discord.  
 A few perspectives can be briefly outlined. First, the extent to which opportunities 
become limited significantly depends on economic variables outside AA jurisdiction. 
Sluggish economic and employment growth compound the difficulties faced by members 
of non-designated groups; as much or more fault may lie with economic policies or 
fortuitous circumstances. Second, instituting strict meritocracy, typically presented as the 
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solution for both instituting fairness and alleviating the alienation of non-designated 
groups, bears the opportunity costs of perpetuating group disadvantage, perhaps resulting 
in marginalization and alienation of the group designated under AA. In consonance with 
the discussion above, on the issue of feelings of grievance among the non-designated 
group, the trade-off is also not as straightforward as justice and cohesion under 
meritocracy and the diametric opposite under affirmative action. 
 
2. 1. 3. 4. Overall assessment 
 Affirmative action intervenes in societies bearing historical injustices, systemic 
disparities and socio-political schisms between racial groups. Its objectives are as 
difficult as the conditions it seeks to redress are seemingly intractable. These 
contradictions cannot be denied nor avoided: positive discrimination to eliminate past 
discrimination or present disadvantage, designating beneficiaries by race towards the goal 
of attenuating the role of race in educational and occupational advancement, instituting 
preferential treatment to attain equal opportunity. Any assessment must take cognizance 
of the complexities of both the problems and the solutions.  
 Our overview of contentious issues in affirmative action finds theoretical 
indeterminacy and context specificity in policy prescriptions. Whether competitive 
markets or state intervention can dismantle discrimination and overcome systemic 
disadvantage both depend on ancillary conditions. Market solutions hinge on rapid 
educational advancement among the disadvantaged group and marked shifts in attitudes 
and perceptions of towards them by institutions and employers. However, market 
tendencies to maintain norms – including assumptions about the objectivity and veracity 
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of merit assessments – and to avoid risk and coordination, while not necessarily 
precluding racial redress, are likely to militate against substantial and robust progress. 
State intervention fills in the coordination gap and engenders institutional change, not just 
behavioral change. But it must then mitigate tendencies for racial preference to proceed 
unsustainably, with inadequate attention to the amount and suitability of supply of 
participants, and to become entrenched indefinitely. 
The importance of the historical context in which affirmative action is instituted must 
be reiterated. AA arises out of socio-political pressures amidst expectations of change 
and uncertainties, factors which research must acknowledge and appreciate. The 
conjuncture of these conditions gravitates the framework towards designating 
beneficiaries along the same lines in which previous discrimination or exclusion was 
manifest, chiefly race, also gender and caste.  
Equal opportunity and class-based AA constitute the two basic alternatives; both lack 
theoretical and empirical cogency. Solutions deriving from belief in the self-demise of 
discrimination in competitive markets hinge on key underlying assumptions, especially 
regarding equal access to development and zero barriers to entry. Historical experience of 
racially divided societies demonstrates these to be false (disparities in development 
between population groups persist) or partial (informal barriers to entry can prevail, even 
if formal or legal discrimination is prohibited). A system of class-based AA would 
benefit the disadvantaged group since they are over-represented among the socio-
economically needy. However, in encompassing income-based redistribution in general, 
this scheme obfuscates the objective of AA – i.e. to redress under-representation – and 
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proposes a set of policies that will be as permanent as the incidence of income inequality, 
that is, more permanent than race-based AA.  
We submit that anti-discrimination legislation and class-based redistribution should 
be complementary, not adversarial, to race-based affirmative action, and in concert all 
should pursue the most effective and opportune means of redressing systemic 
disadvantage over a bounded time horizon. Race-based AA offers direct and more 
effective means for facilitating the progress of a disadvantaged group into socially 
esteemed and economically influential positions. This will involve some inter-
generational social mobility, but will also allow for selection of candidates who would 
not be considered under-privileged, who originate from middle-class households. To the 
extent prudent and possible, programs can incorporate progressive elements that, within 
the designated group, prioritize socio-economic criteria. 
 Of course, affirmative action has its pitfalls. The issues surrounding AA, in terms of 
its argued effects on vitiating meritocracy, attenuating effort of beneficiaries and 
generating dependency on state assistance are more nuanced than the criticisms often 
present. As discussed above, meritocracy and assessment of merit are questionable 
regarding their objectivity and propensity to preserve a status quo. Thus, absolute 
deference to norms and standard meters of merit for allocating opportunities is 
problematic from a social standpoint.  
Ascribing preference to disadvantaged groups, however, may curtail the effort exerted 
by beneficiaries and entrench dependency on state assistance. Although these problems 
are not confined to race-based AA, they are plausibly more severe than they would be 
under the alternatives, principally class-based AA. Even more severe is the issue of elite 
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‘capture’ – the manipulation of policy, especially regarding wealth ownership, for the 
express enrichment of a politically connected business class. We should note that 
inequality and corruption could conceivably increase, and middle classes and elites 
consolidate their position, in the absence of affirmative action. Nevertheless, these pitfalls 
of AA underscore the need for judiciously formulated and vigorously implemented 
affirmative action that, like infant industry programs, avert rentier behavior and 
decisively transition away from protectionist and preferential elements.  
 Other ramifications of affirmative action, specifically the stigmatization of 
beneficiaries and alienation of non-beneficiaries are real and present, but pertain more to 
the implementation than the institution of policies, and are primarily empirical matters. 
Disadvantaged groups may be stigmatized for receiving preferential treatment, or if their 
presence in esteemed and empowered positions is continually low. Alienation of non-
beneficiaries correlates partly with the efficacy and duration of preferential policies that 
disfavor them, but this must be weighed against the possible sense of deprivation that a 
disadvantaged group may experience without specific programs that compel and 
coordinate their upward mobility.  
 All in all, then, it is more pertinent to ask how race-based affirmative action can be 
made more effective rather than whether it should exist, and more productive to consider 
incremental instead of instantaneous elimination of policies, especially in Malaysia and 
South Africa where the political imperative is overwhelming. Avoiding the polemics and 
absolutist positions on merit versus preference, the important questions revolve around 
safeguards that benefits are distributed equitably within the designated group, with a 
balance of allocation based on present qualification and on potential learning. It is 
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prudent to limit the scope and duration of AA, placing more emphasis on education and 
employment and less on procurement and wealth, and to be open to targets and quotas not 
necessarily equating with strict proportionality.  
 
2. 1. 4. Empirical approaches to affirmative action  
The indeterminacy of theories underlying affirmative action and the context-
specificity of policies underscore the gravity of researching affirmative action outcomes. 
Some brief notes on empirical approaches are in order. As with the variety of definitions 
of AA, we also find a broad range of techniques, focal points and methods. This body of 
literature broadly falls into two categories: individual-based case studies and country-
level analyses. The scope of case studies is as narrow or wide as their subjects. A section 
of the literature refers to whether legal cases (Beckwith and Jones 1997, Cahn 2002, 
Curry 1996), others to university admissions (where sample sizes vary, e.g. Bowen and 
Bok 1998, whose analysis applies to elite colleges), hiring practices and contracting (also 
dependent on sample size, as surveyed in Bergmann 1996 and Holzer and Neumark 
2000). Much of this research, at least the portion falling under the heading of affirmative 
action, has focused on sectors or localities within the United States. The case study 
method more deeply analyzes individual beneficiaries than assessments at the national 
level, but is of limited applicability to this study, since such data are unavailable in 
Malaysia and South Africa.  
 Country-level studies are more relevant on the rudimentary criterion of the unit of 
analysis, but are fraught with other data problems and questions of comparability. 
Firsthand surveys with national representation are virtually impossible, hence we must 
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rely either on compiling secondary research or referring to official datasets, or both. 
Weisskopf (2004) conducts a notably original and systematic benefit-cost of AA in 
university admissions in the U.S. and India, on a range of socio-economic criteria and 
based on a synthesis of existing literature. The strength of this analysis is that the broader, 
qualitative – and sometimes intangible – goals of AA, such as learning environments, 
sense of group dignity, and race relations – are accounted for in some way. However, the 
feasibility of Weisskopf’s (2004) approach is contingent on availability of the types of 
studies he refers to, which are non-existent in Malaysia and sparse in South Africa. We 
therefore draw on empirical studies of our two countries as reference points, instead of 
any existing cross-country research. 
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2. 2. Imperative, content and context of affirmative action: Malaysia  
Malaysia’s affirmative action must be situated in historical context, to understand 
their imperatives and design, their attainments and shortfalls. The programs that have 
transformed the economy were promulgated from 1971, but to gain an appreciation of the 
forms of systemic disadvantaged faced by the majority race group, we need to elucidate 
the conditions from the start, and how those conditions demanded an extensive and 
intensive regime of AA. Policies were also formulated in a particular socio-political 
milieu – specifically, the centralization of state control and consolidation of executive 
power, in the wake of social upheaval – which partly account for the ways Malaysia has 
pursued affirmative action.  
 
2. 2. 1. Systemic disadvantage and affirmative action imperatives 
Legal foundations for preferential measures were embedded in the Federal 
Constitution, which enshrines both the principle of equality and provisions for the special 
position of Malay/Bumiputera10. Individual equality and prohibition of discrimination is 
set out in Article 8, with a proviso: “[e]xcept as expressly authorized by this 
Constitution” (See Appendix 1). Article 153 grants specific authorization, in making 
provision for the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (the national king) to “exercise his functions… 
in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the special position of the Malays and 
natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak [i.e. non-Malay Bumiputera] and the 
legitimate interests of other communities”, through reserving places for the designated 
group in public sector employment, scholarships, training programs, and licenses. 
                                                 
10 Malays were the majority group in Malaya (Peninsular Malaysia) from Independence in 1957.  
Bumiputera, or “sons of the soil”, include indigenous groups from Sabah and Sarawak, which 
joined the Peninsula to form Malaysia in 1963. 
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Bumiputera “special position” has become deeply entrenched in Malaysian politics and 
policies, and warrants an overview of the socio-economic fractures and dimensions of 
systemic disadvantage out of which it was negotiated. 
 When Malaya’s independent era commenced in 1957, its constituent race groups did 
not enter on equal footing. Fractures had formed through British colonial rule and 
migration processes in which foreign interests dominated the ownership of resources and 
capital, while Malays, Chinese and Indians, by and large, lived and worked in separate 
geographic and economic spheres. European, particularly British, interests held a massive 
portion of Malaya’s rich primary commodity production, which centered on rubber 
plantations and tin resources11. Across the Peninsula, the vast majority of the Malay 
population lived in rural settings, engaged in rice cultivation – generally on a subsistence 
level. They also constituted a large portion of the bureaucracy, police and security 
services. The Malay community was mostly stratified by its traditional hierarchical 
structure, comprising an aristocratic elite above an expanding administrative corps, 
followed by a vast agrarian peasantry mostly detached from wage labor markets and 
private capital. The Chinese population was highly urbanized, supplying a large share of 
labor and establishing enterprises in tin mines, plantations, and factories, and gaining a 
foothold in distribution and retail of goods. The community comprised of a substantial 
working class and a nascent capitalist class, with clan-based networks providing financial 
resources. The Indian population was most conspicuous in two areas: laborers on rubber 
plantations and lower-rung administrators in government services. They would be 
distributed more evenly between rural and urban economies, but in both spheres had not 
                                                 
11 Khoo (2005: 11) conveys Puthucheary’s (1964) finding that Europeans controlled over 84 
percent of large rubber estates and 60 percent of tin output, and accounted for about 70 percent of 
exports and 60 percent of imports. 
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managed to advance beyond wage labor (Andaya and Andaya 2001, Gomez and Jomo 
1999). 
 This social structure, outlined in Table 2-1, is aptly described as an ethnic division of 
labor, in which groups were preponderantly and persistently confined to particular 
occupations and industries (Khoo 2005). This division of labor, and parallel rural-urban 
gaps, were reinforced by disparities in educational opportunities and access to credit. 
Educational institutions were fragmented, again, by race and socio-political factors, and 
not integrated into a broader system for facilitating social interaction and coordinating 
curricular content. The common standards of formal education were low, which 
magnified the advantage to those with access to the minority of institutions offering 
superior instruction and reputation. More urbanized states demonstrated higher literacy 
rates, reflecting the educational advantages available to residents of towns and cities, 
which were largely Chinese populated, although they were also more racially mixed than 
rural communities (Leete 2007: 178-179)12. The Malay masses were overwhelmingly 
excluded from these developments, except for the privileged or exceptional few who 
enjoyed access to elite schools, scholarships and civil service appointments. Indians on 
plantations were excluded on the grounds that plantations were classified as private 
property; hence, the educational and health needs of its workers fell outside of the state’s 
jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
12 In 1957, literacy rates in Northern Peninsular, Malay-dominant states and East Malaysia 
(Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis, Sabah, Sarawak) fell below the national average of 50 
percent, while the West coast and central Peninsula states recorded notably higher literacy rates 
(Leete 2007: 199). 
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Table 2-1. Peninsular Malaysia: Racial distribution of labor force with industries, 
1957. 
 Malay Chinese Indian Others 
Rice cultivation 95.8 2.4 0.0 1.2 
Rubber cultivation 42.4 32.6 24.5 0.5 
Mining and quarrying 17.7 68.3 11.6 2.4 
Manufacturing 19.7 72.2 7.4 0.7 
Commerce 16.4 65.1 16.8 1.7 
Government services 52.4 15.4 26.3 5.9 
Police, home guard and prisons 83.2 9.6 4.4 2.8 
Armed forces 76.8 8.8 8.4 6.0 
Source: Khoo 2005. 
 
 
 The Malaysian government, a coalition of race-based parties representing Malays, 
Chinese and Indians, recognized the problem of racial fragmentation by location and 
economic activity, but settled on a compromise that did little to fundamentally alter the 
configuration. Political power was vested in the aristocracy-led Malay majority while 
Chinese business was granted freedom to operate without distributive obligations, and 
cultural institutions were sustained (Jesudason 1989, Gomez and Jomo 1999, Leete 2007). 
Economic policy from 1957 to 1969 was characterized by a laissez faire dispensation.  
 Programs and expenditures were put in place to alleviate rural poverty, reduce urban-
rural disparities and bridge inter-racial inequalities, but no broad strategy for overcoming 
systemic disadvantages was laid out and no specific targets were set (Thillainathan 1976: 
72). The regime did little to address the continuing dominance of foreign interests or to 
foster Chinese-Malay economic cooperation (Jesudason 1989).  Schooling continued to be 
fragmented, as it was under colonial rule. The British provided a tiered system to Malays, 
while Chinese and Indians were permitted to establish vernacular schools and missionary 
organizations ran schools with instruction in English. English-medium schools equipped 
 47 
leavers for formal employment operating in English, but few Malays attended such 
institutions, for locational or cultural reasons (Pong 1993: 246).  
 Some preferential policies were implemented in public sector employment and post-
secondary education, notably scholarships. The racial composition of federal and state 
governments in 1969 was 64.5 percent Malay, 18.4 percent Chinese, 15.7 percent Indian, 
1.5 percent other categories. At the top rung (Division 1), the estimated proportion of 
Malays rose from 14.1 percent in 1957 to 39.3 percent in 1970. However, in the elite 
Malayan civil service, the proportion of Malays rose from 34.6 percent in 1957 to 86.6 
percent in 1970. The number of public enterprises increased from 22 in 1960 to 109 in 
1970 (Khoo 2005: 18, 30). However, on a national scale, the impact of affirmative action 
was limited. The public sector comprised 11.9 percent of the working population in 1970, 
and exerted a modest impact on the overall racial employment profile, although it 
presumably bolstered the proportion of Malays among professionals and technicians.  
 The lack of progress in redressing racial disparities and systemic disadvantages, and 
in raising incomes on the whole, are reflected in urbanization and poverty rates. Table 2-2 
shows, between 1957 and 1970, small gains in poverty reduction for all groups – even an 
increase in absolute poverty among Indians – and only slight changes in the vastly 
different constitution of urban and rural populations. In sum, as Khoo (2005: 24) puts it, 
“laissez faire capitalism could not resolve the destabilizing contradictions of an ethnic 
division of labor”, which remained markedly drawn in 1970 (Table 2-3). Most crucially, 
development policies had done little to facilitate entry of the vast majority of Malays into 
the modern, urban economy. However, while it is generally accepted that distributive 
issues were insufficiently addressed, the Malaysian government faced some major 
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constraints. Among the many issues government had to confront was a communist 
insurgency and confrontation with Indonesia, for which British forces aided. Thus, it was 
hard to intervene with British commercial interest (Jesudason 1989: 52-53). In the 
education system, immense policy emphasis had to be placed on the more basic issues of 
unifying a disjointed schooling system, providing rudimentary schooling and reducing 
drop-out rates (Leete 2007: 188). Narrowing disparities in access to and quality of 
secondary schooling were in these contexts less urgent. 
 
Table 2-2. Peninsular Malaysia: Composition of population and poverty, by 
race and area, 1957 and 1970 
  1957 1970 
Racial composition of total population  
 Malay 49.8 53.1 
 Chinese 37.2 35.4 
 Indian 11.3 10.5 
Racial composition of urban population  
 Malay 22.6 27.6 
 Chinese 63.9 60.0 
 Indian 10.7 11.3 
Poverty rate  
 Malay 70.5 64.8 
 Chinese 27.4 26.0 
 Indian 35.7 39.2 
 All races 51.2 49.3 
Sources: Khoo 2005 and Leete 2007. 
  
 
Table 2-3. Malaysia: Racial composition of occupation groups, 1970 
 Malay Chinese Indian 
Administrative and managerial 22.4 65.7 7.5 
Professional and technical 47.2 37.7 12.7 
Clerical 33.4 51.0 14.3 
Sales 23.9 64.7 11.0 
Services 42.9 42.5 13.4 
Agriculture 68.7 20.8 9.6 
Machine operation and elementary 31.3 59.9 8.6 
Overall 51.4 37.0 10.7 
Source: Third Malaysia Plan, cited in Jesudason 1989, p. 68. 
Note: rows do not sum to 100 due to exclusion of other groups. 
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 Disaffection had grown in the 1960s within the Malay community towards the lack of 
material progress, continued small landholdings and indebtedness, and abuse of programs 
for the poor to enrich wealthy Malays (Gomez and Jomo 1999, Andaya and Andaya 
2001). Inter-racial conflict was more manifest in urban areas, where Malays saw gaps 
between themselves and Chinese that fuelled a sense of exclusion. Pressures for state 
support and proactive measures to develop a Malay business class grew in the 1960s. 
Administrative elites had cultivated close ties between government and a nascent 
capitalist class, as many moved from one sphere to the other or secured a footing in both 
spheres (Jesudason 1989: 51-52, 65-68). The mid-1960s witnessed the first budget for 
Malay business development in the First Malaysia Plan (1965-70), and the establishment 
of Bank Bumiputera in 1965, MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat, or the Council of Trust for 
the People) in 1966, and other development agencies entrusted to fund or train Malay 
commerce and industry. Thus, on the whole, affirmative action measures expanded from 
the mid-1960s.  
 However, income diverging trends persisted through the decade. Inequality increased 
on a national scale, between racial groups and within racial groups, and deepening 
sentiments toward the failures of economic and social policies to uplift Malays made for 
a volatile political setting13. Indeed, a political cataclysm compelled a shift of the policy 
regime onto a drastically different path. The 1969 general elections, in which the ruling 
coalition suffered losses and the opposition made gains – largely on the back of Chinese 
votes – created a volatile standoff between ascendant Chinese political power and a 
                                                 
13 From 1957 to 1970, the income share of the top 5 percent of households increased considerably. 
Inter-racial disparity grew as well, with the Chinese: Malay household income ratio increasing 
from 1.89 in 1957 to 2.47 in 1967, and the Indian: Malay household income ratio also rising over 
the same period, from 1.51 to 1.95 (Anand 1983). 
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backlash from the Malay establishment. On both sides, a sense of trespass escalated, with 
Malays wary of increased penetration of non-Malay opposition into the political domain, 
while non-Malays, especially Chinese, reacted against measures perceived to constrict 
their cultural and commercial space.  
 The May 13th riots momentously shook, then reinforced, coalition government and 
overhauled the policy regime. Galvanized by the May 13th tragedy, a top-down approach 
and centralized executive control set a precedent for Malaysia’s mode of governance (Ho 
1992). Politics and policy were infused with a reassertion of Malay dominance and pro-
Malay policies, galvanized around a doctrine, somewhat legitimated by the ongoing crisis, 
that extensive and intensive state intervention would be necessary. Policy discourses were 
embroiled in a contestation over a new framework, broadly between a pro-market and 
growth-focused strategy and an intensive state-led expansionist and distributive agenda, 
the latter of which prevailed (Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman 1990). 
 
2. 2. 2. Affirmative action policies and programs 
Malaysia’s affirmative action program burgeoned in scale and scope with the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1971. The NEP itself was more 
of a political vision statement than a comprehensive set of policies14. It outlined general 
ideas and objectives towards alleviating poverty and generating growth, and increasing 
Bumiputera education, labor market participation and ownership, but more specific 
interventions would unfold over the subsequent years through specific programs, 
executive decisions and legislations. The NEP term has come to designate and connote 
                                                 
14 Author’s interview with Khoo Boo Teik, August 15, 2007. 
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various things. A very brief overview of its basic tenets is therefore warranted at this 
juncture, followed by discussion of specific affirmative action programs within its rubric.  
The NEP projected two over-riding objectives: first, the eradication of poverty 
irrespective of race; second, the restructuring of society to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function (Table 2-3). The Second 
Malaysia Plan fleshed out the agenda in slightly more detail: 
“The Plan outlines policies and programmes to modernize rural life, encourage a rapid 
and balanced growth of urban activities, provide improved education and training 
programmes at all levels, and above all, ensure the creation of a Malay commercial and 
industrial community in all categories and at all levels of operation, in order that 
within one generation Malays and other indigenous people [i.e. Bumiputera] can be 
full partners in the economic life of the nation” (Malaysia 1971: 6). 
The NEP was commissioned to tackle various dimensions of poverty and disparity, much 
of which lies beyond the scope of affirmative action. Hence, it is important to recognize 
the NEP as supplying the mandate and impetus for race-based redistribution, but not to 
equate it with affirmative action. 
 
2. 2. 2. 1. Representation in education 
 Under the NEP, the agenda of educational reform was substantially carried by newly 
created institutions and backed by generous increases in public expenditure15. A 
signification portion of these expenditures did not operate on a race preferential basis, 
and by conception was progressive in the designation of children of rural and poor 
                                                 
15 Annual per capita public education expenditure, which had increased from RM30 in 1961 to 
RM50 in 1970, burgeoned to RM206 in 1980 and RM356 in 1990 (Leete 2007: 181). 
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households as the principal beneficiaries. However, Bumiputera witnessed the highest 
gains in schooling attainment after 1971. Pong (1993) found, by comparing successive 
cohorts spanning pre-NEP and post-NEP periods, that secondary school completion was 
increasingly associated with race, after controlling for other socio-economic 
characteristics16. 
 Direct affirmative action policies in education created new school-level institutions 
for Bumiputera, and quota systems and scholarship programs for university enrollment. 
Although overall enrollment in university was not far off the racial profile of the country 
as a whole, the under-representation of Malays in scientific and technical fields was acute, 
which was attributed in large part to deficiencies in available teachers and facilities in 
rural schools17. This shortfall was compounded by the labor requirements of 
industrialization. From the mid-1970s, ‘manpower planning’ – in particular, cultivation 
of science and engineering graduates – began to be prioritized in education policy (Lee 
1994). To fill the gap, the Ministry of Education established exclusively Bumiputera 
residential science colleges. MARA also set up junior residential colleges primarily for 
pupils in rural and underprivileged areas. These institutes, which youth entered after six 
or nine years schooling, enjoyed higher standards of teaching and facilities, especially in 
                                                 
16 Pong (1993) finds that, controlling for parents’ education, occupation and earnings, being 
Malay increased the probability of attaining secondary school education over successive cohorts, 
with marked difference between those of school-going age when the NEP came into effect and 
those who attended school before the NEP. These results are interpreted as suggesting that the 
gains of public expenditure were disproportionately captured by Malay families. However, the 
model does not control for urban/rural location and state, which bear correlations with race. 
 
17 In 1970, the University of Malaya was the only university in Malaysia. In science subjects, 
Malay graduates numbered 22 out of a total 493 in science, 1 out of 67 in medicine, 1 per 71 in 
engineering, 15 per 49 in agriculture (Selvaratnam 1988: 180). 
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science classes (Leete 2007: 189)18. Bumiputera-exclusive matriculation programs have 
also been established to provide an alternate route to university entrance bypassing 
national schools and the national higher school certificate examination. 
At the tertiary level, new public universities were founded and a centralized 
government unit was created to process applications and implement enrolment quotas19. 
The racial distribution of university bear out the effect of this policy: in 1970, the student 
population comprised of 40.2 percent Bumiputera, 48.9 percent Chinese and 7.3 percent 
Indian. By 1985, campuses had been recomposed to 63.0 percent Bumiputera, 29.7 
percent Chinese and 6.5 percent Indian, with variations across universities (Khoo 2005: 
21)20. Notwithstanding this expansion, tertiary enrollment still did not keep up with 
increasing supply of secondary school leavers. Whereas in the early 1970s about half of 
applicants were offered place in university, by the mid-1980s this proportion had dropped 
to a fifth.  
Overseas and private education has eased some of the social pressures of insufficient 
spaces in public tertiary institutes. Many non-Bumiputera who didn’t secure a place in 
local universities opted to pursue higher education abroad or settle for local non-degree 
                                                 
18 Between 1970 and 1990, MARA allocated RM700 million – 67 percent of its total budget – for 
educational purposes (Faridah 2003). By 1987, enrollment in the Education Ministry’s residential 
colleges touched over 17,000, while the 390 MARA junior science colleges had 15,000 students 
(Selvaratnam 1988: 185). 
 
19 Exact quotas were usually not publicly disclosed, but it was reported in the early 2000s that 
universities observed a Bumiputera: non-Bumiputera quota of 55:45 (Faridah 2003). 
 
20 The proportion of Bumiputera at universities established after 1971, such the National 
University (73.0 percent), Agricultural University (81.0 percent) and Technological University 
(76.0 percent), in addition to the exclusively Bumiputera MARA Institute of Technology, 
undertook to absorb the increasing supply of post-secondary students. Other tertiary institutes, 
however, registered higher proportions of non-Bumiputera enrollment, such University of Malaya 
(37.7 percent Chinese), Science University (35.0 percent Chinese, 55.8 percent Bumiputera) and 
the privately owned TAR College (97.9 percent Chinese). 
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programs. In 1985, there were more Chinese enrolled in tertiary institutions overseas than 
in Malaysia21. Private tertiary education grew from the 1980s, when a number of colleges 
were founded, in affiliation with foreign universities or accreditation bodies, to provide 
pre-university level diploma or ‘twinning’ programs from which students could continue 
towards obtaining a degree from a foreign university. The Private Higher Education Act 
of 1996, which permitted domestic private for-profit degree-granting universities, 
induced a proliferation of tertiary education institutions from the mid-1990s22. The 
growth in private higher education is a crucial development parallel to Malaysia’s 
affirmative action regime. Private higher education caters mostly to non-Bumiputera, and 
alleviates tensions arising from quota-based constraints (Brown 2007, Sato 2005). 
 The residential school and university scholarship programs undoubtedly provided 
educational access to many Bumiputera who otherwise would not have the opportunity. 
However, the allocation of opportunities has not operated within any formal framework 
that balances capability and equity as selection criteria. Research on family backgrounds 
of Bumiputera scholarship recipients is sparse. Malaysia’s five-year plans, while 
providing official accounts of progress in occupational, income and wealth inequality, 
have omitted the class distribution of affirmative action benefits, particularly in access to 
education. One widely cited study found the allocation to follow a regressive pattern. 
Mehmet and Yip’s (1985) survey of a graduating cohort of 1983 finds the distribution 
skewed towards children of high income families in general, but most markedly among 
                                                 
21 Faridah (2003: 166) reports that in 1985, out of 22,684 students studying overseas, 73.4 percent 
were non-Bumiputera who failed to gain admission to local public universities or who were 
offered places in programs not of their choice. 
 
22 The proportion of tertiary students (degree, diploma and certificate) enrolled in overseas 
institutions declined from 40.2 percent in 1985 to 13.8 percent in 1995, while the share of local 
private institutions increased from 8.9 percent in 1985 to 34.7 percent in 1995 (Wan 2007: 4).  
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Malay scholars23. This is broadly in line with a report that in the mid-1970s, 63 percent of 
students in MARA junior science colleges were found to belong to urban middle class 
households (Selvaratnam 1988: 191). Ball and Razmi’s (2005) survey of Bumiputera 
scholars studying abroad in the late 1990s, on the other hand, observes that the proportion 
whose fathers only attained primary schooling was 58 percent, signifying a more 
progressive distribution. However, while this study is more recent, drawbacks in its 
sampling warrant circumspection toward its findings24. 
In recent years, scholarship programs, both for Malaysians and exclusively for 
Bumiputera, have become somewhat more transparent in their operations. For instance, it 
was revealed that a quota has been implemented in awarding Public Service Department 
scholarships, which was formally raised from 10 percent non-Bumiputera to 45 percent 
non-Bumiputera around 200025. However, reports found that from 2000 to 2007 the 
proportion of scholars who are non-Bumiputera averaged 15 percent at overseas 
institutions and 20-25 percent in local institutions. Overall, the distribution of 
                                                 
23 Mehmet and Yip (1985) sample 45 percent of the graduating class in Malaysia’s five 
universities in 1983, out of which the number who were on scholarships is a sizable 1,244. They 
find that in the national population, 49.4 percent of households had income below RM300, but 
only 12.3 percent of scholars in their sample came from families in that bottom income bracket. 
Among Malays, 63.2 percent of households had that level of income, while 14.2 percent of 
scholars were from those households. At the upper end – income above RM1,000 – the national 
proportion was 10.3 percent compared to the share of scholarships, which registered 25.5 percent. 
Within the Malay community, this top income range constituted 4.9 percent of families, but 22.9 
percent of scholars’ families. 
 
24 Ball and Razmi (2005) sample Bumiputera studying under government scholarship in overseas 
universities and Bumiputera students in the same set of academic disciplines in local universities, 
within a three year range in late 1990s. They receive a small sample of 385 respondents who 
returned the questionnaire by mail. 
 
25 In 2000, a quota of 10 percent non-Bumiputera enrollment was also introduced in the 40 
MARA junior science colleges. The proportion of non-Bumiputera in these colleges was 10.5 
percent in 2008 (The Star, May 15, 2008). 
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scholarships continues to be an aspect of affirmative action characterized by lack of 
clarity and coherence. 
 
2. 2. 2. 2. Representation in upper-level occupations 
 The restructuring of labor markets in Malaysia abided by a mandate that 
“employment patterns at all levels and in all sectors… must reflect the racial composition 
of the population” (Malaysia 1971: 42). The main affirmative action interventions in this 
regard comprised predominantly of public sector employment, and sporadic regulation of 
the private sector. Although the general objective was a racially representative workforce, 
there was no specified timeline for incrementally achieving that target, nor a systematic 
approach to increasing Malay penetration into the higher occupational levels. Indeed, 
employment practices in government and requirements imposed on the private sector 
operated largely without codified regulations and monitoring mechanisms.  
 Government and statutory bodies served to absorb Malay urbanization and entry into 
formal wage employment. As noted above, prior to the NEP, measures were already in 
place to maintain a high Malay presence in the public sector26. Malays comprised 62.5 
percent of civil servants in 1970 (Malaysia 1971: 38). Under the NEP, the government 
augmented the public sector, especially from the 1970s until the early-1980s,27 and 
further increased the Bumiputera share, which have been recently reported at 76.9 percent 
                                                 
26 In the elite Diplomatic and Administrative Service corps, a 4 to 1 ratio of Malay to non-Malay 
quota was introduced in 1953 (CPPS 2006a: 5). Zainal (1994: 612) maintains that the main 
instrument for increasing Bumiputera participation was through hiring quotas. 
 
27 Between 1970 and 1981, public sector employment grew by 6.0 percent per year, above the 
total employment rate of 3.8 percent per year. Correspondingly, the share of the public sector in 
total employment rose from 11.9 percent in 1970 to 15.0 percent in 1981 (Author’s calculations 
from Rasiah and Ishak 2001).  
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in 1999 (Khoo 2005: 19) and 84.8 percent in 2005 (MCA 2006: 4). Among Division 1 
officers, the proportion of Malays rose from 39.3 percent in 1970 to close to 65.0 percent 
in 1987 (the latter figure includes non-Malay Bumiputera). Public sector employment is a 
natural extension of the university scholarship program. Mehmet and Yip’s (1985) survey 
of graduating scholars in the early 1980s found that 86.2 percent for Malays, compared to 
61.9 percent of Chinese and Indians, worked for government and statutory bodies.  
 Preferential employment policies, although targeting a representative public sector, 
tended to self-generate inertia in gravitating toward higher Bumiputera representation. 
Increasing Bumiputera employment in some governmental bodies, especially non-
administrative statutory bodies, also transpired in the absence of specific policies. For 
example, the state did not mandate preferential hiring of academic staff or the racial 
composition of university staff. Nevertheless, the application of quotas to enrolment 
exerted a demonstration effect of sorts on the hiring process28.  
 The remarkable entry rate of Bumiputera into occupations within the NEP’s original 
timeframe of 1971-90, especially in occupations broadly classified as professional, can be 
considerably attributed to public sector employment policies. The proportion of 
Bumiputera among professionals and technicians increased from 47.2 percent in 1970 to 
62.2 percent in 1990. Progress since then, however, has slowed – a point we explore 
further in Chapters 3 and 4.  
The Industrial Coordination Act, passed in 1975, was preponderantly a measure to 
enforce equity redistribution, but it also required manufacturing establishments to align 
their workforce in accordance with the proportionality principle. Workers’ ranks, it turns 
out, were easily filled, especially with young Malay women from villages who flocked to 
                                                 
28 Author’s interview with Maznah Mohamed, August 24, 2007. 
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electronics and textile and clothing factories. Compliance at managerial levels was harder 
to effect, although employment aspects of the ICA were more strictly enforced before the 
late 1980s, through submission of Employees Provident Fund (EPF) files to ensure that 
the reported personnel were being paid, and hence likely to be tasked with meaningful 
work29. Overall, it is likely that the effect of the ICA in terms of increasing Malay 
representation was limited and concentrated in non-technical responsibilities such as 
personnel management30.  
In the past two decades, little emphasis has been placed on the racial composition of 
Malaysians within firms31. There is no general legislation of employment practices in 
non-manufacturing sectors, although some strive for racial diversity in a selective manner, 
whether for reasons of strategy or licensing requirements. For example, the tellers and 
service workers of most banks are mixed, although management tends to identify racially 
with the banks’ owners32. Recently, regulations were proposed for publicly listed 
companies to disclose corporate social responsibility activities, including ethnic diversity 
of workforce, but no rewards or consequences for compliance were enunciated33. 
                                                 
29 Author’s interview with senior industry source, September 5, 2007.  
 
30 Openings for Bumiputera in management and professional in oversight of assembly operations 
is also constrained by the flat organizational structure of factories, which offer few management 
or supervisory positions for a given workforce (Author’s interview with Sulaiman Mahbob, 
Director-General of the Economic Planning Unit, September 11, 2007). 
 
31 Malaysia’s institutional framework governing labor markets provides few instruments for 
enforcing employment quotas, with the possible exception of non-renewal of licenses (Author’s 
interview with Tuan Haji Shamsuddin Bardan, Executive Director of the Malaysian Employers 
Federation, September 5, 2007). 
 
32 Author’s interview with National Union of Banking Employees (NUBE) officials, September 
19, 2007. 
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2. 2. 2. 3. Equity and property ownership 
Equity ownership has been the highest prioritized of the NEP’s objectives and the 
area of starkest Bumiputera under-representation34. This study’s focus on education and 
employment outcomes, however, excludes empirical consideration of inequality in 
ownership of equity, and wealth more generally. Nevertheless, this study cannot proceed 
without some discussion of this subject, given its preponderance in economic policy, as 
well as its interwoven relationship with racial representation in management. Efforts to 
secure controlling stakes play a significant part in accompanying, or preceding, the 
appointment of people of designated groups to managerial positions.  
Malaysia underwent various phases in the project of increasing Malay equity holdings. 
Progress on this front was slow at the inception of the NEP, and front the mid-1970s 
pressures mounted for the state to intervene more forcefully in the transfer of assets. The 
Industrial Coordination Act was passed in 1975 under the banner of organizing the 
industrial sector by requiring firms to obtain manufacturing licenses, but its underlying 
objective was to mandate the transfer of equity. Firms above a certain threshold in 
capitalization and/or workforce – a benchmark that has over time been renegotiated to 
exclude small and medium enterprises – had to obtain a manufacturing license, 
conditional on allocating at least 30 percent of shares to Bumiputera individuals at prices 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 The 2007 and 2008 Federal Budgets, respectively, proposed and reiterated a requirement to 
“disclose their employment composition by race and gender, as well as programmes undertaken 
to develop domestic and Bumiputera vendors.” 
 
34 Share capital ownership in 1970 (at par value; excluding holdings of government agencies and 
nominee companies), according to race and citizenship, was 1.9 percent Malay, 22.5 percent 
Chinese, 1.0 percent Indian, and 60.7 percent foreign. In the all-important agricultural sector, 
Malays owned 0.9 percent, Chinese 22.4 percent, Indian 0.1 percent and foreigners 75.3 percent; 
and similarly in mining, the distribution was 0.7 percent Malay, 16.8 percent Chinese, 0.4 percent 
Indian, and 72.4 percent foreign (Gomez and Jomo 1999: 20). 
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approved by government authorities. Export-oriented (more than 80 percent of output 
exported) firms were exempted.  
The government also moved aggressively in acquiring stakes, directly or through 
agencies, in the form of institutional representation of Bumiputera interest. State-operated 
Bumiputera trust funds were also set up from the late 1970s, selling units and 
substantially investing in areas of national priority. Such trust funds have attracted broad 
participation, but the distribution of ownership of trust fund units has consistently been 
highly skewed35. One condition of Malaysia’s political economy that worked rather 
fortuitously to its advantage was the large presence of foreign firms, particularly in the 
then lucrative and resource-based fields of mining and plantations. State investment funds 
played a key role in taking over these hitherto foreign establishments. From the late 
1980s, privatization proceeded rapidly and voluminously, under various arrangements 
such as public listing or build-operate-transfer contracts (Gomez and Jomo 1999). More 
generally, initial public offerings mandate setting aside 30 percent for Bumiputera at a 
discount.  
 
2. 2. 2. 4. Managerial and enterprise development 
 This branch of affirmative action overlaps with employment programs aiming to 
increase Bumiputera representation in management, but focuses on the production of 
goods and services by private or public enterprises, as distinct from public administration. 
One of the acutest areas of Malay under-representation was among managers of 
                                                 
35 In the late 1980s 1.3 percent of two million unit holders owned 75 percent of Amanah Saham 
Bumiputera (then known as Amanah Saham Nasional) shares (Jomo 2004: 14). At the end of 
2008, 16 percent of 6.5 million unit holders held 91 percent of the total number of units (Author’s 
calculations from Amanah Saham Bumiputera Annual Report 2008).  
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enterprises and in manufacturing. Programs in this respect initially centered on state-
owned enterprises in the 1970s-mid-1980s, then shifted to privatized (former public) 
corporations in the 1990s until the 1997 financial crisis, to renationalized corporations, 
termed ‘government-linked companies’. Licensing and public procurement constitute a 
second route towards this objective. 
 
2. 2. 2. 4. 1. Public enterprises to privatization to government-linked companies 
 
 Throughout most of the NEP, the Malaysian government has adopted a state-centric 
approach to enterprise development. Various agencies were created or reinvigorated to 
support Malay business, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. State-owned enterprises 
numbered just 22 in 1960, but burgeoned to 109 in 1970, 656 in 1980 and 1149 in 1992, 
with the largest numbers in manufacturing, services, agriculture, finance and construction. 
To put the growth in perspective, the number of new public enterprises averaged 9 per 
year in 1960s, 55 in 1970s, and 41 from 1980 to 1992 (Gomez and Jomo 1999: 29-31). 
The government’s five-year plan expenditure on non-financial public enterprises flowed 
in accordance with funding needs in these enterprises36. State Economic Development 
Corporations (SEDCs) were designated a salient role in spearheading Malay business 
from the early 1970s, bolstered with seed funds or guarantees from government. However, 
ventures largely turned out unsuccessful or unsustainable, undermined by poor 
governance, inexperience, or corruption37.  
                                                 
36 Specifically, such expenditures ballooned from RM3.9 billion (1971-75) to RM12.0 billion 
(1976-80) to RM27.7 billion (1981-95), then contracted to RM17.7 billion (1986-90) (Ismail and 
Meyanathan 1993: 19). 
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 As mentioned above, the Malaysian government, through its investment arms, 
secured ownership of hitherto British-owned companies from the late 1970s, and 
facilitated entry of Malay managers and professionals into these new sectors. These 
takeovers of foreign-owned companies contributed to promotion of Malay management. 
Cadres of public administrators, who had acquired some experience by this stage, were 
positioned to assume places of leadership in these corporations.  
 The 1980s witnessed major shifts in the state-sponsored Bumiputera capitalist and 
entrepreneurial development agenda. In the early 1980s, the heavy industries program 
commenced with the establishment of the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
(HICOM) and ventures into various sectors, prominently automobiles, steel, and cement. 
These large firms were to be government-owned and Bumiputera-managed, with 
financial and operational support from Japan. The global recession of the mid-1980s 
stymied the launch of heavy industries, but their pre-maturity also showed up in the 
emergence of excess capacity, lack of competency and gross under-performance. The 
focus shifted again from the late 1980s to public procurement contracts and privatization 
of state entities, which were to facilitate the development of individuals in the 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC), beyond agencies or 
institutions such as trust funds.  
 This policy watershed had two crucial implications. First, it positioned the private 
sector and the BCIC as the main target of state priorities and resources – while 
affirmative action programs in education and employment continued without substantive 
revision. Second, it ushered in and pumped resources into private capital accumulation 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 In 1981, available information on 260 companies under the purview of the Ministry of Public 
Enterprises showed that 94 were making losses and 21 had yet to operate (Jesudason 1989: 98-
100). 
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(Gomez and Jomo 1999, Jomo 2004). State-owned enterprises were handed over to a 
coterie of new, politically connected individuals. However, in 1997, the financial crisis 
left many of these state-sponsored Malay capitalists foundering. The largest corporations 
that they had been handpicked to helm were subsequently re-nationalized. The public 
enterprise regime has been broadly reconfigured as government-linked corporations – 
majority-owned by government – and ostensibly injected with a more corporate ethos. 
Government-linked companies (GLCs) in both financial and productive sectors, continue 
to play significant roles in Bumiputera advancement, under an implicit mandate to excel 
as exemplars of enterprise and to generate employment opportunities. 
 
2. 2. 2. 4. 2. Licensing and public procurement 
 
 The Malaysian state has also deployed licensing and public procurement toward 
developing a Malay capitalist and entrepreneurial class, although these policy instruments 
have operated through relatively less formalized and codified mechanisms. Affirmative 
action programs through licensing can be differentiated by sector. For instance, the 
Petroleum Development Act (1974) vested ownership of oil reserves in the hands of the 
government, and required that management of petrol stations be reserved in Bumiputera 
hands, and the issuing of taxi licenses has also been dictated by terms that require 
Bumiputera ownership – although this is an area of conspicuous Ali-Baba relationships, 
where a Bumiputera partner merely secures a license, then subcontracts the work to other, 
usually Chinese, persons. The vendor development program in the automobile sector sets 
up a system for development of parts suppliers. “Approved Permits” have also been 
distributed, granting quotas to import motor vehicles. The fields of transportation, 
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telecommunications, and media have seen the issuance of licenses for big and politically 
strategic operations (Gomez and Jomo 1999: 91-100). The utilization of licensing for 
promoting Bumiputera business, in spite of the extensive measures and expenditures, is 
critically considered to have achieved little beyond the allocation of rents to politically 
connected persons. 
 The NEP gave impetus to utilizing the public procurement system to stimulate and 
finance Bumiputera commerce. The 1973 Bumiputera Economic Seminar resolved to 
prioritize Bumiputera operators in government transportation, supplies and service 
contracts. Treasury Circular Letters have served as the medium for setting out such 
policies. A tiered procurement framework was introduced in 1974, in which 100 percent 
of small projects and 30 percent of the total value of other projects are reserved for 
Bumiputera contractors. The remaining 70 percent is open for bidding among all 
companies, Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera. Bumiputera contractors also receive price 
handicaps, on a sliding scale, that place Bumiputera bids on par with lower priced non-
Bumiputera competitors – except for the largest category of contracts38. In 1982, a 
provision was introduced to prioritize members of the Malay Chamber of Commerce39. 
The parameters for classifying contracts and discounts were adjusted in 1995, but the 
basic framework was retained40.  
 The terms for receiving preferential treatment mentioned in the Malaysian Treasury’s 
circulars on procurement policy emphasize Bumiputera majority ownership, 
representation in executive and managerial positions and in financial management. While 
                                                 
38 Treasury Circular Letter No. 7, 1974.  
 
39 Treasury Circular Letter No. 3, 1982. 
 
40 Treasury Circular Letter No. 4, 1995. 
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it is stipulated that tenders must meet timeline, local content and quality standards, the 
formal procedures for selecting contractors do not specify rules or incentives structured 
towards broadening entrepreneurial capacity, or promoting greenfield investment, 
technological and skills development. Malaysia’s public procurement regime is widely 
considered to amount to a political patronage network, where deals are sealed on the 
basis of connection and positioning of powerful figures on company boards. The 
awarding of lucrative deals without open and competitive tender concurs with general 
assessments that the system is built around patronage and enrichment, without unclear 
strategies and timelines for increasing transparency and productivity. 
 
 
Table 2-4. Malaysia: Affirmative action programs and notable features 
 Programs 
 
Notable features 
 
Secondary 
and tertiary 
education 
 
 
§ Residential colleges 
 
§ Matriculation colleges 
 
§ Expansion of tertiary 
institutions, enrollment 
quotas in public 
universities 
 
§ University scholarships 
 
 
§ Exclusively Bumiputera (until 2000) 
 
§ Exclusively Bumiputera (until 2002) 
 
§ Extensive growth of Bumiputera in tertiary 
education; but concerns of decline in 
quality 
 
§ Important in facilitating access to university 
education, but scarce systematic 
consideration of equity aspects 
 
 
Employment 
in 
managerial 
and skilled 
positions 
 
§ Public sector 
employment 
 
 
 
§ Industrial Coordination 
Act 
 
 
§ De facto quota, but largely ad hoc in 
implementation; absorption of urbanizing 
Malays; major factor in Malay professional 
and middle class 
 
Proportional representation in production 
workforce, minimal impact at managerial 
and professional level; no impact on SMEs 
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Table 2-4 (continued) 
 Programs 
 
Notable features 
 
Enterprise 
and 
managerial 
development 
 
 
 
 
§ Public enterprises 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Takeover of foreign 
companies  
 
 
§ Licensing 
 
 
 
§ Public procurement 
 
 
§ Span all sectors, but largely under-
performing or failing; post-1997 crisis: 
government-linked companies given 
reinvigorated mandate to spearhead BCIC 
agenda 
 
§ Resulted in a number of Bumiputera control 
and management of some conglomerates; 
limited impact on a national scale 
 
§ Confined to fields with limited 
technological growth; no incentive 
structure, particularly for SMEs 
 
§ Little impact on broadly cultivating self-
reliant Bumiputera business; widely viewed 
as patronage regime; no incentive structure, 
particularly for SMEs 
 
 
Equity 
ownership 
 
§ Industrial Coordination 
Act 
 
§ Privatization 
 
§ Modest effect, no effective control 
transferred 
 
§ Concentrated wealth accumulation; many 
requiring rescue in 1997 crisis 
 
 
 
2. 2. 3. Political economic context 
2. 2. 3. 1. Malay hegemony and executive dominance  
 
 Affirmative action under the NEP was formulated in the wake of a political crisis to 
which Malay nationalism responded with vigor and force. The political watershed was 
characterized by consolidation of Malay political hegemony and enlargement of a Malay 
dominant ruling coalition. Accordingly, affirmative action policies expanded and 
intensified a framework that was partly in place, deploying many government agencies 
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that were set up in the 1960s. Notwithstanding some continuities, the 1970s marked a 
clear break from the past in that state institutions involved in economic policy were 
infused with a more assertive pro-Bumiputera, and especially pro-Malay, agenda.  
Lacking policy models to emulate, Malaysia adopted a practical and experimental 
approach41. This combination of a strong state and pragmatist disposition concurs with 
the emergence of a state-centric regime often making discretionary decisions and policy 
shifts, oriented more around executive power than statutes or formalized procedures. 
Malaysia’s centralized and executive dominant mode of policy-making and 
implementation has effected change that would otherwise involve more negotiation and 
formalization, and that would probably transpire less rapidly. Exclusive Bumiputera 
programs, such as education institutions, scholarships, and licensing, were politically 
possible and quantitatively feasible. Quotas in education, employment and ownership 
were also implemented with greater speed and latitude than would be conceivable in most 
countries.  
 
2. 2. 3. 2. Dynamics of race relations 
 
The Malay-dominant state notwithstanding, policy-making has been shaped by the 
dynamics of race relations in Malaysia. While economic issues have been important to 
the Chinese and Indian communities, they have generally been more steadfast and 
voluble in advocacy of cultural preservation and access to mother tongue schooling and 
tertiary education than of state deregulation in principle. The quota system for university 
enrollment and for scholarships, in particular, has been a source of friction, especially for 
Chinese families who cannot afford to send their children abroad. Chinese- and Tamil-
                                                 
41 Author’s interviews with former Economic Planning Unit officials. 
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medium schools provide avenues for linguistic and cultural expression, while 
proliferation of private higher education and increased non-Bumiputera quota in 
government scholarships has alleviated to some extent grievances arising from restricted 
entry to university due to quotas.  
Domestic-foreign interactions have also shaped development and affirmative action 
policies. It is important to note, at the inception of the NEP, that Chinese did not control 
all sectors – indeed, foreign ownership and control was pervasive, especially in key 
commodities. The government, in service of the Malay/Bumiputera interest, had 
established banks and development funds and taken over hitherto foreign-owned entities. 
The existence of a non-domestic target for transfer of equity ownership significantly 
insulated Malaysia from an internal conflict over assets, particularly in primary 
commodities. At the same time, new foreign capital has been seen as a counterweight to 
Chinese capital, and has thus been courted, especially in manufacturing, as part of 
Malaysia’s export oriented industrialization program. 
Some ramifications of the dynamics of race relations on affirmative action may be 
noted. Malaysia has engaged more in implicit “bargaining” over safeguarding special 
domains for each race group, instead of broad efforts to make all socio-economic spheres 
multiracial. Policies for attaining equitable representation within organizations, especially 
to foster Bumiputera-non-Bumiputera cooperation, were not pursued in a systematic 
manner in the private sector. The public sector, state-owned enterprises, privatized 
entities, and regulations on foreign capital were the main vehicles for increasing 
Bumiputera participation in management and highly skilled occupations, largely to the 
exclusion of meaningful engagement with non-Bumiputera. These inter-racial and cross-
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national dynamics are interwoven with the process of developing independent 
Bumiputera enterprises, which is one area where achievements have conspicuously fallen 
short of expectations. Bumiputera involvement in SMEs, particularly in manufacturing, is 
lacking, and largely dependent on subsidies42. Additionally, lack of cooperation between 
government and predominantly Chinese SMEs has arguably stunted skills training, 
research and development and technological upgrading (Ritchie 2005, Henderson and 
Phillips 2007, Jomo 2007).  
 
2. 2. 3. 3. Economic growth and public expenditures 
 
The Malaysian economy has enjoyed steady economic growth over the past 50 years, 
including some bursts of sustained rapid growth. Average annual real GDP growth 
registered 5.8 percent (1957-70), 6.3 percent (1971-87), 8.8 percent (1987-97), and 3.9 
percent (1997-2006). Our interest is not in explaining causes of growth, nor in exploring 
interactions between growth and distribution, but to keep in view the fact that economic 
growth for the most part provided ample means for Malaysia to undertake its extensive 
and intensive AA programs. Additionally, discovery of oil reserves in the 1970s 
coincided with the OPEC price hikes and availed a windfall source of funds. While the 
actual allocation of such funds is unknown – since Petronas, the government agency 
mandated to claim oil royalties, is exempted from financial disclosure – it is believed that 
substantial amounts were spent in social development, especially in the latter 1970s and 
the 1980s. 
Malaysia also augmented public expenditure at a time when international convention 
was less inimical towards expansionary macroeconomic policies than has subsequently 
                                                 
42 Authors interview with Suresh Narayanan, August 14, 2007. 
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been the case43. The accumulation of fiscal debt, partly in foreign denomination, forced 
cutbacks in public spending and hiring in the mid-1980s, and accelerated the shift to 
privatization. Nonetheless, a relatively large public sector, in terms of employment and 
expenditure, has continued as a mainstay of the affirmative action program.  
 
                                                 
43 Public expenditure per GDP registered 29.0 percent in 1970, 39.9 percent in 1979, and 58.4 
percent in 1981. 
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2. 3. Imperative, content and context of affirmative action: South Africa  
 Any consideration of post-Apartheid South Africa’s problems must be framed within 
the comprehensive structures of disenfranchisement, oppression, and discrimination that 
prevailed under colonialism and Apartheid. Non-whites were systemically disempowered 
in terms of citizenship and political voice, socially excluded from urban centers, legally 
prohibited from upward mobility and ownership – except in the Bantustans44 – and forced 
into inferior education, health services and employment. This study cannot proceed 
without an attempt to survey the breadth and depth of Apartheid’s legacy, even though 
some errors of over-simplification and omission will unavoidably be committed. 
However, the error of decoupling post-Apartheid policy formulation and outcomes from 
inherited conditions would be greater45. The following brief overview will focus on 
aspects of Apartheid that most directly impacted on the transition to democracy, the 
transformations of South Africa’s political, social and economic order, and the 
formulation of affirmative action policies. 
 
2. 3. 1. Apartheid legacy and affirmative action imperatives 
The transition out of Apartheid applied pressures and constraints on affirmative 
action. Black South Africans for many generations were denied equal rights to vote, to 
own property and to organize labor or work on fair terms, and were deprived of equal 
access to education, employment and self-determination. These various and enormous 
                                                 
44 The author is grateful to Gerhard Maré for highlighting major differences between the 
Bantustans and townships. 
 
45 Indeed, economic historian Sampie Terreblanche in his seminal History of Inequality in South 
Africa, 1652-2002 acknowledges that, “[w]ith the wisdom of hindsight we now know that the 
legacy of colonialism, segregation and Apartheid was much worse, and the pauperizing 
momentum inherent in it much stronger, than was realized in 1994” (p. 29). 
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inequities of the Apartheid state and its racial division of labor – arguably more 
systematized than in any other country – had to be redressed, while negotiating a 
precarious rebalance of power. South Africa is distinctive for transferring political 
dominance from a domestic minority racial group with entrenched influence and 
generally well-developed human capabilities, to a majority group characterized by an 
ascendant political elite and incipient capitalist class, economic disadvantage and mass 
poverty. The situation differs from countries that have introduced affirmative action, such 
as Malaysia, while largely preserving the political order. Affirmative action in South 
Africa, aiming to redress multitudinous socio-economic disparities, rested on a political 
transformation. Inevitably, political and economic transitions were necessary; the 
question was whether they would take shape simultaneously or sequentially. It turned out 
more toward the latter. Political transformation – a thoroughly new Constitution 
negotiated between old and new political blocs – preceded, and had to supercede, socio-
economic transformation. Discourses over the post-Apartheid economic order no doubt 
took place concurrently with the political transition, but were spread over a diversity of 
forums between delegations, and unfolded in more disparate and opaque processes. This 
important element of the South African transition will be discussed later in this section. 
Apartheid reinforced disparities through all-encompassing and institutionalized 
exclusion and repression, while effectively implementing affirmative action in favor of 
the white, specifically Afrikaner, population. Blacks were forced into low-wage and 
unskilled labor on farms, mines or factories, where they had no rights, or to residency – 
millions by force – in the ostensibly self-governing but resource-deprived and 
economically dependent Bantustans, or “independent homelands”, while over 80 percent 
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of South Africa’s land was in the hands of the white population. Township populations at 
the periphery of cities and towns burgeoned, as blacks flocked to seek menial work under 
heavily policed conditions. South Africa’s government and service delivery system was 
splintered into central government and homeland administrations46. The employment 
profile of these departments reflected Apartheid policy and enforcement. The public 
sector and parastatals constituted an important channel of employment, skill acquisition, 
and upward mobility for whites. More generally, whites were disproportionately 
employed in senior positions and in security services, while blacks were predominantly 
laborers, or educators and nurses in the homelands (Naidoo 2008: 102-103).  
The education system was further segregated and stratified under Apartheid from the 
mid-1950s. Schools were reordered towards ethnic homogeneity, while universities were 
explicitly segregated by law and education departments were segmented by race or in 
alignment with ‘independent homeland’ borders. Curricula were designed to prevent 
Africans from aspiring to positions beyond subservient functions of production or 
Apartheid administration, and black populated schools were systemically deprived of 
funds. Schools in the Bantustans and tertiary institutions in general operated with a 
degree of autonomy; some universities enrolled blacks from the 1970s. On the whole, the 
education system was segmented and stratified by race, and academic learning was 
disrupted by political ferment and anti-Apartheid struggle that pervaded many schools. A 
glance at education statistics is revealing: in 1986, the passing rates for standard 10 
examinations were 51.6 percent for Africans, 67.6 percent for Coloreds, 87.1 percent for 
Indians and 93.1 percent for Whites. In 1990, the passing rate for Africans had declined 
                                                 
46 In 1993, there were 172 departments in the central government and homeland administrations 
(Naidoo 2008: 101). 
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to 36.7 percent, while that for other race groups continued to increase (MERG 1993 and 
Motala et al. 2007)47. 
Repression, segregation and discrimination in the labor market are widely 
documented. Racial conflict and systematic discrimination were far more direct and 
blatant in capitalist-worker relations than in other arenas. Terreblanche (2002) describes 
the persistent structural feature of the South African labor market as black labor 
repression, which has taken on various forms over three and a half centuries. The 
Apartheid regime from 1948 reinforced discriminatory measures in various ways, 
whether through law or arbitrary exercise of power. A few directly relevant to labor 
markets are worth mentioning here for illustrative purposes. Amendments to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act in 1953 reserved certain classes of work for specified racial 
categories to “safeguard against inter-racial competition”, and in 1956 prohibited 
registration of “mixed” unions. Black trade unions were not recognized until 1979. The 
Apartheid system militated especially aggressively against black advancement up skill 
levels, through training and promotion, and blacks in management. White unions 
prevented training of African artisans, resulting in no African apprenticed outside the 
Bantustans before 1975 (Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 138). Until 1977, it was illegal to 
employ African managers in urban areas (Nzimande 1996: 190). 
                                                 
47 In 1990, the standard 10 passing rate was 79.4 percent for Coloreds, 95.0 percent for Indians 
and 95.8 percent for Whites. Per capita educational expenditure in 1988 registered R276 for 
Africans, R1,358 for Coloreds, R2,225 for Indians and R3,080 for Whites, while the proportion of 
teachers with professional qualification in 1990 also showed disparities within the black 
population, with 87 percent for Africans; 96 percent for Coloreds and 98.5 percent for Indians 
(MERG 1993: 129-134). Other sources yield different estimates for disparity in education 
spending, e.g. Motala (et al. 2007: 3 and 12) report ratios of average spending on whites to blacks 
of 3.2 in 1993, and as high as 15 in 1990. 
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The mid-1970s signaled new directions for South Africa. The 1973 Durban strikes 
forcefully marked a shift in worker activism from the relative quiescence of the 1960s. 
More momentously, the 1976 uprisings in Soweto and nationwide protest that it spawned 
were triggered by the imposition of Afrikaans instruction in black schools outside the 
Bantustans, and other contributory factors. By then, township communities had settled 
beyond being migrant, transient populations, which in turn yielded township-born 
generations of schooled youths who were inflamed against their abject living conditions. 
The Apartheid government strategy of concentrating development for blacks in the 
Bantustans, to the neglect of urban townships, had laid conditions for such a backlash 
(Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 108). The state and big business responded, notably through 
the Wiehahn, Riekert and de Lange Commissions, the Human Sciences Research Council 
and the Urban Foundation, which made recommendations for reforms in housing, 
industrial relations and social policy. Black trade unions were formally recognized from 
1979. This strategy partly aimed at deflecting public protest away from black working 
class mobilization against the racist Apartheid state towards conflict within formal 
industrial relations, and achieved this to some extent48.  
The reforms, however, were selective and amounted to an upward shift of the color 
bar – barriers to black advancement were raised, but were far from removed. Standing, 
Sender and Weeks (1996: 386) point out, for instance, that none of the Commissions 
made substantive recommendations towards the deracialization of training schemes49. 
                                                 
48 Author’s interview with Professor Eddie Webster, October 29, 2007. 
 
49 Racial segregation persisted in skill formation. Africans comprised about 10 percent of 
qualified artisans by 1990, but were concentrated in six relatively low-skill trades, including 
welding, boiler-making, fitting and sheet metal working, while whites continued to predominate 
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There was a steady relaxation of restrictions on African trade and business in urban areas, 
yet black business development remained severely inhibited (Southall 2004: 316). 
Nevertheless, legal amendments to labor relations and policy attention to urban social 
and housing development from the late 1970s would set in motion two important 
developments in the distributional dynamics of South Africa. First, superficially altering 
Apartheid and perforating some barriers to black upward mobility became accepted as 
strategic objectives within the corporate world and the state. The business sector became 
more politicized in the 1970s, while at the same time more autonomous from the 
Apartheid state machinery and pro-active in advocating reforms. Second, the changes 
accentuated class differentiation in the African population – an important precursor to the 
process of social stratification in the post-Apartheid era (Marais 2001, Seekings and 
Nattrass 2005, Terreblanche 2002). The reforms of ‘petty Apartheid’, however, coincided 
with intensification of political repression and manipulations to maintain power, which 
fuelled resistance and mass mobilization through the 1980s. Thus, the Apartheid system 
faced demands for removal – in highly volatile circumstances. 
This very brief overview of systemic disadvantage in South Africa raises a few 
themes that are taken up later. First, Apartheid was comprehensive. Correspondingly, 
redress measures – affirmative action and broad reforms – needed to be comprehensive. It 
is inconceivable to expect prohibition of discrimination alone to redress the breadth and 
depth of Apartheid’s socio-economic legacy. Active measures for South Africa had to 
chart a path through multiple transitions unlike any other country in the late 20th century, 
and progress had to be substantial and expeditious given the social pressures and 
                                                                                                                                                 
in higher skill trades in metal, engineering, electrical and motor sectors (Standing, Sender and 
Weeks 1996: 388).  
 77 
expectations of tangible change. The post-Apartheid state was constrained to respond 
urgently to a plethora of basic and deep-seated problems, notably, fragmented 
government and service delivery systems and grossly inadequate basic education and 
health provision. 
Second, features of the political and economic transitions impacted on the formation 
of affirmative action policies. South Africa faced enormous challenges, but enjoyed wide 
political legitimacy, to redress systemic disadvantage and inequality. At the same time, 
the imperative of dismantling Apartheid demanded a new Constitution and negotiations 
among top leadership, amid a volatile political climate. These circumstances subordinated 
economic policy formulation to a less centralized, transparent and coordinated process 
than the concurrent political reconstitution, effectively preempting broader economic 
bargains that could have bolstered the economic transformation, such as transitory wealth 
taxes50. In addition, historical and ideological factors, especially the end of the cold war, 
South Africa’s reemergence from isolation and global pressures for financial 
liberalization, weighed in on an ANC leadership inexperienced in economic matters.  
The Freedom Charter of 1955, de facto manifesto of the anti-Apartheid struggle, 
expressed intentions to return the nation’s wealth to the people and to guarantee freedom 
of economic engagement. The Charter did not spell out economic programs for 
redistribution and black empowerment; its most resonant policy was a reference to 
nationalization. Economic negotiations from the 1980s, however, had reached an elite 
pact that laid the groundwork for conservative policies. With reconciliation forming the 
basis of political transformation, the ANC, leading the Government of National Unity, 
initially adopted an accommodative stance towards white capital, but grew more assertive 
                                                 
50 Author’s interview with Sampie Terreblanche, January 21, 2008. 
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over time towards cultivating a black capitalist class (Southall 2004). Thus, the vision of 
a non-racial and non-sexist democracy, conceived in the liberation struggle and sustained 
as a bargaining position, became embedded in the Constitution, as were provisions for 
affirmative action. The fact that specific legislation and policy on affirmative action was 
promulgated after the enactment of a new Constitution derives from the urgency of 
fostering political stability and a power-sharing deal, while formal AA legislation was 
introduced from the late 1990s.  
Third, structural aspects of the Apartheid political economy further complicated the 
transition and introduction of affirmative action programs: entrenchment of a developed 
capitalist class and marked class boundaries, reservation of upper rung jobs in the formal 
economy for the white minority, presence of nascent black professional and middle 
classes, and rise of political elites seeking reward for past discrimination. Apartheid’s 
cultivation of Afrikaner capital and appeasement of English-speaking capital perpetuated 
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. Hence, the challenge of overcoming racial 
inequality would inevitably be fraught with the complications of a multi-dimensionally 
divided society and economy.  
 
2. 3. 2. Affirmative action policies and programs 
2. 3. 2. 1. Terms and principles 
This study’s conceptualization of affirmative action includes policies that 
conventionally go by other terms in South Africa (See Appendix 2). Chapter 3 of the 
Employment Equity Act carries the heading ‘Affirmative Action’, probably resulting in 
the common equation of affirmative action with employment equity.  However, AA as 
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conceptualized in this study spans a wider range. Employment equity and BEE qualify as 
AA under the broad definition applied in this paper, in the spheres of employment, 
management and ownership. Also by convention, South Africa’s education policies are 
less couched in AA terms. Unlike in Malaysia, where enrolment quotas and race-
delineated educational institutions have become policy mainstays, in South Africa the 
concept and language of redress and transformation pervades, constituting not fixed 
targets or racially exclusive academies for beneficiaries, but a mandate to redress past 
inequalities in access to education and achieve more equitable racial representation, 
which inevitably involves some extent of preferential selection. In sum, then, to establish 
common ground in this two-country study, and to cohere with the definition of AA we 
have set out, we take AA in both Malaysia and South Africa to encompass measures that 
are both explicitly and implicitly preferential and aimed at redressing racial inequalities, 
in the spheres of education and training, employment and ownership. 
 The underpinnings of affirmative action were crystallized in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, which stipulates principles for safeguarding equality and 
prohibiting unfair discrimination (emphasis added), while recognizing the legacy of past 
discrimination (See Appendix 1). Article 9 serves as the cornerstone of affirmative action, 
where it is specified that, “[t]o promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination may be taken”. The importance accorded to affirmative action in 
the public sector is upheld in the Constitution. As pointed out by Jain (2006), Article 
195(1) sets forth the mandate that “[p]ublic administration must be broadly representative 
of the South African people”, and Article 217(2) provides for “categories of preference in 
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the allocation of contracts” and “protection or advancement of persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination”. The Employment Equity Act (1998) 
distinguishes two stages to the process of attaining equity: legislation of non-
discrimination, and official provision for affirmative action to correct historical unfair 
discrimination. This study, it is worth reiterating, locates employment equity in the labor 
market as a component of the broad rubric of affirmative action. 
 
2. 3. 2. 2. Representation in education 
As observed above, the challenges in the education domain were to restructure its 
fragmented and unequal state and to promote equitable access. Under Apartheid, 
education was partially available to discriminated groups, but historically black schools, 
teknikons and universities were also purposely kept inferior in teacher capacity, facilities, 
funding and curriculum. Thus, the mandate for transformation was cast broadly, 
including measures to increase and improve basic education for the mass population, to 
reorganize or merge tertiary institutes, and to pursue equitable representation in the 
systematically superior, historically white institutions. With institutions already 
segregated, emphasis was placed on integration. Any creation of racially exclusive elite 
schools and colleges would be at odds with the objective of deracializing education. 
At the primary and secondary levels, under-provision or poor quality of schooling 
warranted the priority placed on basic education. The composition of schools corresponds 
with the population of the surrounding district/s; hence, pursuing racial proportional 
representation would be unproductive in some cases, notably in black-dominant township 
or rural schools. However, it was imperative to integrate historically white institutions. 
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These processes did not involve affirmative action measures, but are an important 
backdrop to the transformation that has been pursued at the tertiary level. In a 1990 
restructuring program, most urban white public schools had opted for a ‘Model C’ format, 
which gave schools latitude to collect fees and have jurisdiction over major decisions, 
including enrollment, subject to approval of the school governing authority51. Devolving 
some authority and financing to the school, it was argued, would also democratize school 
governance and encourage parental participation, while availing public funds to other 
more needy schools (Chisholm 2008, Motala et al. 2007). The Model C structure and 
user fees were preserved into the post-Apartheid era, motivated by concerns of exodus of 
whites to private schools and of public finance constraints. Furthermore, the struggle for 
education rights had historically not been cast in racialist terms, thus the policy to provide 
education was “based principally on the constitutional guarantees of equal educational 
rights for all persons and non-discrimination” (White Paper on Education and Training 
1995).  
However, while these political and pragmatic considerations exerted substantial 
weight, the policy process was also infused at the ideological level by a ‘pro-market’ 
orientation and attendant cost efficiency arguments (Weber 2002: 265), which 
outweighed the flipside of user fees, namely its propensity to reinforce and perpetuate 
privilege and inequality by excluding those who cannot afford to pay (although this 
would be legally prohibited) and by allowing schools that charge fees to poach better 
teachers from other schools. Another dimension of equity stems from the reality that 
                                                 
51 Technically, schools could enroll blacks, and some did, although at a very low pace in the early 
1990s (MERG 1993). 
 82 
black households are larger and hence would face more difficulty sending children to fee-
charging schools (MERG 1993: 100-102).  
Education policy discourses did not acquire the language of affirmative action. While 
the exact reasons are unclear, it appears to stem from acceptance of the convention of 
confining AA terminology to employment processes, coupled with abstention from 
formal racial or gender targets or quotas in schools and universities. Nevertheless, we can 
locate policies geared towards overcoming systemic disadvantage and under-
representation of blacks under the rubric of transformation and redress. Another 
challenge in summarizing AA in education is the incremental path it followed, which can 
be traced out in a series of official documents: government white papers (1995-1998)52, 
the 1996 National Commission on Higher Education report53, the 2000 Council on 
Higher Education report54, and the 2001 National Plan for Higher Education55. Early 
policy objectives were outlined in the 1995 and 1996 White Papers, which gave priority 
to integration of administrative bodies, and expansion and improvement of basic 
schooling. “Affirmative action” would be applied only in the recruitment of teaching staff. 
The papers recognized problems of higher education, particularly its racially splintered 
                                                 
52 White Paper on Education and Training, 1995 (Education White Paper 1); The Organisation, 
Governance and Funding of Schools, 1996 (Education White Paper 2); A Programme for Higher 
Education Transformation, 1997 (Education White Paper 3); A Programme for the 
Transformation of Further Education and Training, 1998 (Education White Paper 4). 
 
53 An Overview of a New Policy Framework for Higher Education Transformation, 22 August 
1996.  
 
54 The full title is: Policy Report: Towards a New Higher Education Landscape: Meeting the 
Equity, Quality and Social Development Imperatives of South Africa in the Twenty-first Century.  
 
55 This report was authored by the Ministry of Education. 
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and stratified structure, but deferred policy proposition to the newly formed Commission 
on Higher Education.  
 Affirmative action in terms of student composition, under the banners of 
transformation, redress and equity, were most salient in higher education– which had 
been perhaps the educational level at which blacks witnessed quantitatively both the 
greatest disparity and fastest growth prior to the transition. Between 1986 and 1993, the 
number of African students at universities and teknikons56 increased by 14 percent per 
year, against 0.4 percent for whites. However, in 1993 the participation rates were starkly 
far apart, at 70 percent for college-age whites versus 12 percent for Africans (White 
Paper 1997). The need for redress in higher education has been consistently articulated 
with respect to unequal access based on race, gender, class and region, but measures to 
unify, restructure and coordinate education administration took precedence in the early 
post-Apartheid years. Statements on the process reflect the manifold challenges of 
transforming both structure and access, e.g. “[h]igher education must be transformed to 
redress past inequalities, to serve a new social order, to meet pressing national needs and 
to respond to new realities and opportunities” (White Paper 1997). Notably, 
transformation and redress in education institutions have not been legislated. National 
Education Policy Act 1996, which stipulates terms of reference for establishing 
educational institutions and formulating education policy, and the Higher Education Act 
1997, which outlines a framework for restructuring and administering higher education, 
provide no explicit legal framework for affirmative action57. 
                                                 
56 Teknikons were technical colleges, renamed universities of technology in 2005. 
 
57 The National Education Policy Act stipulates equitable access and redress of past inequality as 
guiding principles, and specifically mentions gender equality in educational access as a national 
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 The transformation mandate in higher education was formulated in two layers: 
institutional redress and social redress. The gulfs between historically white institutions 
(HWI) and historically black (or historically disadvantaged) institutions (HBI) needed to 
be bridged. Structural inequalities in access to higher education – due to past racial or 
gender discrimination, regional restrictions, or inability to afford fees – were also to be 
rectified58. Initially, much policy focus was channeled toward narrowing the disparities 
between HWIs and HBIs. The framework for funding of the mid- to late-1990s 
designated public funding for general operations, proportionate to enrollment, and 
earmarked funding for institutional redress (between HWIs and HBIs) and individual or 
social redress (financial aid to students, e.g. the National Student Financial Aid Scheme 
(NSFAS)) (CHE 1996).  
In practice, institutional redress was effected to a larger extent. However, the mid- to 
late-1990s saw a decline in enrollment in public higher education institutions, partly due 
to mismanagement of historically black institutions, but also due to stagnation in quality 
of school graduates59. The HBIs faced acute difficulties, inter alia, in collecting fees – 
while expectations of redress funding did not materialize – and in providing academic 
programs and facilities, fuelling downward spirals in enrolment and financial 
sustainability. At the national level in the late 1990s, the proportion of black, especially 
                                                                                                                                                 
policy objective. The preamble to the Higher Education Act validates the social desirability of 
efforts to “redress past discrimination and ensure representivity and equal access”. 
 
58 The White Paper on Transformation of Higher Education (1997) maintains that “transformation 
involves not only abolishing all existing forms of unjust differentiation, but also measures of 
empowerment, including financial support to bring about equal opportunity for individuals and 
institutions”. 
 
59 Senior certificate pass rates flatly fluctuating over 1990-97 but showed an increasing trend over 
1997-2002. University entrance pass rates fell from 18 percent in 1994 to 12 percent in 1999 
before recovering to 17 percent in 2002 (SAIRR, cited in Jack 2003: 36-37). 
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African, students increased, as many entered public HWIs and technical universities, 
which saw substantially higher enrollment growth, while many whites opted for private 
higher education. The higher education participation rate, however, remained static, and 
enrolment in sciences and engineering did not increase as desired (Imenda, Kongolo and 
Grewal 2004, Morrow 2008, CHE 2000). 
 Thus, by the late 1990s a transformation program for higher education began to take 
shape more extensively and vigorously. The 1997 White Paper asserted that “changing 
the composition of the student body will be effected through targeted redistribution of the 
public subsidy to higher education. The relative proportion of public funding used to 
support academically able but disadvantaged students must be increased.”60 From around 
2000, higher education policy shifted in some important ways, with institutional redress 
becoming less narrowly focused on leveling playing field between HBI and HWI and 
increasingly geared towards social redress (CHE 2000, MOE 2001)61. The proportion of 
students receiving NSFAS aid increased clearly, though still gradually, from 20 percent 
in the late 1990s to 25 percent in the early 2000s. Mergers and combinations of HBIs and 
HWIs were formally proposed, on a case by case basis. The number of higher education 
institutes fell from 36 in 1995 to 29 in 2004 to 25 in 2005, and the demarcation of HBI 
and HWIs was officially phased out, consistent with the shift to de-emphasize 
institutional redress and broaden the transformation program in higher education.  
                                                 
60 Universities would be required to request “goal-oriented public funding” conditional less on 
enrollment size and more on a set of plans, including an academic development plan, equity plan, 
capital management plan, and performance improvement plan. 
 
61 We should note that institutional redress and social or individual redress, especially with the 
mergers and restructuring of institutions, are conceptually but not necessarily functionally 
distinguishable (Personal correspondence with Nazeema Mohamad, Director of Transformation, 
University of the Witwatersrand). 
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2. 3. 2. 3. Representation in upper-level occupations and skills development 
In the workplace, the Apartheid legacies of acute skills shortage, labor repression and 
barriers to upward mobility posed some deep and fundamental policy challenges. The 
formation of affirmative action policies was far from a straightforward and consensual 
process. From the early 1990s, a number of organizations advocated variations of AA, 
notably the Black Management Forum (BMF), the National African Federated Chamber 
of Commerce (NAFCOC), and organized labor, while others lobbied against AA, 
saliently the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) (Horwitz 1996, Adam 2000). 
ANC policy documents mirror these political pressures and electoral expectations, with 
Ready to Govern (1992) and the RDP (1994) both making firm and broad statements on 
AA, only to be circumscribed by the follow-up RDP White Paper (1994). As mentioned 
above, the latter expressed commitments to affirmative action only in public sector 
employment, while becoming silent on interventions to redress disadvantage in private 
sector employment62. 
It is not surprising that affirmative action was taken up in the public sector with 
greater vigor. The public services were a mainstay of pro-white affirmative action under 
Apartheid. However, this inherited condition made for a complicated transition towards a 
more representative workforce, especially at the administrative level and in highly-skilled 
occupations, due to limited room for maneuver in restructuring government offices 
(existing departments and officials performing crucial functions cannot be replaced) 
alongside shortages in skill and experience among blacks. As with all areas of transition, 
affirmative action was a component of a much broader transformation agenda. The 1995 
                                                 
62 Bond (2000: 99) points out that the authoring of the White Paper, which was delegated to 
partisan individuals at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, reflects of the capture of the 
policy agenda by neoliberal-leaning ideology and personnel. 
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White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service highlighted a swathe of problems: 
shortfalls in representativeness, in popular legitimacy (the state being viewed as an 
Apartheid appendage) and in service delivery, and operational defects or obsolescent 
practices such as top-down management, lack of accountability and transparency, low 
productivity, low pay and demotivated staff. One severe constraint in the initial post-
Apartheid years was the need to manage the continuation of senior and skilled staff from 
the previous administration, which gave rise to ‘the sunset clause’ and averted mass 
evacuation of key government posts, and was also a vital bargaining point in transitional 
negotiations.  
Affirmative action in the public service was formally set out in the 1998 White Paper 
within the framework of the Employment Equity Bill. Thus, there is little to differentiate, 
in principle and procedure, affirmative action in the public and private sectors. However, 
one distinguishing element of AA in the public service in the 1990s is the stipulation of 
specific targets and timeframes. The state’s direct control over employment in the public 
sector is reflected in its rapid schedule for increasing black representation in 
administration, the flipside of which is the possibility of setting overly ambitious goals63. 
Another problematic aspect of affirmative action in the public sector is the widely 
believed disproportionate distribution of gains among ethnic groups within the black 
population. 
                                                 
63 Percentage of designated group, baseline targets and timeframe 
 Target December 1997 
Black people at management level 50% by 1999 33%  
Women new recruits to the management level 30% by 1999 13%   
People with disabilities 2% by 2005  0.02% 
Source: White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service 
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Obstacles to effecting AA in the private sector were steeper. The state can exert only 
indirect influence, through persuasion or legislation, over hiring decisions, while 
entrenched ownership and managerial interests are disposed to pursue private interests 
over the social principle of equity and redress. Some blacks had enjoyed social mobility, 
through “black advancement” initiatives in the 1980s, but had been subjected to a moving 
color bar often lodged at middle level management or human resource management 
(Nzimande 1994). In the early 1990s, some companies began to voluntary undertake 
affirmative action, largely in anticipatory compliance with future legislation and quotas. 
Blacks, however, remained glaringly under-represented in managerial positions, with 
high incidences of ‘window-dressing’ or nominal, non-executive appointments (Adam 
2000)64. That the under-representation of blacks is due to combinations of discrimination 
and lack of experience and training is undeniable, but no definitive conclusion on the 
balance of these determinants has been, and perhaps never can be, reached. The outcome 
of negotiations over employment legislation reflects the dual objectives of ending 
discrimination and promoting opportunity – and a premise that free markets do not self-
regulate towards the eradication of discrimination. 
Affirmative action in employment was institutionalized after an interim, during which 
basic labor legislation was passed (LRA 1995 and BCEA 1997), macroeconomic policy 
was imposed (GEAR 1996) and the transformation agenda as a whole was gathering 
momentum. The Employment Equity Act (EEA), passed in 1998, sets out to distinguish 
                                                 
64 A 1995 FSA-Contact survey reported 94 percent of private sector organizations had 
implemented some form of AA (67 percent formally; 27 percent informally), mainly at the 
managerial, professional and technical levels. By 1996, however, 85-95 percent of senior 
positions remained held by whites, and the black proportion of top management was a mere 3 
percent (Adam 2000: 82). The lack of standard definitions of what constitutes AA and 
benchmarks for black advancement is reflected in these developments preceding the EEA. 
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unfair discrimination from affirmative action, to register prohibition of unfair 
discrimination and, most importantly, to establish a legislative framework for 
implementing affirmative action in hiring, promotion and training65. The EEA states as its 
chief intent the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from designated 
groups in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce. It makes provision for 
preferential treatment – i.e. fair discrimination - and numerical goals, but not explicit 
quotas. It is applicable to ‘designated employers’, which encompasses government 
departments and municipalities (excluding national defense and intelligence services), 
and companies with either 50 or more employees or turnover above various sector-
specific thresholds, broadly corresponding to conventional definitions of medium-size 
enterprise in South Africa. 
In the selection process for recruiting, promoting and training employees, the EEA 
stipulates that, among ‘suitably qualified’ candidates, employers are to give preference to 
persons from designated groups, defined as black people, women and persons with 
disabilities66. The EEA requires government departments and designated employers, in 
consultation with workers, to: (1) submit employment equity reports of their workforce 
profile and their progress made towards equitable representation, disaggregated by race, 
gender and disability categories; (2) devise employment equity plans specifying targets 
for increasing the number of members of disadvantaged groups who benefit from 
promotion, skills development or recruitment. The baseline target of workforce 
                                                 
65 The EEA is sparing in its chapter on unfair discrimination. Legislation governing such matters 
is more fully developed in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act, 2000, which stipulates legal grounds for prosecution of individual cases.  
 
66 The unqualified designation of women in the EEA has stirred controversy over whether white 
women can be considered as disadvantaged as black men, leading to assertions of a further order 
of priority: black female, black male, white female, white male. 
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composition at every occupational level is the economically active population of South 
Africa, although in practice the Department of Labor takes into account the racial and 
gender composition of the province where employers are located67.  
The outcomes and problems of employment equity legislation will be discussed at 
various junctures of this study. At this point, we should note that South Africa’s EEA has 
a broad scope and formalized mechanisms, since it encompasses public and private 
sectors, imposes self-regulatory requirements and a penalty system for non-compliance, 
and integrates skills development as a component to enable disadvantaged employees to 
be upwardly mobile within firms68. In practice, however, employment equity has 
proceeded more vigorously in the public sector, and in general involves preferential 
hiring and/or promotion more than skills development. Professional and managerial 
positions were formerly the most inaccessible and presently the most coveted, and have 
thus come under the most pressure and public scrutiny to demonstrate equitable 
representation. The public sector, under the direct purview of government, has absorbed 
large numbers of tertiary educated blacks into technical, professional and administrative 
occupations, coupled with a shift in public policy toward ‘managerialism’ which has 
increased the proportion of management-level posts (Chipkin 2008, Edigheji 2007). 
Implementing employment equity in the private sector is relatively more complex and 
fraught with obstacles and resistance.  
                                                 
67 Author’s interview with Employment Equity Division official, Department of Labor, 
November 30, 2007. 
 
68 The Skills Development Act, also passed in 1998, provides for the establishment of Sector 
Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) and a one percent of payroll levy that firms can 
reclaim through enrolling staff in the SETAs, irrespective of company size. The skills 
development program operates largely in tandem with employment equity for medium-scale and 
larger enterprises. 
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The skills development component of EE is arguably more pertinent to clerical, 
service or production workers. However, the record of skills development and reputation 
of SETAs are also generally not held in high esteem; many companies pay the levy and 
pass it on as a cost to consumers. Complying with EE is also considered an added cost, 
on top of labor regulations, or at an even more basic level – a carry-over from Apartheid-
era mentality – many South African employers are plainly predisposed against regulation 
of any sort, as reflected in unreceptive attitudes toward gender equity and safety 
regulations69. For the most part, therefore, it seems that employment equity has been an 
operational cost to which firms comply minimally, especially for medium-scale firms 
(small-scale firms are exempted). Basic problems of illiteracy or low formal education 
among workers impair their involvement in the consultation process and enhance the 
bargaining power of employers in negotiating employment equity plans70. In addition, 
unskilled workers are concerned primarily with basic issues of wages, benefits and unfair 
dismissals, and less invested in employment equity, especially where they are pessimistic 
about prospects for skill acquisition and promotion71. 
The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) mandate and legislation provide an 
incentive structure for employment equity and skills development in favor of the black 
population. The concept of BEE, although it had been articulated since the late 1980s, 
was formalized through the BEE Commission’s proceedings and institutionalized in the 
Broad-Based BEE Act (2003). Beyond compliance with employment equity legislation, 
                                                 
69 Author’s interviews with Johan de Lange, senior official, Confederation of Employers of South 
Africa (COFESA), November 26, 2007, and Andries Bezuidenhout, October 30, 2007. 
 
70 Author’s interview with Johan de Lange. 
 
71 Author’s interview with Rudi Dicks, Labor Market Coordinator, Cosatu, December 4, 2007 
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BEE institutes a metering system – the BEE Scorecard, audited by private firms – in 
which participants earn a composite score for performance across seven weighted 
elements. The weightage of ownership, skills development and employment equity are 
relatively high.  
The BEE program adds a dimension to affirmative action in employment, in that 
participation of employers is voluntary, and is incentivized by the rewards of public 
procurement and state-private sector dealings. Furthermore, BEE’s targets are centered 
on black advancement, whereas employment equity legislation does not specify targets 
and includes women and disabled as beneficiaries, and certain minimal compliance levels 
are higher under BEE72. The organizational constraints of firm scale are incorporated into 
legislation through allowance under BEE for small companies to select of four out of 
seven elements, i.e. small businesses can opt to not pursue employment equity73. 
 
2. 3. 2. 4. Corporate ownership and control 
 Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is subject to various interpretations in terms of 
its meaning and scope, and its relation to employment equity and affirmative action. As 
with the Malaysian case of the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community 
(BCIC), our interest in BEE recognizes the political and economic importance of 
ownership and control over capital, especially in its potential influence on increasing 
black representation in management and on the distribution of earned income. BEE is 
                                                 
72 For instance, whereas the mandatory skills development levy is one percent of payroll for all 
employees, to obtain points under BEE companies must spend three percent on training black 
employees. 
 
73 Author’s interview with Jeffrey Ndumo, Director of BBBEE partnerships, Department of Trade 
and Industry, November 27, 2007. 
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often thought of as a program for redistributing ownership and wealth – and in both 
concept and practice, that was the case from 1994 to the early 2000s74. Black corporate 
ownership proceeded in an ad hoc manner through the 1990s, at the initiative of white 
capital and through a series of mechanisms, with limited and erratic outcomes. The 
formation of the BEE Commission in 1998 and its deliberations yielded discourses on 
‘maximalist’ and ‘minimalist’ paradigms of BEE, based on the scope of black 
empowerment as well as the intensity of intervention – whether the state administers 
programs in a more indicative or dirigiste manner. The Commission decided on a 
maximalist approach, with expansive objectives including ownership and control over 
capital, employment equity, and skills development (Gqubule 2006). However, up until 
the final Commission Report of 2001, the main thrust of BEE remained in the arena of 
ownership and control (Ponte, Roberts and van Sittert 2007)75.  
The Commission’s foundation and reports signified government’s serious 
commitment to BEE and served notice to white capital to take up transformation more 
seriously76. Business sectors began drafting industry charters of procedures, targets and 
timelines for ownership transfer and broader inclusion of historically disadvantaged 
individuals. At the same time, public outcries over concentrations of ownership among a 
black, politically-linked elite, compelled construction of a broader scheme for spreading 
                                                 
74 The rhetoric of the early Mbeki Presidency is telltale. Speaking to the Black Management 
Forum in 1999, he asserted: “As part of the realization of the aim to eradicate racism in our 
country, we must strive to create and strengthen a black capitalist class. A critical part to create a 
non-racial society, is the deracialization of the ownership of productive property” (cited in 
Gumede 2002: 207).  
 
75 The decision in the Commission’s report to name the proposed legislation the BEE Act, instead 
of the commercial equity act, was made at the last minute (Author’s interview with Duma 
Gqubule, November 3, 2007). 
 
76 Author’s interview with Roger Southall, December 7, 2007. 
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benefits. Aside from criticisms of wealth acquisition, the hoped for and hyped up impact 
of a ‘patriotic African bourgeoisie’ on transformation within firms also largely failed to 
materialize, whether for systemic-behavioral reasons – black capitalists are as self-
interested as any capitalists – or practical reasons – having incurred heavy debt to acquire 
stakes, they were primarily motivated to pay back77. The Broad-Based BEE Act of 2003 
consolidated the empowerment project, and laid the groundwork for the drafting of 
‘codes of good practice’ for measuring BEE. The BEE Codes, drafted and redrafted over 
a long process and finally gazetted in February 2007, schematize a BEE points system, as 
well as align industry charters to a coordinated set of targets. The seven categories and 
respective score allocations demonstrate an institutional broadening of BEE, although it 
is too soon to evaluate the impact. 
 A few other strands of intervention that can potentially engage in advancing black 
ownership and control are worth mentioning, to fill in this overview of affirmative action 
institutions. Some agencies pursue transformation in a trustee-type relationship, on behalf 
of the black community as a whole. The National Empowerment Fund (NEF), an agency 
of the Department of Trade and Industry, provides financing for BEE equity transactions. 
The Public Investment Corporation (PIC), wholly owned by the South African 
government, deploys public pension funds to push for transformation in companies 
through exerting stakeholder influence78. 
                                                 
77 Author’s interview with Lumkile Mondi, Chief Economist, Industrial Development 
Corporation, November 28, 2007. 
 
78 A number of other development finance institutions operate with a more restricted scope of AA. 
Two main entities, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and Khula Enterprise Finance 
Ltd, officially allocate credit on developmental, not race preferential, bases. However, BEE 
considerations are factored into their operations (Consulta Research 2007, Khula Annual Report 
2007). 
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2. 3. 2. 5. Managerial and enterprise development 
2. 3. 2. 5. 1. Employment Equity 
 
The development of black managerial and entrepreneurial capacities can be connected 
to four legislative or policy elements: employment equity, preferential public 
procurement, BEE and public enterprise employment. As discussed above, black 
representation in management and in owning and operating businesses remains one of the 
more elusive areas of South Africa’s transformation. While employment equity can 
compel management to become more racially representative, relinquishment of decision-
making power will assuredly face resistance, especially in family-based companies and 
medium-size firms with relatively fewer positions to reallocate. Additionally, large firms 
have resources to create either token positions or insert blacks into management posts 
without commensurate responsibility.  
One rationale behind employment equity is the mandate for suitably qualified persons 
of disadvantaged groups previously unfairly denied recruitment or promotion to be given 
opportunities to acquire experiences that can only be learned on the job, perhaps leading 
to such persons venturing on their own. Resistance toward enforced entry to top 
management may propel capable blacks to start own businesses, although this will 
depend on a confluence of other ancillary factors, especially access to credit. Considering 
the constraints, we should take note that EE is limited in its capacity to cultivate black-
owned and operated enterprises. 
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2. 3. 2. 5. 2. Preferential Public Procurement + BEE 
 
The preferential public procurement program has become a key instrument of 
affirmative action in managerial and enterprise development. South Africa began to 
leverage its lucrative government contract system to promote black-owned and operated 
business from about 2000. The terms of engagement were broadly codified in the 
Preferential Public Procurement Framework Act (PPPFA) (2000), which stipulates 
allocation of 80-90 points for price and 10-20 points for specific goals, depending on the 
size of contract. The specific goals stated in the Act include “contracting with historically 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on basis of race, gender or disability” and 
“implementing programs of the RDP”. Hence, procurement practices operated with a 
clear template for AA, although the initial terms of engagement were rather imprecise. 
The procurement system has been given greater clarity and structure under the aegis of 
BEE, with the BEE Codes, which are much more detailed that the goals outlined in the 
PPPFA, serving as the basis for preferential selection. In practice, of course, government 
procurement is still exposed to misuse and abuse, most acutely through fronting, 
especially for higher value-added projects79. The BEE Codes, by drawing in other 
empowerment meters, may attenuate fronting, although the practice remains controversial 
and is widely believed to be pervasive.  
Factoring BEE scores into open tenders for government projects presumably injects a 
competitive dimension and gives bidders a fillip to pursue the various elements of the 
points system. The Codes are in fact designed with public procurement in view – with 
implication that every organ of state and public entity must take codes into account in 
                                                 
79 Author’s interview with Lumkile Mondi, November 28, 2007. 
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issuing licenses or concessions, in developing and implementing preferential procurement, 
in the sale of SOEs, and in partnerships with the private sector. Large companies also 
earn points in accordance with the BEE score of their subsidiaries and vendors, or for 
financially assisting the development of smaller enterprises. BEE and preferential 
procurement is a recently institutionalized centerpiece of government policy pursuing 
affirmative action objectives; hence, its material effect is largely yet to be realized. 
Licensing, by forging a tighter relationship between government and license-holder, is 
arguably more effective than procurement in advancing black business development80. 
However, the scope for licensing is more limited, and more favorable to large-scale 
operations.  
 
2. 3. 2. 5. 3. Public Enterprises 
 
 South Africa’s public enterprises have emerged as institutions for pursuing AA 
objectives in employment, and are specially positioned as a training ground for black 
enterprise development. The privatization agenda pushed in the early post-Apartheid 
years – on more ideological, free market grounds than as a redistributive instrument for 
affirmative action – unraveled in the late 1990s, and momentum fizzled out. The 
prominence of public enterprises was reinvigorated in the early 2000s, together with a 
shift toward a more expansive role for government procurement and state agencies. 
While the public enterprises are similar to government departments in terms of the state’s 
direct influence over employment equity practices, public enterprises are largely engaged 
in production and are relatively more exposed than the bureaucracy to competition81. 
                                                 
80 Author’s interview with Duma Gqubule, November 3, 2007. 
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South Africa’s experiences with poor service delivery have also raised expectations of 
paying consumer on monopolies such as power utility Eskom. Public enterprises occupy 
a space in between the public services, where blacks have risen into administrative ranks 
but may not be sufficiently equipped for managing in competitive markets, and the 
private sector, which has embraced employment equity unevenly. However, the socio-
psychological effects on the black community of demonstrating competency and attaining 
success in visible ways are significant and important. 
 
Table 2-5. South Africa: Affirmative action programs and notable features 
 Programs / Legislation 
 
Notable features 
 
Tertiary 
Education 
 
 
§ Institutional redress 
  to narrow HWI-HBI   
  disparities 
 
§ Individual / social redress 
to increase enrollment of 
disadvantaged persons 
 
 
§ Institutional autonomy emphasized 
 
§ AA programs devolved to institution level, 
public funding available for implementing 
equity plans 
 
§ NSFAS operates on an individual basis 
 
 
Employment 
 
§ Employment Equity Act 
1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) 
 
 
§ Mandatory for: 
§ public sector (except defense) 
§ private sector (except small    
enterprises) 
 
§ EEA scope:  
§ recruitment, promotion and skills 
development 
 
§ BEE: voluntary participation, public 
procurement provides incentive to engage 
in elements, including employment equity 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
81 For example, South African Airlines competes internationally, and public highways have 
applied competitive pressure on Transnet, the railway operator (interview with Sean Phillips, 
Department of Public Enterprises, December 5, 2007). 
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Table 2-5 (continued) 
 Programs / Legislation 
 
Notable features 
 
Ownership 
and control 
 
 
 
§ BEE 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Initiative from private capital in 1990s 
 
§ More structured and institutionalized with 
BEE Commission, industrial charters and 
BEE codes 
 
 
 
Managerial 
and 
enterprise 
development 
 
§ Employment Equity 
 
 
 
§ Public enterprises  
 
 
§ Preferential public 
procurement 
 
 
 
§ BEE 
 
 
§ Black managers hired or promoted under 
employment equity may start own 
companies 
 
§ Role in demonstrating competency and 
capacity to deliver 
 
§ Framework from 2000: preference on 
basis of ownership (previously 
disadvantaged persons)  
 
 
§ BEE Codes (2007) broaden scope of 
criteria for public procurement 
§ Seven elements (and points): 
§ Ownership                               (20) 
§ Management control               (10) 
§ Employment equity                 (15) 
§ Skills development                  (15) 
§ Preferential procurement         (20) 
§ Enterprise development           (15) 
§ Socio-economic development   (5) 
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2. 3. 3. Political economic context 
2. 3. 3. 1. Complex transitions: Political and economic dimensions 
Negotiating a political settlement took primacy in South Africa’s transition out of 
Apartheid, for fundamental and strategic reasons. Fundamentally, a comprehensively new 
and democratized political order provided the bedrock for facilitating concurrent 
transformations – and incorporating tensions – in economic and social realms. Of 
particular relevance to this study are the political and constitutional provisions to balance 
majority rule and minority rights, black political dominance and white economic security, 
fair discrimination and equal opportunity. Strategically, the ANC had for decades 
emphasized Apartheid’s political dimension over socio-economic modes of oppression, 
encapsulated in the Freedom Charter, its “only official statement of economic intent” 
(Sparks 2003: 176). The liberation movement, under ANC leadership, accordingly 
pressed first and foremost for political democratization, having also mobilized masses to 
undermine the Apartheid government and economy. Strategies for the late Apartheid state 
and white capital to preserve rights and interests and resolve a decades-long accumulation 
crisis also converged on a negotiated political transition (Marais 2001).  
A maelstrom of circumstances in the late 1980s and early 1990s that could not be 
fully predicted or controlled, including mass social instability, potential civil war, 
anxieties over the military’s allegiance and uncertainties over homeland administrations, 
further compelled the centralized, summit-level level political bargaining and 
constitution-building that took place (Sparks 2003, Terreblanche 2002). The means for 
resolving the clash of political and ideological agendas across the spectrum of issues, and 
for unifying a fractured nation and fostering continuity in public administration, came in 
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the form of a negotiated settlement transferring political power and guaranteeing socio-
economic rights82. 
The transition to a post-Apartheid economic order, however, stands in marked 
contrast to the negotiated political settlement. While the political transition was a high-
level bargaining process, dialogue and deal-making over economic spheres were 
conducted by various delegated groups or agenda proponents in a dispersed, non-
consultative, and somewhat opaque and tentative manner. Economic policy and 
development of post-Apartheid economic institutions happened through more gradual 
and contested processes that reflect conflicting ideology, lop-sided power and experience, 
and lack of coordination. We touch on only a few out of many proposals and documents, 
and their respective proponents.  
From the mid-1980s, ANC economists met outside of South Africa with various 
groups, including NP government delegates. Between 1955 and 1990, the ANC had 
published no new statement on economic policy issues except to reaffirm a commitment 
to the Freedom Charter in its 1988 constitutional guidelines83. From the late 1980s, 
various ‘economic scenarios’ were promulgated, most prominently by corporate 
conglomerates (e.g. Anglo American, Old Mutual), parastatals (e.g. Sanlam) or business 
organizations (e.g. the South African Chamber of Commerce). These overtures reflect the 
strength and autonomy of the corporate sector, as well as the conservative milieu of the 
                                                 
82 Even equal suffrage was contested. Up to 1992, the NP and de Klerk assured white 
constituency of commitment to uphold a “statutory entrenched minority [i.e. white] vote”. 
However, in September 1992 the NP accepted “sunset clauses” under the auspices of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU), with the important guarantee of continuity of employment 
of white bureaucrats, which elicited agreement to a “one person one vote” system and the five-
year power sharing arrangement in the GNU (Terreblanche 2002: 80). 
 
83 Marais (2001) points out that the lack of specific outlines of economic policy in the Freedom 
Charter also afforded the ANC room to maneuver in negotiations. 
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NP administration, which had initiated privatization from the 1980s and shifted towards 
deflationary macroeconomic policy in the early 1990s. Big business went out of its way 
to warn the democratic movement of ostensible dangers in pursuing a comprehensive 
redistributive program, and maintained a position on Apartheid that not only denied 
profiting from the system, but also asserted that economic crisis resulted from an over-
regulated system – and therefore supply-side policies and trickle-down effects would 
restore growth and prosperity to a stuttering economy (Bond 2000, Terreblanche 2002).  
In contrast to the constant message emanating from the NP and business sector, ANC 
stances wavered. By the late 1980s, the ANC had gravitated away from Freedom Charter 
pronouncements towards social democratic visions84. This ideological conversion was 
augmented by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the portent of a triumphal global 
capitalist order. Amid the plethora of policy groups and policy documents, a few stand 
out as landmarks on South Africa’s winding path to a new economic order. In terms of 
overall programs of action, the ANC’s Department of Economic Policy (DEP) initially 
called for an active role for the state. However, its 1992 report, Ready to Govern, which 
had become a de facto draft electoral platform, had excised mention of growth through 
redistribution and scaled down its envisioned role of the state. The Reconstruction and 
                                                 
84 Shifting positions on nationalization reflect the uncertainties and ambiguities in economic 
policy formulation, and its weaker hand in the debate. At Mandela’s release in 1990, 
nationalization retained salience on the ANC’s agenda. Over the following two years, however, 
the ANC altered its position on nationalization and an expansive redistribution agenda. The 1992 
World Economic Forum marked a watershed event, where Mandela decisively turned against 
nationalization and towards a system centered on the private sector with limited roles for the 
public sector in social and welfare services (Sparks 2003: 174-176). 
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Development Program, the ANC’s 1994 election manifesto, articulated a broad outline 
for reform, but never translated into actual policy priorities or allocation of resources85.  
More rigid foundations were laid in the specific quest for a macroeconomic paradigm. 
In 1993, the NP government’s Department of Finance promulgated its Normative 
Economic Model (NEM), a document propagating economic orthodoxy that would 
cement state dispositions on economic matters beyond the transition (Bond 2000, Marais 
2001, Terreblanche 2002). South Africa’s macroeconomic framework was consolidated 
with the adoption in June 1996 of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
program. South Africa adopted GEAR under some duress from the corporate and finance 
sectors86, but its conception and behind-the-scenes formulation, from late 1995, as an 
enhancement of the NEM suggest that the policies would have become regimented, 
regardless of public debate (see Hirsch 2006: 99-101) 87. GEAR has been broadly 
criticized on its theoretical underpinnings, and in light of the South African economy’s 
falling short of all major growth, employment and investment targets except deficit 
reduction (Michie and Padayachee 1998, Habib and Padayachee 2000, Weeks 1999, 
                                                 
85 The RDP was diluted and altered almost beyond recognition in the 1994 White Paper on the 
RDP. The RDP Minister was not a designated government department and clear jurisdictions, 
rendering the program practically inoperative (Sparks 2003). 
 
86 The SAF (South Africa Foundation) published Growth for All with the support of the 50 largest 
corporations, asserting that the government had no credible and comprehensive economic policy 
framework. The appointment of Trevor Manuel as Finance Minister in February 1996 was 
received negatively by business. The South African economy was also performing poorly in early 
1996, saddled with high unemployment and stagnant growth, and the Rand was sliding, to which 
Manuel responded by announcing initiatives to placate the corporate and financial sectors 
(Terreblanche 2002). 
 
87 GEAR was written and pushed aggressively, and obtained approval from the ANC’s National 
Executive Committee, despite opposition from alliance partners COSATU and SACP, with 
Mbeki and Manuel closing the matter as “non-negotiable”, while Mandela acknowledged: “I 
confess even the ANC learnt of GEAR far too late – when it was almost complete” (Marais 2001: 
162). 
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Gqubule 2006, Pollin et al. 2006, Terreblanche 2002). Public positive opinion of GEAR 
is harder to find, and points to the decline in fiscal deficit and generally lower inflation 
rates as stabilizing outcomes and preconditions to the upswing in growth and 
employment after 2001 (Hirsch 2006)88. 
GEAR has nominally faded as a policy platform, but its macroeconomic mainstays 
and policy instruments are well entrenched, particularly with the official adoption of 
inflation-targeting in 2000. Nonetheless, while keeping inflation within its designated 3-6 
percent band dictates monetary policy, the government’s position on public spending has 
become more expansionary. This shift responds to societal pressures, skills shortages and 
BEE demands, as well as more effective tax revenue collection. The Accelerated Shared 
Growth Initiative – South Africa (ASGISA), launched in 2006, has given a new mandate 
for harnessing public investment towards growth and distributive goals, focusing on 
infrastructure and skills development.  
The negotiated transition broadly traded-off political and economic demands and 
concessions, but omitted alternative visions and some potential trade-offs within the 
economic terrain. The enfranchised black majority was able to bring moral and electoral 
weight to bear on political negotiations. But it conceded much of the economic agenda to 
supply-side and trickle-down arguments, persuaded by pro-market ideas and efficiency 
arguments and apparently believing that the economy would benefit from a structural 
break from the past and a jolt into a new economic order. Of course, it is difficult to 
present counterfactuals, and inconclusive how growth and distribution would have turned 
out under a different ideological orientation.  
                                                 
88 Author’s interview with Cheslyn Mostert, former economic policy co-ordinator in the ANC 
Presidency (December 6, 2007). 
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However, the marginalization of varying proposals, such as from MERG, and 
dismissal of alternatives in general, precluded some potential bargains. For instance, the 
black population’s demands for transformation could have been moderated in return for 
predominantly white capital’s acceptance of bearing a higher share of transformation 
costs. In the face of mounting fiscal debt on the one hand, and growing prospects for 
private finance, South Africa could have widened revenue collection through wealth 
related sources such as the capital gains tax (which was subsequently introduced in 2001). 
Also, the momentum towards trade and financial liberalization swung rapidly, arguably 
providing insufficient time to develop industrial policy and adapt capital controls to new 
modes of global finance. Reintroducing or amending regulations may have raised 
concerns about non-cooperation or abuse by business and fears of capital flight, but it is 
also perceivable that the clout and resistance of domestic capital, and expectations of 
capital inflows, were over-estimated89. 
Another aspect in which the political and economic transitions are important to our 
study concerns the temporal unfolding of affirmative action policies. Early after the 1994 
elections, much effort was invested in industrial relations and regulation of basic work 
conditions, areas of gross injustices and focal points of the liberation struggle, which 
accordingly became urgent areas of tri-partite engagement. Policies for racial redress and 
transformation of education and public sector employment (1995-97) preceded the 
Employment Equity and Skills Development Act, both of which were passed in 1998. 
Preferential public procurement and BEE were formalized soon after, with the formation 
of the BEE Commission in 1998 and BB-BEE Act in 2003 as official markers. 
                                                 
89 I am grateful to Seeraj Muhamed for this insight. 
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The point in sketching out the contestation for South Africa’s macroeconomic regime 
and the unfolding of AA-related legislation is not so much to deduce a logic to how AA 
transpired, but to locate AA programs in politico-economic and temporal context and to 
be cognizant of manifold constraints. South Africa’s multiple ransitions were 
characterized by varying degrees of coordination and reaction, while facing resource 
constraints and striving to accommodate complex, contending interests. While criticism 
abounds on the lack of policy coherence and particular policy designs, but it is 
questionable whether a coherent and systematic process of transformation was even 
possible90. 
 
2. 3. 3. 2. Economic structure and performance 
2. 3. 3. 2. 1. Advanced capitalist class and big business 
Various features of the South African capitalist class mentioned or alluded to above 
are worth reiterating. By the 1980s, white capital was politicized and organized, and 
concentrated in ownership, yet significantly autonomous from government. The English-
speaking section of the capitalist class, dominant in privately-built business, had acquired 
considerable experience and tact in cultivating personal ties and reaching 
accommodations with the Afrikaner-dominant state91. Afrikaner capital, significantly 
grown out of Apartheid affirmative action programs, was more entwined in institutional 
relationship with the state, but had been shifting ideologically, perhaps expediently as 
well, towards privatization and looser ties with government. It is hard to discern an 
                                                 
90 Author’s interview with Steven Friedman, November 22, 2007. 
 
91 Indeed, until 1997-98, white business remained hostile towards the ANC and still placed faith 
in the NP within the GNU. It was only after the passage of GEAR that white business began to 
see ANC as a friendly to them, a factor in the subsequent rapid demise of the NP (Author’s 
interview with Stephen Gelb, November 1, 2007). 
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organized black capitalist class poised in the early-1990s with a clear agenda for pursuing 
its interest. Although organizations such as NAFCOC and BMF, lacking liberation 
struggle credentials, strove to exert policy influence, the rise of a nationally powerful 
black business elite is a later development. Practical constraints were also difficult to 
surmount. Southall (2005) notes the problems to black capital formation posed by 
industrial concentration, but assesses that lack of experience and skill, and constricted 
access to capital were greater obstacles.  
What are the implications on affirmative action? First, the redistribution program on 
the whole was eroded, as the post-Apartheid state embraced a macroeconomic regime 
preserving capitalist levers of power. The state’s capacity to formulate and execute policy 
is circumscribed by the structural power of capital and the favorable macroeconomic 
framework in place. While it will be an overstatement to describe the state as captured by 
capital, it is beholden to the primacy of sustaining ‘investor confidence’.  
Second, while big business most volubly advocates neoliberal policies, it also 
possesses most resources to engage in affirmative action and BEE, having more 
employment positions and assets to redistribute, as well as economic power. The upper 
strata of society are among the most racially integrated92. The basic structure of BEE that 
has emerged out of interactive processes between the ANC government, BEE 
Commission and industry charters, has also shifted the process “(possibly unintendedly) 
partly away from political debate and towards technical and system performance 
discussions” (Ponte, Roberts and van Sittert 2007: 941-942). The BEE codes do 
correspond with less state intervention in selection processes, although the determination 
of development projects remains in state hands. Policies to cultivate black ownership and 
                                                 
92 Author’s interview with Adam Habib, November 20, 2007. 
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enterprise run the risk of departing from original socio-economic and developmental 
objectives towards passive market-based solutions.  
Third, there appears to have been little penetration into main sectors or growth in 
scale of black business established during the Apartheid era. Those who have prospered 
in big business in post-Apartheid years are largely composed of a new generation of 
black capitalists (Southall 2004, Randall 1996, Iheduru 2004). Inevitable limits to 
ownership transfer will also be reached in areas and firms dominated by white capital, 
which underscores the importance of creating of new, politically independent black 
enterprises. The GNU administration did express a priority for developing small, medium 
and micro enterprises (SMMEs), and passed the Small Business Act in 1996, but the 
program has failed to take off. 
Fourth, the entry of blacks into an entrenched capitalist structure poses dilemmas for 
the transformation project. BEE projected the notion of ‘patriotic’ African bourgeoisie to 
engender change within firms and trickle-down benefits to wider society, as a furtherance 
of the ‘national democratic revolution’(Marais 2001 and Southall 2004). This endeavor 
has not been pursued much beyond a code of conduct for black capitalists, or a form of 
moral suasion with voluntary participation. The nouveau riche, however, are generally 
observed to behave in no substantially different manner than general wealth owners 
towards the community – although their obligations to extended families are likely to be 
more extensive. Thus, expectations of positive impacts of black capitalist class 
development are more realistically placed on psychological confidence-boosting effects 
of breaching historical barriers, should black businesses, public enterprises and 
government departments demonstrate capacities to compete, innovate and govern. 
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2. 3. 3. 2. 2. Economic growth and public expenditures  
The South African economy entered its democratic era characterized by a 
contradictory mix of slow growth (annual real GDP growth averaged 0.3 percent per year 
over 1990-1994), high unemployment and mass poverty, alongside deindustrialization, 
relatively high capital-intensity and skills shortages93. Low growth in the 1980s had 
crippled training and apprenticeship programs, administered mostly by parastatals, which 
still have not managed to recover94.These conditions posed major limitations on the 
priority accorded to and resources available for affirmative action.  
Since 1994, the overall economic performance went through various phases, as 
indicated by two key indicators: real growth in GDP and public expenditures. From 1994 
to 1998, real GDP grew 2.6 percent per year, while real public expenditures contracted by 
0.6 percent per year. Average annual real GDP growth subsequently saw continued slow 
growth until the mid-2000s, registering 3.3 percent (1998-2000), 3.2 percent (2000-03), 
and 5.1 percent (2003-06). Real annual growth in government consumption saw a 
steadier increase, from 1.7 percent (1998-2000) to 4.6 percent (2000-03) to 5.4 percent 
(2003-06)95. 
The patterns of public expenditure impact on the resources available for public sector 
employment and affirmative action programs involving procurement. Fiscal tightening 
                                                 
93 The proportion of industry in GDP declined continuously from 45.7 percent in 1981 to 40.1 
percent in 1990, 34.8 percent in 1995, 31.8 percent in 2000 and 30.7 percent in 2005 (World 
Bank World Development Indicators).  
 
94 The number of new apprenticeships fell from 14,497 in 1982 to 9,660 in 1986 (Standing, 
Sender and Weeks 1996: 386-388). The numbers of workers involved in industrial training and 
total apprenticeships fell, respectively, from 736,581 and 29,826 in 1986 to 152,870 and 16,577 
in 1998 (Hirsch 2006: 185). 
95 Author’s calculations from data accessed at: databank.worldbank.org. 
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resulted in employment losses in the public sector in the late 1990s96. However, public 
administration also shifted organizationally, in its adoption of ‘managerialism’ and 
market-oriented initiatives, namely ‘new public management’ (Chipkin 2008). The public 
sector was reoriented around an expanded and managerial role for officials, in contrast to 
conventional hierarchies and bureaucratic operations. As a result, the proportion of public 
service employees classified as managers has risen, which also increases the openings for 
blacks at those occupational and salary levels. Accordingly, the number of public service 
workers of management rank increased from 24,000 in 1995 to over 70,000 in 2001, 
while total employment declined by 125,000 between 1994 and 2001 (Naidoo 2008: 108-
109). However, as Chipkin (2008) argues, the new system has promoted under-qualified 
personnel to posts, sometimes newly created and poorly defined, who are unable to 
perform the functions, and has induced rivalry between departments for staff, potentially 
inflating mobility and vacancy rates and hampering service delivery.  
 
                                                 
 
96 A ‘leaner government’ strategy was endorsed by Mandela in February 1998 in a state of union 
address, stressing the need to shed some of 1.2 million public sector jobs to prevent over-
spending (Hirsch 2006: 164). 
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2. 4. Malaysia and South Africa in Comparative Perspective 
Comparisons of affirmative action policies in Malaysia and South Africa and their 
political economic contexts have faded in and out of academic attention. In the early- to 
mid-1990s, when South Africa sought out other countries’ experiences in devising its 
economic policies, Malaysia stood out as a model of majority-favoring affirmative action 
in a diversified economy. Much of this attention, it seems, was not substantively 
informed, prompting Emsley (1996) and Hart (1994) to caution against overestimating 
the commonalities between Malaysia and South Africa. The fact that South Africa 
initially adopted little of Malaysia’s policies – saliently, in drawing on inputs from 
Canada and the U.S. for employment equity legislation – may have been influenced by 
intellectual realization of some fundamental differences with Malaysia, but was also – if 
not more – likely compelled by the constraints of negotiating multiple transitions 
(democratization, governmental restructuring, counterbalancing white dominance in 
every sector, etc.) outlined in the previous section. 
Nearly twenty years after the democratic transition, and almost a decade and a half 
into formal affirmative action, similarities and differences between Malaysia and South 
Africa have remained, but have also shown some new characteristics, providing valuable 
material for comparative analysis. This section will discuss notable comparative elements 
of affirmative action programs in Malaysia and South Africa, and the political economic 
context out of which the policies emerged. 
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2. 4. 1. Affirmative action programs 
2. 4. 1. 1. Representation in tertiary education 
 
Malaysia has maintained a centralized administration of affirmative action in tertiary 
education and, to a lesser extent, in secondary education. The main instruments, formed 
at a time of severe under-provision of secondary and tertiary education, consist of 
enrollment quotas in public universities and government scholarships, and Bumiputera-
exclusive institutes and scholarships. In contrast, South Africa has adopted a more 
decentralized framework and implemented AA programs only at the tertiary level. 
Universities had their autonomy preserved and were mandated to pursue broadly defined 
redress agendas. Having inherited vastly unequal historically white institutes (HWIs) and 
historically black institutes (HBIs), much focus was placed on increasing black 
representation in HWIs and narrowing disparities between HWIs and HBIs. Very little 
comparative attention has been paid to educational institutions, with rare exceptions such 
as van der Westhuizen (2002: 45) who maintains that Malaysia’s enrolment quotas are 
“far more discriminatory” than corresponding programs in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
The contrast between the two countries in AA instruments in tertiary education will be 
discussed further in later sections of this study. 
 
2. 4. 1. 2. Representation in upper-level occupations 
 
The measures Malaysia adopted to increase Bumiputera representation in managerial, 
professional and technical positions are comparatively lesser in scope, and implemented 
through a less formalized and codified process. The public sector has abided by de facto 
hiring and promotion quotas or race preference norms, and has desisted from instituting 
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mechanisms for monitoring or inducing equitable group representation within 
government departments. There is no broad private sector and cross-industry program 
along the lines of employment equity legislation, although the Industrial Coordination 
Act (1975) may have had some impact – limited at best – in the manufacturing sector, 
while some sectors appear to have adopted ad hoc targets for increasing Bumiputera 
representation in management. The guideline for group representation in employment, as 
stipulated in the New Economic Policy in 1971, is the racial composition of the 
population.  
In marked contrast, South Africa institutionalized an employment equity law 
requiring medium- and large-scale firms to increase the proportion of previously 
disadvantaged individuals and provide training where they are under-represented, chiefly 
in professional and managerial positions. The legislation, backed by monitoring 
mechanisms and punitive consequences for non-compliance, covers all industries and 
encompasses private and public sectors, forming the bedrock of affirmative action in the 
labor market. Black economic empowerment, through leveraging the reward of public 
procurement, theoretically supplements employment equity by providing some 
inducement for firms to increase their efforts in hiring and promoting disadvantaged 
persons. South Africa adopts as a baseline that the racial and gender composition of 
organizations should reflect the economically active population.  
Overall, Malaysia’s and South Africa’s respective approaches to the employment 
branch of AA serve as contrasting case studies. However, both countries are alike in 
setting the racial composition of the population as quotas or targets from the start, instead 
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of an incremental approach in correspondence with growth in the supply of suitably 
qualified candidates. 
 
2. 4. 1. 3. Managerial and enterprise development 
 
Malaysia’s passage towards cultivating Bumiputera owned and operated enterprises 
followed a meandering, experimental and heavily state-led path, from emphasis on state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and takeover of foreign-owned companies, to heavy industries, 
privatization of SOEs, followed by renationalization and resurgence of government-
linked companies. Government procurement and licensing have also been geared towards 
Bumiputera enterprise development.  
South Africa’s approach has also been incremental, but in contrast, leans relatively 
more on statutory and market-based instruments. Formal programs did not take shape 
until the late 1990s, with the establishment of the Black economic Commission in 1998 
and passage of the BEE Act in 2003. Concomitantly, government procurement and 
licensing operated within a less codified preferential framework, but became subsumed 
into the black economic empowerment program with the BEE Act and the expansion of 
government procurement. The BEE Codes, promulgated in 2007, lay out an incentive 
framework for granting preference based on performance in advancing black persons in, 
inter alia, ownership and control, and enterprise development. Although South Africa 
indicated in the mid-1990s that privatization of parastatals, initiated in the 1980s, would 
proceed, the policy largely did not materialize, and public enterprises have incorporated 
the BEE mandate.  
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2. 4. 2. Political economic context 
First, the provisions for affirmative action are embedded in the respective 
constitutions of both countries, with some noteworthy differences. The Malaysian 
Constitution stipulates Bumiputera “special position” as the basis for specific reservations 
and quotas, while the South African Constitution provides for measures to protect or 
advance persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. In retrospect, one can debate the 
wisdom and/or language of these constitutional articles, but more productive energy will 
be spent on prosecuting affirmative action effectively and prudently, within the bounds of 
the Constitution. In both cases, preferential programs are optional, not mandatory. In the 
case of Malaysia, Article 153 stipulates safeguarding Bumiputera “special position” not 
as a mandate in absolute terms, but as one to be exercised “as may be necessary” (See 
Appendix 1). South Africa’s legal establishment of disadvantage due to unfair 
discrimination as the basis for AA is judiciously worded to statutorily limit the scope and 
duration of policies. Thus, in both countries, the pursuit of AA, but not its perpetuation, is 
constitutionally legitimated.  
Second, contrasts in the transition towards extensive affirmative action must be 
reiterated. Malaysia sustained a Malay-dominant political order and bureaucracy 
throughout post-Independence nationhood, then reinforced Malay political power when it 
expanded and intensified AA. South Africa transformed from Apartheid minority rule to 
democratic majority rule. As affirmative action incrementally unfolded, the Malaysian 
executive branch of government expanded its powers and reasserted a pro-
Malay/Bumiputera agenda, while the South Africa democratized and grappled with 
balancing black advancement against potential backlashes from a white population 
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dominant in every industry and across public and private sectors97. Emphatically, the 
Malaysian state was in a much stronger position vis-à-vis capital, and faced problems of 
lesser magnitude. South Africa negotiated a transition to democratic rule amidst social 
instability and fears of capital flight, and had to unify a fragmented public service, 
integrate separate systems of education, among other challenges which required a more 
conciliatory posture. On the other hand, the government could engage white economic 
and governmental entities from the standpoint of directly correcting previous 
discrimination, whereas in Malaysia, Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera establishments 
were not historically opposite sides of directly exploitative relationships. Thus, while 
South Africa adopted a more legislative route with a more constraints on executive power, 
the scope of some of its AA institutions, notably employment equity, are broader than in 
Malaysia. 
The extent of domestic inter-racial confrontation impacted on AA policy in the initial 
stages. The command of whites over the South African economy vastly exceeds the 
command of the non-Bumiputera over the Malaysian economy. Whites owned virtually 
all productive land and capital, held all senior positions in government and business 
across all industries, and reserved the best schools and universities, whereas Chinese and 
Indians held substantial but not entirely dominating positions in education, employment 
and ownership. Additionally, the dearth of tertiary education in Malaysia allowed for 
creation of new universities favoring Bumiputera enrolment, whereas South Africa’s 
reputed historically white institutions and backward historically black institutions pre-
existed affirmative action. The Malaysian state also exerted relatively more leverage over 
                                                 
97 Padayachee and Valodia (2002) make a general point about the cross-country differences in 
democratic constraints on executive power. 
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capital, and could target foreign owned companies as sources of wealth transfer and 
employment, somewhat buffering domestic conflict (Crouch 2001). In contrast, South 
Africa’s conflicts were more internal, with the power of white capital entrenched and able 
to utilize the threat of capital flight more credibly in a financially globalized environment 
(Hart 1994).  
These differences, nonetheless, were not all sustained over time, as affirmative action 
programs and laws unfolded in both countries. In particular, the means for affirmative 
action expanded in South Africa, and its government’s stance grew more assertive. Of 
course, policy approaches and instruments still differ markedly, as we discuss later. 
Among the manifestations of this heightening of state-led policy include the expansion of 
employment equity in the public sector while the ‘sunset clause’ – the retention of white 
officials for administrative continuity – waned, which established the crucial role of 
government as an employer enforcing affirmative action in South Africa. Public sector 
employment has all along sustained a large portion of Bumiputera occupational mobility 
in Malaysia. Another area in which similarity has increased over time concerns 
privatization and state-ownership. Both countries have also passed through a phase where 
privatization was on the agenda – and was implemented and failed massively in Malaysia, 
but largely did not take off in South Africa – to a reinvigoration of large scale public 
enterprises in the 2000s.  
Third, there was a contrast in economic performance and conditions in the initial 
stages of affirmative action. The Malaysian economy grew robustly in the 1970s, while 
the South African economy experienced sluggish growth in the 1990s. The difference 
between Malaysia’s growth outcomes and South Africa’s growth prospects were 
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highlighted as key differences during the latter’s mid-1990s transition period (Emsley 
1996, Padayachee and Valodia 2002). Additionally, global conventions were more 
accommodating of expansionary policies in the 1970s, and oil prices soared, which 
funded development spending in Malaysia. Conversely, South Africa adopted, in line 
with the mainstream but also on its own accord, a deflationary macroeconomic 
framework, in a period of stable mineral prices (Padayachee and Valodia 2002). Overall, 
we can observe rapid economic and employment growth and public sector expansion in 
Malaysia, and sluggish growth, employment losses and public sector contraction in South 
Africa.  
The 2000s, however, see broadly similar conditions, with both economies growing 
modestly, and government spending expanding at higher rates. Malaysia recorded annual 
real GDP growth of 4.9 percent and annual real growth in government consumption of 
9.1 percent over 2000-2006. Correspondingly, South Africa registered 4.1 percent real 
GDP growth and 5.0 percent real government consumption growth98.  
 
 
                                                 
98 Author’s calculations from data accessed at: databank.worldbank.org. 
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Table 2-6. Malaysia and South Africa: Affirmative action programs and notable features 
Area Malaysia 
 
South Africa 
 
Tertiary 
education 
 
 
§ Racial quotas in public tertiary 
institutions; creation of Bumiputera-
exclusive institutions and 
scholarships 
 
§ Centralized administration 
 
§ Fragmentation by location and type: 
§ local public institutions 
§ local private institutions 
§ overseas institutions 
 
 
§ Redress programs within and 
between institutions 
 
 
 
§ Institutional autonomy 
 
§ Persistent disparities in student 
performance overall (black, 
especially African students 
lagging), and between HWIs 
and HBIs 
 
 
Upper-level 
occupations 
 
 
§ Public sector employment quotas / 
implicit racial preference 
 
§ Employment equity legislation: 
applies to public sector and 
medium- to large-scale private 
companies 
 
 
 
Management 
and 
enterprise 
development 
 
 
 
§ Phases of policy emphasis: 
§ State-owned enterprises (1970s) 
§ Takeover of foreign companies 
(1970s) 
§ Heavy industries  
  (early- to mid- 1980s) 
§ Privatization of state entities (late-
1980s – late-1990s) 
§ Government-linked companies 
(late-1990s – )  
 
§ Licensing and public procurement:  
§ Ownership and executive 
representation are predominant 
criteria  
 
 
 
§ Public enterprises 
 
§ Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE):    
§ codifies award system for 
public procurement and 
licensing 
§ reinforces employment 
equity and skills 
development 
§ integrates enterprise 
development through 
support for 
vendors/subsidiaries 
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Table 2-7. Malaysia and South Africa: Political economy context of affirmative action  
Area Malaysia 
 
South Africa 
 
Constitution 
 
 
§ Provisions for affirmative action 
 
§ Basis: special position of 
Bumiputera 
 
 
§ Provisions for affirmative action 
 
§ Basis: disadvantage due to 
unfair discrimination; equitable 
representation 
 
 
Institutional 
framework 
 
 
§ Discretionary executive 
authority 
 
§ Statutory and codified system 
 
Racial dynamics  
in governance 
and economic 
ownership 
 
 
§ Continuous Malay/Bumiputera 
political power and dominance 
in bureaucracy 
 
§ High foreign ownership, 
Chinese presence not dominant 
in all sectors 
 
 
§ Shift from white minority rule to 
black majority rule 
 
 
§ Dominant white ownership 
across all sectors 
 
Economic 
performance 
 
 
§ Robust growth and fiscal 
expansion (except for mid-1980s 
and late 1990s recession) 
 
§ Sluggish growth and fiscal 
contraction in late 1990s, 
steadier growth and fiscal 
expansion in 2000s 
 
 121 
2. 4. 3. Empirical approaches to affirmative action in Malaysia and South Africa 
The paucity of literature comparing Malaysia and South Africa extends to empirical 
work, where we find no reference point for constructing a framework for this study. 
Research on both countries individually has focused more on inequality on a national 
scale, not on the specific dimensions of inequality most pertinent to affirmative action – 
inter-racial disparities in educational and occupational outcomes. We will engage with 
those studies in the following chapters, but will not replicate an existing work or draw on 
any particular precedent. 
This study will survey outcomes in the key objectives of affirmative action, 
specifically by evaluating evidence on racial representation in tertiary education and 
targeted occupational groups. Earnings disparity officially lies outside the ambit of 
affirmative action. However, while affirmative action focuses on inequality in access and 
participation, the consequences of inequality in labor market outcomes, chiefly inter-
racial earnings disparity, are paramount. Increasing upward mobility of the designated 
group is expected to translate into narrowing earnings gaps, and hence warrants empirical 
enquiry. We refrain from attempting to measure asset or wealth inequality, maintaining 
our focus on earnings inequality that corresponds with AA policies in education and 
employment. Moreover, financial data are notoriously unavailable or incomplete, and 
non-earned income in higher income households tend to be under-reported. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MALAYSIA: PATTERNS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY, 1995 – 2005 
 
3. 1. Overview 
This chapter will explore patterns of racial inequality in Malaysia, with attention to 
educational and occupational dimensions that are particularly relevant to affirmative 
action. Our approach is empirical and exploratory, framing assessments around 
affirmative action objectives. We also navigate around the absence of the race variable in 
our income dataset, which precludes direct analyses of correlations of race with 
individual earnings, despite its centrality to this study. However, by tapping labor force 
and population census data, we are able to gather information on the correlations of race 
with group representation in upper educational and occupational strata. This chapter aims, 
specifically, to: 
1. Compile available statistics and address gaps in the literature on education and 
employment outcomes pertinent to affirmative action;  
2. Explore inter-racial earnings inequality, in view of severe data restrictions, by 
juxtaposing original findings against literature documenting inter-racial household 
income inequality;  
3. Compute patterns in the correspondence of educational attainment and occupational 
position with earnings; 
4. Summarize main findings and propose questions to be taken up in Chapter 4. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we derive, from a range of sources, 
information on the educational and occupational composition of the labor force and 
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employed population, including aspects that are often overlooked in the literature about 
racial representation and the progress of AA programs. We find gains in tertiary 
education attainment across race groups, although Indians and especially non-Bumiputera 
are lagging. The tertiary educational attainment of professionals and managers increased 
in Malaysia as a whole, suggesting that expansion of tertiary education is facilitating 
entry into these occupational groups.  
However, we also observe some disjunctures in the transition of graduates into the 
labor market, more markedly among Bumiputera. Labor force participation declines 
among tertiary educated working-age persons, while unemployment rises within the 
tertiary educated labor force and among young adults. Both trends occur by larger 
margins among Bumiputera. We reproduce official statistics showing that Bumiputera 
representation in upper-level occupations remained static over 1995-2005, in contrast to 
preceding periods during which their proportions grew. We also draw attention to the 
underlying pattern that most Bumiputera professionals continue to work in the public 
sector, predominantly as teachers. Hence, while affirmative action has undoubtedly 
increased Bumiputera tertiary education access and sustained their presence in 
managerial and highly-skilled occupations, momentum towards the ultimate objectives of 
Bumiputera self-sufficiency and elimination of racial preference appears to have stalled.  
Second, we present an overview of inequality in household income – the 
preponderant focus of literature addressing affirmative action and the only income 
variable in which racial designation is available over time. We consider if inter-racial 
individual earnings inequality patterns can be deduced from household income inequality 
patterns, and find little correspondence between the two income variables. Between 1995 
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and 2004, national household income inequality shows a downward trend, but individual 
earnings inequality widens. Hence, we find no grounds to deduce that Bumiputera-
Chinese and Bumiputera-Indian individual earnings gaps have declined alongside the 
narrowing of inter-racial household income gaps. These findings underscore the 
importance of focusing on individual earnings inequality in appraising affirmative action, 
and caution against interpreting inter-temporal changes in inter-racial household income 
inequality as indications of the effects of affirmative action on the labor market.  
The third section of this chapter addresses the substantial gap in the literature by 
examining patterns of earnings inequality corresponding with education and occupation 
levels. We find high employment growth, but much slower earnings growth, among 
tertiary educated workers. This translates into a diminishing earnings differential between 
degree holders, in particular, and less qualified workers. In our occupational analysis, we 
find premiums on holding a managerial or professional position rising, alongside fairly 
robust employment growth. We thus find counteracting patterns of earnings growth in 
educational and occupational categories targeted by affirmative action. While overall 
average earnings returns on tertiary education have declined, premiums on upper-level 
occupations have risen. However, without racial disaggregation of these data, we are 
unable to compute the net effect on the racial inequality, in particular the inter-racial 
disparities among tertiary educated workers, managers and highly-skilled occupations.  
The fourth section recapitulates our main findings and outlines key themes for 
Chapter 4. While tertiary education has grown, the momentum of Bumiputera entry into 
upper-level occupations has waned and dependence on the public sector persists. Tertiary 
educated and young Bumiputera have registered a larger increase in their unemployment 
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rates between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. This combination of outcomes suggests 
that qualitative differences in tertiary education constitute an important determinant of 
group representation in upper-level occupations, and that Bumiputera may hold a 
disproportionately higher share of lesser regarded qualifications. This is a crucial 
question to be further probed. We also found exceptionally slow earnings growth among 
degree-qualified workers. Hence, a second and parallel question arises, whether 
Bumiputera beneficiaries of affirmative action are disproportionately affected in terms of 
declining earnings capacity. 
 
3. 2. Review of official accounts and literature 
3. 2. 1. Tertiary education expansion 
 Malaysia’s rapid expansion of tertiary education from the mid-1990s is evidenced in 
enrollment statistics (Table 3-1). The 1995-2000 period saw a spike in enrollment, 
registering annual growth rates of 13.9 percent in diploma/certificate-level public 
institutions and 17.7 percent in degree-level public institutions. Growth slowed down 
over the subsequent five-year interval (2000-05). However, over this same period the 
student population in private institution degree programs grew rapidly, by 13.1 percent 
per year. Private institutions increased their national share of degree-level enrollment, 
from 24 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in 2005, while maintaining a large share (62-63 
percent) of overall diploma/certificate enrollment.  
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Table 3-1. Malaysia: Average annual growth in tertiary education enrolment, 1990-2005 
 Public institutions Private institutions 
 Total enrollment  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2000 2005 
Diploma / certificate   37,180     60,036   115,214   136,884   198,810   226,377  
Degree   60,010     87,891   198,160   253,504     62,237   114,933  
  Total   97,190   147,927   313,374   390,388   261,047   341,310  
  
Average annual growth 
 
 1985-90 1990-95 1995-2000 2000-05 2000-05 
Diploma / certificate 3.1 10.1 13.9 3.5 2.6 
Degree 9.7 7.9 17.7 5.0 13.1 
  Total 6.9 8.8 16.2 4.5 5.5 
Sources: Malaysia Plan, various years. 
 
 
These figures reflect the dynamics of continual affirmative action in public 
institutions together with expansive private provision of tertiary education, which was 
partly motivated by the need to absorb non-Bumiputera who may be excluded from 
public universities by quota, or who opt for private institutes by choice. The overall 
enrollment figures at face value represent progress in expanding education. However, the 
public/private divide also corresponds with a considerable degree of racial separateness, 
as Bumiputera overwhelmingly enroll in public institutions, while the student bodies of 
private institutions are predominantly non-Bumiputera. Some concurrent developments 
are indicative of deterioration in quality of schooling and difficulties of Bumiputera 
students, in particular, in gaining entry into universities. Matriculation colleges, a shorter 
and widely considered easier route to university entrance compared to Sixth Form in the 
national schooling system, were expanded in the late 1990s (Loo 2007: 223). Enrollment 
in these Bumiputera-only99 colleges burgeoned from 15,470 in 1995 to 46,509 in 2000, at 
                                                 
99 A 10 percent non-Bumiputera quota was introduced in 2002. 
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a growth rate of 24.6 percent per year100. This broadening of a tiered university entrance 
system is arguably a component of the problem of diluting academic standards in public 
universities, which disproportionately affects Bumiputera students.  
 The effect of tertiary education growth extends to the labor force (Table 3-2). The 
proportion of the labor force with tertiary education increased from 11.4 percent in 1995 
to 18.8 percent in 2004. The share of tertiary educated persons in the Malay and Chinese 
labor forces in 2004 were, respectively, 20.9 percent and 21.1 percent. However, 
differences persist across race groups. By 2004, the Indian workforce still lagged in 
formal educational attainment, with 16.9 percent reaching the tertiary level, and the non-
Malay Bumiputera workforce trailed further behind, with 9.7 percent holding tertiary 
qualifications.  
Table 3-3 further breaks down tertiary education into diploma and degree levels. The 
respective proportions of the Chinese and Malay labor force with diploma are even, while 
the corresponding figures among Indians and non-Malay Bumiputera are less. Starker 
disparities surface at the degree level. The proportion of degree-qualified persons is 
highest among Chinese (8.9 percent), followed by Malays (7.7 percent) and Indians (6.7 
percent), while just 2.5 percent of non-Malay Bumiputera labor force are university 
graduates. In sum, access to and completion of tertiary education, especially at degree-
level, has expanded, but the opportunities available to Indians and especially non-Malay 
Bumiputera are consistently narrower. 
                                                 
100 Author’s calculations from the Eighth Malaysia Plan. 
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Table 3-2. Malaysia: Percent of labor force with tertiary education, 
within race group, 1995-2004  
 1995 1999 2004 
Bumiputera 11.4 13.8 18.8 
  Malay 13.1 15.7 20.9 
  Non-Malay Bumiputera 4.4 6.4 9.7 
Chinese 12.0 15.1 21.1 
Indian 9.5 11.9 16.9 
  Malaysia 11.1 13.2 18.2 
Source: Labor Force Survey Report, various years. 
 
 
Table 3-3. Malaysia: Percentage of labor force with diploma 
or degree, within race group (2004) 
 Diploma Degree 
Bumiputera 8.4 6.8 
  Malay 9.2 7.7 
  Non-Malay Bumiputera 4.8 2.5 
Chinese 9.2 8.9 
Indian 7.7 6.7 
  Malaysia 8.5 7.3 
Source: Labor Force Survey Report, 2004. 
 
 
3. 2. 2. Graduate and youth unemployment 
Graduate unemployment, especially among Bumiputera, has become a major concern 
in recent years. Discussion often lacks systematic substantiation, and the gravity imputed 
to the problem is perceivably more proportionate to its political than empirical weight. 
Nonetheless, this general diagnosis that Bumiputera graduates experience higher 
unemployment is widely accepted101. Before examining unemployment statistics, it is 
                                                 
101 Most saliently, the number of unemployed graduates was first cited at 40,000 around 2000, 
apparently based on registrations with Ministry of Human Resource’s job placement scheme. The 
40,000 figure was reiterated until 2006, when a new figure of 60,000 became popularly cited. 
Few specifics, if any, are provided on the content or reliability of these aggregates (duration of 
unemployment, rate of job placement, etc.). This method of counting the unemployed is based on 
voluntary participation in a program, not on random and representative sampling, and must 
therefore be received with circumspection. The more important task, given data scarcity, is to 
assess if the problem has heightened over time, and less to supply precise gross numbers of 
unemployed. 
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instructive to observe labor force participation rates, where we find some differences 
across race groups. Malaysia’s labor force participation rate exhibited a marginal 
difference between 1995 and 2004, i.e.  64.1 percent compared to 63.0 percent. However, 
the tertiary educated working-age population’s labor force participation rate fell from 
71.4 percent to 64.3 percent, within which the Bumiputera differential was highest (73.1 
percent in 1995 and 62.9 percent in 2004), compared to Chinese (68.6 percent and 66.7 
percent) and Indian (70.2 percent and 66.3 percent). 
Turning now to unemployment, we see that changes over time also vary by 
educational attainment. The share of tertiary educated persons among the unemployed 
grew from 8.9 percent in 1995 to 20.9 percent in 2004, while the share of secondary 
school educated fell from 70.3 percent to 62.9 percent. Table 3-4 provides a breakdown 
by race of unemployment within educational categories. The rate among tertiary educated 
Bumiputera is notably high, and increased between 1995 and 2004. The problem is also 
pronounced among tertiary educated Indians, who tend to be overshadowed by the 
spotlight on Bumiputera graduates. The margin of change in unemployment rates over 
time varies across race groups. Tertiary educated Bumiputera and Indian workers 
experienced an increase, respectively, from 3.8 percent and 2.6 percent in 1995, to 4.8 
percent for both in 2004, while Chinese saw a decrease from 2.3 percent to 1.9 percent102. 
The unemployment rate for tertiary educated non-Malay Bumiputera is highest of all, at 
7.9 percent in 2004. 
 
                                                 
102 Unpublished Labor Force Survey data on graduate unemployment data were made available to 
Leete (2007), who reports similar levels and trends. Among both Bumiputera and Chinese, 
graduate unemployment was approximately 3 percent in 1995, but this trended upward for 
Bumiputera towards 5 percent in 2004, while fluctuating within a 2-3 percent band for Chinese 
(Leete 2007: 217). 
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Table 3-4. Malaysia: Unemployment rate within race group, by highest education, 
1995-2004 
 Malaysia Bumiputera Chinese Indian 
 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
Primary  1.7 2.2 2.7 2.2 0.8 2.3 1.5 2.2 
Secondary 4.0 4.1 6.0 4.8 1.7 2.3 3.2 3.9 
Tertiary 3.1 4.1 3.8 4.8 2.3 1.9 2.6 4.8 
Overall 3.1 3.5 4.6 4.2 1.5 2.2 2.6 3.6 
Source: Author’s calculations from Labor Force Survey Reports. 
 
Differentials in unemployment rates between age brackets inform another aspect of 
the problem of unemployed graduates and its differential impact across groups. Young 
people constitute the bulk of the unemployed, with 15-24 year-olds accounting for about 
70 percent over 1995-2004, but amidst this continuity we find some differences within 
age groups. Between 1995 and 2004, the biggest change in unemployment rate occurred 
among 20-24 year-olds – among whom a significant portion would be university 
graduates (Table 3-5). 
 
Table 3-5. Malaysia: Unemployment rate, 
by age bracket, 1995 and 2004. 
Years 1995 2004 
15-19 17.1 16.4 
20-24 5.7 9.9 
25-29 2.0 2.8 
30-34 1.0 1.3 
35-44 0.7 1.0 
45-64 1.1 1.0 
Source: Author’s calculations from Labor Force Survey Reports. 
 
Cross-tabulating the age and race dimensions of unemployment, we next consider 
unemployment rates within age brackets by race group, for 2004 (Table 3-6). 
Unemployment in the 20-24 age brackets is higher among Bumiputera (12.4 percent), 
especially non-Malay Bumiputera (16.1 percent), followed by Indians (8.8 percent) and 
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Chinese (5.3 percent). The pattern also obtains in the 15-19 years category, where 
unemployment among Indians (16.7 percent) is only slightly lower than Malays (18.5 
percent) and non-Malay Bumiputera (19.6 percent). In view of Malaysia’s schooling 
system we may assume the majority of economically active persons in the 15-19 age 
range have not attained post-secondary education (secondary schooling is completed at 
17), while a sizable portion of the 20-24 year category likely have obtained a diploma or 
degree. The unemployment drops steeply from the 20-24 years to the 25-29 years 
category, but still remains higher than subsequent age brackets.  
 
Table 3-6. Malaysia: Unemployment rates, by age bracket and race groups, 2004 
Years 
All 
Bumiputera 
Malay 
Bumiputera 
Non-Malay 
Bumiputera Chinese Indian 
15-19 18.7 18.5 19.6 9.4 16.7 
20-24 12.4 11.5 16.1 5.3 8.8 
25-29 3.1 2.7 5.2 3.0 3.2 
30-34 1.5 1.3 2.4 1.1 1.2 
35-44 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.5 
45-64 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Overall 4.4 4.0 6.0 2.3 3.7 
Source: Author’s calculations from Labor Force Survey Reports. 
 
 
Statistics derived from voluntary registration of unemployed persons with the 
Malaysian government’s job placement agency provide an additional reference point on 
the educational and age profile of the unemployed. These databases are not random 
samples, although they maintain a consistent age profile throughout 1995-2005 similar to 
that of the labor force survey, with around 70 percent aged 15-24 and 30 percent aged 25 
and above. This series also reports an increase in tertiary educated among unemployed 
persons, but at a much higher rate, i.e. from 14.4 percent of registered unemployed in 
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1997 to 23.3 percent in 2000, and 49.8 percent in 2005103. The proportion of Malays 
among unemployed graduates registers an exceedingly high 88-90 percent for 2004-
2006104, which is a large differential away from the 74 percent Bumiputera share of 
tertiary educated unemployed, as reported in the nationally sampled labor force surveys. 
These findings indicate that the propensity for unemployed graduates, especially Malays, 
to participate in public employment programs has burgeoned, and concur that Bumiputera 
graduate unemployment to be a serious, albeit somewhat overstated, problem.  
 
3. 2. 3. Representation in targeted occupations 
 Representation of racial groups across occupational groupings has been a vital 
objective of affirmative action, and a benchmark of progress monitored over time. The 
tremendous gains in Bumiputera entry into professional and highly-skilled occupations 
under the New Economic Policy (1971-1990) was overviewed in Chapter 2. 
Developments since 1990 suggests some marked differences, as shown in Tables 3-7 and 
3-8. It must be noted that the official classification system was changed, which likely 
accounts for discrepancies observed before and after 2000. The tables thus report both the 
former and current classifications, and we do not compare pre-2000 with post-2000 
figures. Bumiputera representation in the administrative and managerial category, which 
had increased modestly from 1970 to 1990 (from 22.4 percent to 30.3 percent), recorded 
faster growth in the subsequent half decade, reaching 36.8 percent by 1995. However, 
this share did not rise between 1995 and 2000, and barely changed between 2000 and 
                                                 
103 Yearbook of Statistics, various years. 
 
104 Racial composition data provided in Parliamentary session to William Leong, cited in William 
Leong, “Malaysia catches the Dutch disease”, October 11, 2009 (www.themalaysianinsider.com). 
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2005 under the new classification scheme. In professional and technical occupations, the 
facilitation of Bumiputera entry also appears to have lost momentum since the 1990s. 
Whereas Bumiputera representation increased from 47.2 percent in 1970 to 62.2 percent 
in 1990, it changed just slightly between 1990 and 2000. Moreover the contribution of 
teaching and nursing positions to total employment in these occupational categories has 
been, and continues to be, considerably higher among Bumiputera (Torii 2003). Over 
2000-2005, the proportion of Bumiputera increased marginally among professionals and 
technicians, and remained consistently high among teachers and nurses. 
 
Table 3-7. Malaysia: Distribution of occupation by race, percentage of Malaysian, 
1990-2000 
 1990 1995 2000 
 B C I B C I B C I 
Admin. and managerial 30.3 65.5 4.2 36.8 52.5 4.8 37.0 52.3 5.5 
Professional and technical 62.2 29.9 7.9 64.4 25.7 7.0 63.9 25.8 7.6 
  Excl. teachers and nurses 58.0 33.2 8.8 60.0 28.5 7.2 59.3 29.5 7.9 
  Teachers and nurses 68.8 24.7 6.4 72.3 20.5 6.6 73.2 18.4 6.9 
Clerical workers 52.6 38.8 8.6 57.5 33.8 7.4 56.8 32.9 8.6 
Sales and service workers 46.4 45.0 8.6 47.0 35.8 7.2 47.9 35.3 7.7 
Agricultural workers 76.5 15.3 8.1 61.2 11.9 6.9 61.2 10.3 6.9 
Production workers 46.4 42.1 11.5 44.2 33.7 9.6 44.7 33.8 10.0 
Overall 56.3 34.6 9.1 51.4 29.6 7.9 51.5 29.7 8.3 
Sources: Seventh Malaysia Plan, Eighth Malaysia Plan. 
Notes: B=Bumiputera, C=Chinese, I=Indian; Rows do not total 100 due to omitted ‘Others’ 
category. 
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Table 3-8. Malaysia: Distribution of occupation by race, percentage of Malaysian, 
2000-2005. 
 2000 2005 
 
Bumi- 
putera Chinese Indian 
Bumi- 
putera Chinese Indian 
Admin. and managerial 36.6 55.8 6.6 37.1 55.1 7.1 
Professionals 57.3 33.5 7.9 58.5 31.9 8.2 
  Excl. teachers and lecturers 45.4 44.2 9.3 47.2 42.0 9.6 
  Teachers and lecturers 74.4 18.2 5.8 74.9 17.4 6.2 
Technicians and assoc. pro. 59.5 30.3 9.5 59.5 29.7 10.0 
  Excl. teachers and nurses 54.6 34.0 10.8 55.2 32.9 11.2 
  Teachers and nurses 71.1 21.4 6.4 70.6 21.5 6.9 
Clerical workers 56.6 35.4 7.4 56.7 34.3 8.5 
Sales and service workers 51.2 40.6 7.3 51.5 39.6 8.0 
Agricultural workers 77.1 13.9 5.5 80.8 11.3 4.3 
Production workers 53.2 31.5 12.3 54.4 30.9 12.0 
Overall 56.4 32.5 9.1 56.5 32.4 9.3 
Source: Ninth Malaysia Plan. 
Note: Rows do not total 100 due to omitted ‘Others’ category. 
  
 
Professional association membership rolls serve as another data source on racial 
composition of the employed, shedding light on some of the uppermost professional 
strata in terms of qualification and earnings. Table 3-9 shows that the combined 
Bumiputera share of registered professionals – select occupations predominantly in the 
private sector – increased from 29.0 percent in 1990 to 33.1 percent in 1995, 35.5 percent 
in 2000 and 38.8 percent in 2005, with some variation across occupations. In a few 
categories – specifically, architects, dentists and lawyers – the proportion of Bumiputera 
grew more robustly. On the whole, though, Bumiputera representation in professional 
organizations has climbed slowly, and trails the group’s share of professionals as 
estimated in labor force surveys (see Tables 3-7 and 3-8). 
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Table 3-9. Malaysia: Registered professionals by race, 1990-2005 
 1990 1995 
 Bumiputera Chinese Indian Bumiputera Chinese Indian 
Accountants 11.2 81.2 6.2 16.1 75.2 7.8 
Architects 23.6 74.4 1.2 27.6 70.7 1.5 
Dentists 24.3 50.7 23.7 30.9 45.7 21.9 
Doctors 27.8 34.7 34.4 33.4 32.1 31.9 
Engineers 34.8 58.2 5.3 38.1 55.2 5.2 
Lawyers 22.4 50.0 26.5 29.0 43.3 26.6 
Surveyors 44.7 49.6 3.7 48.3 45.6 3.2 
Veterinarians 35.9 23.7 37.0 40.2 23.7 33.5 
Overall 29.0 55.9 13.2 33.1 52.4 12.9 
 2000 2005 
 Bumiputera Chinese Indian Bumiputera Chinese Indian 
Accountants 17.0 76.2 5.6 20.8 73.6 4.4 
Architects 42.1 56.2 1.5 45.3 53.1 1.4 
Dentists 35.2 42.4 20.5 44.4 35.3 18.4 
Doctors 36.8 31.0 29.7 36.7 29.9 26.6 
Engineers 42.6 51.1 5.2 46.0 47.6 5.4 
Lawyers 32.3 40.1 26.8 38.0 37.1 24.1 
Surveyors 45.1 49.6 3.4 48.2 47.0 3.2 
Veterinarians 41.7 27.7 27.4 39.0 32.2 24.8 
Overall 35.5 51.2 12.0 38.8 48.7 10.6 
Sources: Seventh Malaysia Plan, Ninth Malaysia Plan. 
Note: Rows do not total 100 due to omitted ‘Others’ category. 
 
 
3. 2. 4. Convergence of tertiary education and upper-level occupations 
 Affirmative action programs converge where tertiary educated beneficiaries expand 
their presence in upper-level occupations, particularly in managerial or professional 
positions (which constitute 12-14 percent of the employed population). It is thus 
instructive to view the occupational profile of tertiary educated earners, and the 
educational profile of upper-ranking occupations. Table 3-10 displays the percentage of 
degree- and diploma-holders working in management, professional and technical 
positions in 2000 (derived from census data). 29.0 percent of Chinese degree-holders are 
managers, compared to 18.8 percent and 16.9 percent of, respectively, Bumiputera and 
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Indian degree holders. Bumiputera and Indian workers display a commonality in that, 
relative to Chinese, degree-qualified persons are more likely to be professionals and 
diploma-qualified persons are more likely to be technicians (which includes teachers and 
nurses). These distributional patterns indicate that affirmative action in tertiary education 
has facilitated upward mobility of Bumiputera, but to a lesser extent in management than 
in professional and technical jobs. 
 
 
Table 3-10. Malaysia: Proportion of degree and diploma holders working as 
managers, professionals, and technicians (2000) 
 Bumiputera Chinese Indian Malaysia 
Degree 
   Managers 18.8 29.0 16.8 22.4 
   Professionals 56.5 45.9 62.7 52.7 
   Technicians 16.0 14.1 11.7 15.1 
Diploma 
   Managers 8.9 18.3 13.9 12.3 
   Professionals 21.5 23.9 20.7 22.0 
   Technicians 49.1 31.1 41.0 42.6 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2000 Population Census. 
 
 
 The recent proliferation of degree-level institutions has raised the educational profile 
of these occupation groups (Figure 3-1). Between 1995 and 2004, figures derived from 
the Household Income Survey show the proportion of degree holders among managers 
growing from 17.1 percent to 25.2 percent, while the proportion of diploma holders 
among managers increased from 10.3 percent to 15.7 percent. Among professionals, the 
proportion with degree-level qualification burgeoned most rapidly, from 32.8 percent in 
1995 to 57.5 percent in 2004, while diploma qualified persons comprised a fairly constant 
share, at 19.2 percent in 1995 and 20.8 percent in 2004. Degree- and diploma-holders as a 
percentage of technicians, respectively, grew from 4.3 percent to 8.4 percent, and from 
 137 
18.9 percent to 24.6 percent. For a breakdown of these figures by race group, we again 
refer to data extracted from the 2000 Census, for a single temporal cross-section. Table 3-
11 shows that higher portions of Bumiputera are tertiary educated in all three occupation 
categories, although not by wide margins. This is expected, given the more formal 
channels Bumiputera depend on for upward mobility, whereas Chinese have relatively 
more established business networks, family enterprises and informal apprenticeships. 
Importantly, substantially larger proportions of Bumiputera managers and professionals 
are employed in the public sector, compared to Chinese and Indian (Table 3-12). Almost 
60 percent of tertiary educated Bumiputera professionals and technicians work for 
government. 
 
Figure 3-1. Malaysia: Percentage of managers, professionals and technicians 
with diploma or degree, 1995-2004 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
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Table 3-11. Malaysia: Proportion of managers, professionals and technicians 
with degree or diploma, percentage of total within race group (2000)            
 Bumiputera Chinese Indian Malaysia 
Managers 
   with degree 22.4 17.1 15.4 19.4 
   with diploma 10.1 8.6 10.3 9.2 
Professionals 
   with degree 56.3 50.2 56.7 54.7 
   with diploma 20.4 20.8 15.0 19.7 
Technicians 
   with degree 7.2 9.1 4.5 7.7 
   with diploma 21.2 15.9 12.8 18.7 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2000 Population Census. 
 
 
Table 3-12. Malaysia: Proportion of managers, professionals and technicians 
working in the public sector, percentage of total within race group (2000) 
 Bumiputera Chinese Indian Malaysia 
Total workforce 
   Managers 11.7 1.1 2.0 5.5 
   Professionals 55.4 16.7 23.7 39.7 
   Technicians 45.9 14.7 15.0 34.0 
All occupations 19.9 3.8 7.0 12.7 
Tertiary educated workforce    
   Managers 20.2 2.3 5.8 10.8 
   Professionals 57.6 19.0 26.0 42.4 
   Technicians 58.6 21.7 27.8 46.2 
All occupations 47.8 12.6 20.3 33.2 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2000 Population Census. 
 
 
3. 2. 5. Public sector employment 
Employment trends in the public sector warrant our specific attention, given the 
continuing dependence of affirmative action on government employment105. Malay 
representation rises as we climb the civil service occupational ladder, reflecting a heavier 
affirmative action thrust at the upper rungs. In the government employment roll of June 
                                                 
105 The racial composition of government-linked companies (GLCs), which employed 325,722 
personnel (about 3 percent of the employed population) in 2006, are also relevant in view of the 
important role of these institutions in affirmative action, but unfortunately, such data are 
unavailable (The Star, September 8, 2007). 
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2005, Malays comprised 83.9 percent of top management, 81.6 percent at management 
and professional level, and 75.8 percent of support staff, for an overall share of 77.0 
(CPPS 2006a). The proportion of Chinese and Indians at all occupational layers were, 
respectively, around 9 percent and 5 percent – in other words, the extent of under-
representation is even across the three main occupational layers. Malay over-
representation corresponds with exceptional under-representation of non-Malay 
Bumiputera at managerial and professional levels. Non-Malay Bumiputera occupy only 
1.4 percent of top management positions and 3.2 percent of management and professional, 
and a substantially higher 9.0 percent among support workers, although this is still below 
their share of the workforce.  
The contribution of these distributive statistics to racial representation in the economy, 
of course, must be referenced against the employed population. The importance of the 
public sector in generating employment grew in the early 2000s, especially in the higher 
echelons (See Appendix Table 3-1). The share of the public sector in employment 
increased between 2000 and 2005, from 10.4 percent to 11.3 percent, and by a greater 
margin among management and professional occupations – from 11.3 percent to 17.0 
percent. One of the steps taken to solve the unemployed graduate problem has been to 
intensify public sector hiring. These statistics reflect how growth in teaching and nursing 
positions sustained the absorption of tertiary graduates into the labor market, and may 
partly account for the low unemployment rate for 25-29 year old Malays (see Table 3-6) 
106.  
                                                 
106 The Education Ministry contributed massively to the net increase in public sector employment 
at managerial and professional levels, i.e. 89.5 percent over 1996-2000 and 74.5 percent over 
2000-2005. The Health Ministry maintained a consistently large share of net growth in public 
sector support staff, with 36.0 percent over 1996-2000 and 61.7 percent over 2000-2005 
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The socio-economic importance of these employment outcomes must not be 
overlooked; teachers and nurses sustain vital education and health services, and at the 
very least must be continually hired apace with student population growth and retirement 
of senior workers. However, while absorption of tertiary educated workers into the civil 
service provides jobs, the intensification of this process may mask problems with quality 
and employability of graduates of tertiary education, especially those entering through 
some measure of racial preference. In the context of affirmative action, we must consider 
possible long-term ramifications of dependence on government employment of 
Bumiputera graduates, particularly the challenges it poses for cultivating self-dependence 
and for facilitating participation in private sector labor markets.  
 
3. 2. 6. Household income inequality 
The mapping of income distribution between and within race groups in Malaysia has 
been confined to household income inequality. The sole data series for measuring 
inequality is the Household Income Survey (HIS), which is conducted twice every five 
years. Access to the data is tightly controlled, leaving researchers to refer to statistics 
published in the Malaysia Plans or to obtain partial access to the datasets. Some studies 
have managed, nonetheless, to collate series of inequality indicators from 1970 onwards 
(Rogayah 2008, Ishak 2000 and Leete 2007). This section presents disparity ratios 
between race groups, and Gini coefficients within race groups and for Malaysia as a 
whole. Figure 3-2 shows how the income ratio of non-Bumiputera to Bumiputera broadly 
declined from 1970 to 1987. The Chinese-Bumiputera and Indian-Bumiputera ratios 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Author’s calculations from the Personnel List of Government Ministries and Departments in the 
Federal Budget Estimate. The author thanks Liew Chin Tong for his help in suggesting and 
obtaining these data).  
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indicate an upward trend from 1987 to 1997, followed by a decline towards 2004, 
arriving back at inequality levels similar to 1987. In sum, the trend of declining inter-
racial inequality was discontinued from the late 1980s, and reversed slightly for a decade. 
After 1997, in the post-crisis era, Bumiputera: Chinese and Bumiputera: Indian 
household income inequality moderately declined.  
Figure 3-2. Malaysia: Chinese: Bumiputera and Indian: Bumiputera inequality ratios, 
1970-2004 (gross household income and household income per capita) 
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Sources: Ishak 2000, Ragayah 2008, Malaysia Plan (various years), and Leete (2007). 
 
 
A few studies look beyond aggregated mean gross household income and devise 
supplementary indicators of inequality, notably Leete (2007) and Meerman (2008). Leete 
(2007: 167-168) computes household income per capita by dividing official gross 
household income figures by average household size, to obtain an income metric that 
more closely reflects living standards. The net effect over the NEP period (1970-90) is 
that inter-racial inequality in household income per capita declines, although by a lesser 
margin than in gross household income. However, Chinese-Bumiputera and Indian-
Bumiputera disparities grow in the 1990s, bringing the Chinese-Bumiputera ratio in 1999 
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to the same level as in 1970, and the Indian-Bumiputera ratio to the same level as in 1979. 
The ratios drop towards 2004, but remain considerably above the degree of disparity in 
1990 (Figure 3-2). These outcomes are attributable to a much steeper decline in birth 
rates and family size among Chinese households107.  
Meerman (2008) interacts race and location to estimate Bumiputera to non-
Bumiputera gross household income ratios within urban and rural areas. The rationale for 
separately computing inequality by location is the concentration of poverty in rural areas 
and the preponderance of Bumiputera in rural populations. Non-Bumiputera-to-
Bumiputera ratios of aggregated mean household income therefore overstate inter-racial 
disparities. Meerman (2008) maintains that the chief concern in rural areas is poverty 
alleviation and development policies in which racial preference is redundant, while racial 
inequality and affirmative action are germane to urban areas. Making creative usage of 
limited official data, he estimates urban non-Bumiputera-to-Bumiputera household 
income ratios to fall between 1.15 and 1.31 in 2004. Accounting for the urban-rural 
divide substantially reduces the racial gap in the urban sector, where this dimension of 
inequality is relevant. Meerman (2008: 104) postulates that lesser pay in the public sector 
explains the remaining 15 to 31 percent difference between Bumiputera and non-
Bumiputera household income.  
Leete (2007) and Meerman (2008) both add further insight by extending beyond the 
official and over-generalized inter-group ratios of average gross household income, 
although the connection remains distant between these findings and the specific 
affirmative action objectives of facilitating Bumiputera tertiary education and upward 
                                                 
107 The average household size for Chinese fell momentously, from 5.8 in 1970 to 4.7 in 1990 and 
4.1 in 2004, whereas among Bumiputera households average size dropped only marginally, from 
5.1 in 1970 to 4.8 in 1991 and 4.7 in 2004. 
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occupational mobility. The areas of inequality most instructive to this study are racial 
individual earnings disparities within groups targeted by AA, especially the tertiary 
educated workforce, and managers and professionals.  
Gini coefficients for Malaysian household income at the national level, and within 
race groups, trace out a similar downward trend from the late 1970s before arriving at a 
break point around 1990 (Figure 3-3). Thereafter, national inequality rises from 1990 to 
1997, then follows no particular trend. Inequality within Bumiputera, Chinese and Indian 
populations run roughly parallel to the national trend until 1990, but over 1990-97 
inequality increases among Bumiputera and Indian households, while remaining constant 
among Chinese. The 1997-2004 period sees inequality increase within Chinese and 
Indian populations, and fluctuate among Bumiputera households.  
 
Figure 3-3. Malaysia: Gini coefficient of gross household income, by race (1970-2004) 
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Sources: Ishak 2000, Ragayah 2008, Malaysia Plan, various years. 
 
 
The slight increase in household income inequality – both inter-racial and intra-racial 
– over the 1990s until the 1997 financial crisis has been the subject of some attention, but 
analyses have so far been conjectural, and due to official data constriction, short on 
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empirical support (Ishak 2000, Ragayah 2008, Zainal 2001). Most studies focus on 
liberalization (particularly of investment regulations) and privatization, which unequally 
widened the latitude for asset and wealth accumulation presumably captured in the non-
earned component of gross household income. Zainal (2001) conjectures that Malaysian 
Chinese were better positioned to take advantage of new opportunities generated in the 
wake of economic liberalization. Ragayah (2008) suggests that rising skill premiums 
drive the growth in overall inequality. 
This study, being interested primarily in labor market outcomes, focuses on 
individual earnings – comprising wages and salaries, and self-employment income – 
although, as discussed above, the available statistics directly connecting race with income 
refer to household income as the income variable. Milanovic (2006) provides an 
exceptional snapshot of inter-racial earnings inequality. He reports a Chinese-Bumiputera 
earnings ratio of 1.46, and an Indian-Bumiputera earnings ratio of 0.98, for 1997 (race 
variables were made available for only one dataset). These figures considerably depart 
from the contemporaneous household income disparity ratios, i.e. 1.82 between Chinese 
and Bumiputera and 1.41 between Indian and Bumiputera. Inter-racial individual 
earnings disparity in 1997 was markedly lower than inter-racial household income 
disparity – i.e. by about 40 percentage points. Chinese-Bumiputera disparity holds, but 
parity of Bumiputera and Indian average earnings rebuts the official account of inequality, 
which has maintained that the Indian population on the whole is better off than the 
Bumiputera population. While we are unable to follow up on Milanovic’s (2006) findings, 
we must take note of its implication – that sections of the Indian population may be 
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marginalized from the overall development process – and be mindful that Bumiputera-
favoring affirmative action may exclude Indians in particular ways. 
 
3. 3. Findings from Household Income Surveys, 1995 – 2004 
3. 3. 1. Data quality  
 The scarcity of existing literature on inequality is largely attributable to restricted 
access to household income data. Correspondingly, there has been little critical 
assessment of HIS data quality and engagement with the survey practitioners, a problem 
this study has not been able to obviate. Nevertheless, a few points pertaining to survey 
method and data quality are worth registering at this juncture. The HIS questionnaire asks 
respondents to state their total income from various categories over the previous year. 
This method is vulnerable to inaccurate reporting, due to recall or arithmetic error. 
Moreover, respondents are not provided guidance toward recalling their income, e.g. by 
being asked how often they receive a paycheck. On the positive side, the sample size of 
wage earners hovers at a substantial 60,000, and the questionnaire maintained the same 
format over the period of our focus, 1995–2004, and was mostly unchanged from 1984. 
Hence, procedural change can be reasonably discounted as a variable affecting inequality 
measurement, although the flipside of the unchanged questionnaire format is that the HIS 
has retained its former flaws and neglected international standard practices108. In addition, 
                                                 
108 There are few alternate resources against which the HIS can be referenced. Bhalla and Kharas 
(1992: 44-45) compare wages in manufacturing jobs extracted from the 1987 HIS with wage 
statistics obtained from the Censuses and Surveys of Manufacturing Industries, finding a virtually 
uniform result (the average wage according to the HIS is 0.99 that of the manufacturing survey). 
We replicate this procedure using the Annual Manufacturing Surveys, obtaining a ratio of average 
wages in the Manufacturing Survey to the HIS of 0.91 in 1995 and 0.87 in 2004. The figures 
differ slightly over this interval, but significantly depart from Bhalla and Kharas’ (1992) findings 
for 1987. The causes of the differential cannot be ascertained; the HIS may undercount wages or 
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sampling design and competency of numerators may also have deteriorated over time109. 
The computation of income variables from these datasets may also contain errors and 
discrepancies, as discussed later regarding household income values in the 1997 HIS.  
 Aside from the closer relevance of labor market outcomes to affirmative action, this 
study also observes individual earnings instead of household income due to concerns over 
the reporting of non-earned income (rent, interest, dividends, etc.). A brief enquiry into 
this aspect of data quality affirms this concern. We disaggregate household income into 
its component sources – wages and salaries, self-employment income, property income 
and transfers – and compare these proportions by income deciles. We find that in the first 
(poorest) decile, household income consists of around 55 percent earnings and 26 percent 
transfers, while the second decile has 70 percent earnings and 16 percent transfers. As 
expected, the dual trend of rising share of earnings and falling share of transfers 
continues as we ascend the income scale. Their respective proportions of household 
income are 84 percent and 7 percent in the fifth and sixth deciles, 88 percent and 3 
percent in the ninth and tenth deciles. However, property income (rent, interest and 
dividends) somewhat implausibly contributes a larger proportion of household income 
among low-income households. Household incomes in the first decile on average 
comprise of 17 percent property income, a percentage that declines steadily as we move 
up the deciles, until it stabilizes at 9 percent across the fifth to tenth decile. This finding 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Manufacturing Survey may overstate compensation, or a combination of both may have 
occurred. Regardless of the reasons for the discrepancies, we should take note of the possibility 
that income surveys may be less effectively capturing salary data compared to the past, even 
though the extent of this problem likely does not vary significantly over our time period. 
 
109 Author’s correspondence with a former Department of Statistics senior official. 
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corroborates our concern that non-earned income and wealth flows are substantially 
under-reported among higher-income households.  
 
3. 3. 2. National earnings inequality 
Before proceeding, Malaysia’s macroeconomic conditions must be placed in the 
background of the spotlighted statistics. Temporal reference points are dictated by the 
schedule of the HIS (1995, 1997, 1999, 2002 and 2004), which, it turns out, roughly 
coincides with some turning points. The 1995-97 period corresponds with the closing 
stages of Malaysia’s economic boom, beginning in 1988 and ending with the financial 
crisis of 1997. The financial crisis struck in 1997 and the Malaysian economy contracted 
in 1998, but recovered (more or less to 1997 output levels) by 1999. Unfortunately, 
income surveys prior to 1995 were not accessible; hence, we are unable to compute 
earnings statistics for the duration of the 1988-97 economic boom. Nonetheless, the HIS 
intervals provide a temporal framework that helps distinguish structural developments 
from crisis effects. Our approach will be to interpret patterns broadly sustained from 1995 
to 2004 as reflective of longer-term, structural change in labor markets, and to regard 
humps or troughs over 1995-97 and 1997-99 periods as market shocks triggered by the 
financial crisis. In addition, some discrepancies show up in the 1997 dataset110.  
                                                 
110 The 1997 HIS introduces complications on the empirical front. We generate gross household 
income from raw data – a summation of incomes of all household members – but this does not 
correspond with the figures provided by the Economic Planning Unit, which oversees the HIS. 
The correlation coefficient of my series with the official series is 0.756. The 1997 HIS is 
anomalous, because corresponding correlation coefficients were 1.000 for the 1995, 1999 and 
2004 HISes, and 0.917 for the 2002 HIS. The official household income figures provided are 
exceedingly high for 1997, further raising alert. Given the discrepancies found in official 
household income data, we refer to the self-computed income variables. 
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The Gini coefficients for individual earnings and household income trace out 
significantly contrasting lines (Figure 3-4). The Gini for earnings inequality declined 
from 0.456 in 1995 to 0.441 in 1997, then increased steadily to 0.454 in 1999 and 0.471 
in 2004. Over the 1995-1997 and 1997-99 intervals household income inequality moved 
in the opposite direction as individual earnings inequality. The divergence of inequality 
patterns is difficult to explain, especially since household earned income inequality 
evidently drives gross household income inequality, as shown in Figure 3-5. The share of 
non-earned income in household income and the number of earners per household, both 
of which might cause discrepancy between individual earnings inequality and household 
income inequality, do not change in ways that qualify them as explanations111. However, 
we observe concurrent movements in the incidence of zero earnings and household 
income inequality. The proportion of households with zero earned income – i.e. 
completely dependent on transfers – appears to be an important corollary of household 
income inequality, and a reason why household income inequality has not moved in 
tandem with individual earnings inequality (Figure 3-5).  
 
                                                 
111 For instance, an increase in the proportion of non-earned income or an increase in the number 
of earners in lower income households may counteract low or negative earnings growth, i.e. 
reduce household income inequality even while earnings inequality expands.  
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Figure 3-4. Malaysia: Gini coefficient of individual earnings and household 
gross income (1995-2004) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
Figure 3-5. Malaysia: Gini coefficient of household earned income (including 
zeroes), household gross income, and the proportion of households with zero 
earned income (1995-2004) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
 It follows that trends in racial disparity in individual earnings cannot be extrapolated 
from available household income data. The above discussion, however, has underscored 
the importance of focusing on individual earnings for analytical and policy purposes. 
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Referring to household income as an indicator of employment policy outcomes is 
problematic, since this neglects possible changes in composition of income. Property 
income is prone to be under-reported, especially by high-income households. Earned and 
non-earned income, moreover, are determined by considerably different sets of factors, 
which become muddled when aggregated into household gross income.  
To sum up this section, we find evidence that earnings inequality has grown. We also 
note that expansion in inequality of individual earnings does not translate into parallel 
shifts in household earned income inequality. The extent of inter-racial earnings 
inequality is less than inter-racial household income inequality, but we are unable to 
deduce any patterns in this relationship over time. In any case, incomes averaged over an 
entire race groups reflect broad labor market and social outcomes that lie beyond the 
specific objectives of affirmative action programs. Our main interests in earnings 
inequality are disparities in the education and occupation groups targeted by affirmative 
action. Still, what we have found provides clear demonstration that household income 
inequality does not necessarily move in tandem with earnings inequality, and hence, the 
mildly declining trend in Chinese-Bumiputera and Indian-Bumiputera household income 
over 1995-2004 does not equate with diminishing inter-racial individual earnings 
inequality. 
 
3. 3. 3. Earnings inequality by educational attainment 
Before examining earnings associated with educational attainment, a brief discussion 
of Malaysia’s educational certification and labor market engagement is in order. The 
system is highly centralized, with a succession of national examinations, starting at the 
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completion of primary school and onward to secondary school, in which students obtain 
education certificates. Table 3-13 explains these various certificates – Lower, Malaysia 
and Higher – and their corresponding regular number of schooling years.  
 
Table 3-13. Malaysia’s education certificates and equivalent schooling. 
Certificate Years of formal 
education 
Equivalent schooling 
No certificate 0-8 No schooling, or less than mid-secondary  
Lower certificate 9-10 Complete mid-secondary  
Malaysia certificate 11 Complete secondary  
Higher certificate 13 Matriculation / pre-university 
Diploma 12-14 Technical qualification 
Degree 14-17  University 
 
 
 These certificates serve as reference points, credentials or filters in labor market 
engagement. The importance of possessing certificates is reflected in the distribution of 
the workforce by years of schooling, which sees heavy concentrations at 6 years 
(complete primary school), 9 years (mid-secondary schooling / Lower Certificate of 
education) and 11 years (complete secondary schooling / the Malaysian Certificate of 
education) (Appendix Figures 3-1 and 3-2). Furthermore, dropping out of school before 
attaining certain benchmarks correlates negatively with earnings outcomes. Computing 
mean earnings by years of schooling, we find that earnings for those with 10 years of 
schooling are consistently lower than those with 9 years, and likewise, workers with 12 
years of schooling earn less than workers with 11 years of schooling (Appendix Figures 
3-3 and 3-4). The additional year beyond 9 and 11, instead of equating with more ‘human 
capital’, actually sends negative signals to employers, or adversely affects earnings 
capacity in other ways. However, mean earnings associated with education certificates 
displays a linear increase from persons with no certificate to those holding a diploma, 
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followed by a steep climb for the degree-qualified. These findings demonstrate the 
veracity and relevance of computing inequalities with reference to education certification, 
not on the basis of years of schooling. 
Growth in real earnings and employment vary by education group, as shown in Table 
3-14. Real earnings growth does not vary significantly across educational attainment 
groups, with the exception of degree-qualified workers, who on average experience a 0.9 
percent per annum contraction. The number of employed with tertiary education rapidly 
increases, at annual rates of 11.8 percent for diploma-holders and 12.8 percent for degree-
holders. Influxes of degree holders would be expected to slow down earnings growth and 
compete away premiums. However, concurrent developments indicate that quantity of 
education is not a complete answer. While the proliferation of degree-granting 
institutions is the most momentous change in Malaysia’s education system from the mid-
1990s, the growth of employed persons with complete secondary school (11 years 
education) or who obtained diplomas was also high, with respectively, 8.0 percent and 
11.8 percent per year growth between 1995 and 2004. This increase in supply, however, 
did not correspond with a drop in real earnings.  
 
Table 3-14. Malaysia: Real earnings and employment growth, by highest education 
certificate attained (corresponding number of years) 
Highest 
education 
Average annual growth 
in real earnings 
Average annual growth 
in number employed 
Share of total 
employed 
 1995-2004 1995-2004 2004 
0-8 years 0.7 0.0 32.4 
9-10 years 1.0 6.2 15.7 
11 years 1.0 8.0 33.5 
13 years 1.0 3.8 3.4 
Diploma 0.6 11.8 7.8 
Degree -0.9 12.8 7.2 
Source: Household Income Survey. 
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The above earnings growth rates translate into earnings ratios, relative to Malaysia 
certificate holders (11 years schooling / complete secondary school), as shown in Figure 
3-7. Only in the relative earnings of degree-qualified workers do we notice any 
significant change. The ratio per workers with complete secondary school plunges 
between 1995 and 1997 but mostly rebounds toward 1999. The apparent aberration in 
1997 warrants a brief note. This outcome – and parallel occupational disparity patterns 
seen below – may be interpreted as a transitory shock due to the 1997-98 recession. 
However, the timing of these earnings trends does not concur with economic events; the 
economy grew for part of 1997 and the recession struck most severely in 1998 but 
recovered by 1999. The possibility that data error in the 1997 HIS causes the outlying 
results therefore cannot be discounted112. Our approach to the findings will thus largely 
disregard 1997 and focus on the longer term trends between 1995 and 2004, where we 
see the earnings differential of degree-holders over secondary school completers decline 
from 3.5 in 1995 to 2.9 in 2002 and 2004. 
This downward trend raises significant implications for affirmative action, since it is 
extensively implemented in university education, and as tertiary education in general 
expands, formal qualifications become increasingly requisite for accessing the upper 
rungs of the occupational ladder. As noted above, questions revolve around whether the 
decline in relative earnings of degree-holders is due more to the quantitative effects of the 
influx of graduates, or to the qualitative effects of racial quotas and preferential policies, 
or deteriorating standards of instruction more generally. The expanding problem of 
                                                 
112 The proportion of managers earning less than RM1,000 per month (per total managers) rises 
from 29 percent in 1995 to 37 percent in 1997, then falls to 20 percent in 1999. Among degree-
qualified workers, the proportion earning less than RM1,000 per month swells from 6 percent in 
1995 to 20 percent in 1997, before plummeting to 4 percent in 1999. These fluctuations simply 
defy plausibility. See footnote 12 for other indications of data discrepancy. 
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graduate unemployment reinforces the notion that tertiary education is struggling to 
maintain quality and cultivate employability.  
 
Figure 3-6. Malaysia: Earnings by highest education attained, per complete 
secondary schooling (11 years) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
3. 3. 4. Inter-occupational earnings differentials  
Real earnings growth rates of occupational groups demonstrate some variation along 
the hierarchy (Table 3-15). The managerial and professional classes enjoyed relatively 
faster earnings growth113. Technicians on average register low earnings growth. At the 
lower end, machine operators and farmers saw markedly low growth. The categories with 
high earnings growth also record high rates of employment growth, suggesting that 
robust demand pulled up wages. Rearranging the findings in terms of relative earnings, 
                                                 
113 Earnings trends for craft workers, machine operators and elementary workers must be taken 
with circumspection. Due to a change in Malaysia’s occupation classification system in 2000, 
categories had to be matched between the old and new codes. Congruence was not difficult to 
achieve for most categories, but some ambiguity remains in production-level occupations, 
especially in the category of elementary workers.  
 155 
the significant changes in the earnings position of managers and professionals is clearly 
visualized (Figure 3-8). The respective ratios of managerial and professional earnings, 
per service and sales workers, dip from 1995 to 1997, but follow an uptrend from then to 
2004, resulting in a net increase over our time period. Between 1995 and 2004, the ratio 
rose from 3.37 to 3.89 for managers, and from 2.46 to 2.80 for professionals.  
 
Table 3-15. Malaysia: Real earnings and employment growth, by occupation group. 
 Average annual 
growth in real earnings 
Average annual growth 
in employment 
Share of total 
employed 
 1995-2004 1995-2004 2004 
Managers 2.6 7.6 7.4 
Professionals 2.5 4.4 5.8 
Technicians 1.1 8.7 13.5 
Clerks 2.2 4.7 9.9 
Service and sales  1.0 1.7 14.5 
Craft 2.0 0.9 10.4 
Machine operators 1.2 5.6 15.6 
Elementary 3.8 4.8 11.4 
Farmers  -0.9 5.0 11.4 
Overall 2.3 4.5 100.0 
Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
Figure 3-7. Malaysia: Earnings by occupation group, per service and sales worker 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
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3. 4. Main findings 
A few findings stand out in this chapter. First, the period in focus witnessed massive 
expansion of tertiary education and growth in the proportion of professionals, managers 
and technicians with degree- and diploma-level qualifications. All communities, 
including Bumiputera, increasingly obtained tertiary education, although non-Malay 
Bumiputera attainment in this aspect substantially lags, and Indian attainment slightly 
lags, that of Malays and Chinese. The facilitation of Bumiputera into upper-tier 
occupations has slowed down from the mid-1990s onwards, compared to preceding 
growth rates. The degree of Bumiputera representation remains low in management, and 
passage into managerial and professional positions continues to depend heavily on the 
public sector. Persistent shortfalls in translating quantitative growth in tertiary education 
into Bumiputera representation in managerial positions and upper-ranking occupations 
outside the civil service suggest that qualitative differences in tertiary education are 
increasingly consequential, and that Bumiputera are more adversely affected.  
Second, we have found that the household income variable, although conventionally 
used as a meter of affirmative action, is problematic on conceptual and empirical grounds. 
Gross household income contains various earned and non-earned income components, 
and often includes contributions of more than one income earner. However, given the 
absence of race-delineated earnings data, we have referred to inter-racial household 
income inequality and considered if inter-racial individual earnings inequality follows the 
same trends. This is an important enquiry, since Bumiputera-Chinese and Bumiputera-
Indian household income inequality declined between 1995 and 2004, and the question 
that follows is whether inter-racial earnings disparities also narrowed. Considering a few 
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discrepancies in household income data, we find no grounds to take the decline in inter-
racial household income inequality to imply a corresponding drop in inter-racial 
individual earnings inequality.  
Third, the most salient trends in the correlation of educational attainment and 
occupational position with earnings involve groups targeted by AA. We find a decline in 
the earnings premium on holding a degree, and increases in the premiums on being a 
manager or a professional. In the absence of data to compute inter-racial disparities 
within these groups, a few questions arise that make some inferences on possible 
disproportionate effects of these trends in educational and occupational earnings 
premiums on Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera. In terms of tertiary education, it is worth 
investigating whether the quantitative gains in access to tertiary education have come at 
the expense of producing quality graduates, and whether Bumiputera are more adversely 
affected. Inter-racial disparities among managers and professionals are of interest to this 
study, but there appears to be very limited means for inferring any differential impacts 
between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera. 
 This chapter lays out some tasks to be undertaken in Chapter 4 to clarify the 
implications of our findings on affirmative action. First, we need to evaluate determinants 
of managerial and skilled employment in an econometric framework, to estimate the 
effects of various factors, including race, on the likelihood of being employed in upper-
level occupations, and where possible, to separate public and private sectors. Second, we 
aim to account for the effects of quality of tertiary education on occupational attainment, 
and draw on supplementary data sources to inform questions about the quality and 
employability of graduates and possible differences across race. Third, we run earnings 
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regressions, and consider whether the earnings determination process differs between 
occupation and age groups. In particular, we are interested in the labor market experience 
of younger, more recent beneficiaries of affirmative action. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MALAYSIA: DETERMINANTS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY AND 
IMPLICATIONS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
4. 1. Overview 
This chapter assesses the causes of inter-racial disproportionalities in representation 
and disparities in earnings, especially in upper educational and occupational strata. We 
follow up on the patterns of inequality outlined in chapter 3 by running regressions for 
occupational attainment and earnings determination, out of which we may infer with 
more precision the independent effects of a set of determinants – as much as possible 
including race – on outcomes pertinent to affirmative action. This chapter sets out four 
main objectives: 
1. To estimate the effect of tertiary education on the probability of attaining managerial 
and highly-skilled occupations; 
2. To investigate of the role of tertiary education quality on occupational attainment in 
the public and private sectors, using location of institution as a proxy for quality; 
3. To estimate the effects of educational attainment and occupational position on 
earnings; 
4. To discuss the implications of our findings on affirmative action. 
The first portion of this chapter reports weighted logit regressions estimating the 
independent effects of a set of individual characteristics on the probability of attaining a 
managerial, professional or technical job. Results for these regressions, on household 
income survey (HIS) data over the period 1995-2004, show substantial and increasing 
effects of degree-level qualification on the probability of being employed as a manager or 
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as a professional. We are able to account for race by running probit regressions on the 
2000 Census data, in which we find that Chinese and Indians are slightly more likely, 
compared to Bumiputera, to attain managerial and professional jobs, holding other 
determinants constant.  
The second major task of this chapter is to qualitatively differentiate tertiary 
education, and to observe occupational outcomes separately between private and public 
sectors. The 2000 Census affords us data to examine this question, through its typology 
of tertiary institutions by location: local public, local private, and overseas. These 
categories broadly correspond with racial composition patterns; tertiary educated 
Bumiputera pursue their studies predominantly in local public institutions. We then run 
another set of probit regressions for attaining a managerial or professional job, on a sub-
sample of tertiary educated workers extracted from the Census, with location of institute 
incorporated as an explanatory variable. On the outcome side of our equation, we 
bifurcate targeted occupations into public and private sectors, in view of the considerable 
role of the former as a vehicle for Bumiputera upward occupational mobility. 
We find that graduates from overseas institutes, relative to graduates of local public 
institutes, and Chinese and Indians, relative to Bumiputera, are substantially more likely 
to be a manager or professional in the private sector. Local public institute graduates and 
Bumiputera face higher prospects of attaining professional jobs in the public sector. 
These findings are consistent with the fact that affirmative action policies in employment 
effectively only apply to Malaysia’s public sector, and with our earlier observation of 
deficiencies in the facilitation of Bumiputera movement up the occupational ladder 
through tertiary education. 
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To test if the impacts of this broad measure of institutional quality differ across race 
groups, we interact race with institute type, and obtain some noteworthy differences 
between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera graduates within the same institutional 
category. We find that among graduates of local public institutes, Bumiputera are less 
likely than non-Bumiputera to attain management and professional positions, especially 
in the private sector. The racial gap among overseas graduates is smaller. Overall, then, 
the objective of facilitating occupational advancement through affirmative action in 
tertiary education is hindered or attenuated by deficiencies in the quality of and selection 
into public tertiary education. This conclusion is corroborated by employer or employee 
surveys, which appraise local public university graduates as relatively under-equipped in 
basic skills.  
Our third section runs earnings regressions to compute the effects of tertiary 
education and upper-level occupations, while controlling for other determinants. The 
patterns outlined in Chapter 3 are sustained: premiums on degree-level education have 
declined, while premiums on managerial and professional employment have increased. 
However, these figures derived from regressions on the entire population do not account 
for structural breaks between different sub-groups. Hence, we run separate regressions on 
occupational and age sub-samples, which we find to be statistically prudent. The earnings 
regressions of managerial and highly-skilled workers, versus service and production 
workers, do not produce any notable trends in the returns to tertiary education. However, 
we find that the premium on holding a degree declines markedly among young employed 
persons (with no trend among older workers), consistent with the increase in 
unemployment among tertiary qualified and young workers reported in Chapter 3. While 
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our earnings regressions do not account for race, we may infer from our findings that 
younger Bumiputera beneficiaries of affirmative action are more likely to experience 
declining returns to tertiary education.  
Our fourth and concluding segment summarizes findings and discusses implications 
on affirmative action. The evidence, compiled from various sources, paint a fairly 
consistent picture of young and tertiary-qualified working-age persons increasingly 
facing difficulties in labor market engagement. We deduce that Bumiputera are more 
affected by these developments, based on our analyses of occupational attainment and 
earnings, which control for a range of other determinants. Most importantly, we find that 
Bumiputera graduates of local public universities are less likely than other graduates to 
attain management and professional jobs in the private sector. Our analysis of inter-racial 
earnings disparity is minimal and tentative, but we obtain results suggesting that young 
Bumiputera workers, compared to young non-Bumiputera workers, are likely to have 
experienced more substantial decline in their earnings capacity. 
A number of implications follow from our findings in Chapters 3 and 4, of which two 
stand out. First, slower Bumiputera entry into management and professional positions 
outside of the public sector seems to stem significantly from differences in quality, 
instead of quantity, of tertiary education. Second, affirmative action in employment and 
enterprise development, through the public sector, licensing and government procurement, 
may also be inappropriate or inadequate towards cultivating a self-sufficient professional 
and managerial class and eventually dismantling preferential treatment. 
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4. 2. Employment in targeted occupations 
Tertiary education bolsters the prospect of being employed in managerial, 
professional and technical occupations. To assess the extent to which tertiary education 
increases opportunities for upward mobility, we conduct weighted logit regressions 
estimating the effects of various factors on the probability of attaining these upper level 
jobs114 (See Appendix Tables 4-1 to 4-3). We specify age, gender, education, occupation, 
area type (urban/rural), location (state), and industry as explanatory variables. Compared 
to other determinants, higher education exerts the most substantial effects on the 
probability of being employed at the upper rungs of the occupational ladder. Having a 
degree most substantially enhances the chances of attaining professional jobs, and makes 
a large but a lesser impact on managerial jobs, while it decreases the prospect of 
employment as a technician.  
These results are not surprising, given the relatively higher reliance in professional 
work on formal knowledge and specific skills, and the wider range of characteristics we 
can expect of our broad category of managers, which spans working proprietors to 
business executives. A degree impacts negatively on the probability of employment in 
technical occupations, where that generally represents over-qualification. Diplomas raise 
the probability of employment in all three groups, most of all in technical occupations, in 
accordance with the suitability of qualification with job requirement, followed by 
managerial and professional occupations. 
                                                 
114 Choice of logit and probit models in this chapter is driven by practical considerations. In the 
Stata statistical program, we find that probability weights could only be applied to a logit model, 
while conversion of estimated coefficients into marginal effects – i.e. the effect of a change in the 
independent variable on the probability of the dependent variable occurring – was simpler and 
more efficient in an unweighted probit model. 
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More pertinent to this study is whether these figures display patterns of change over 
time. Figure 4-1 exhibits effects of having either a diploma or a degree on the probability 
of being employed in the three targeted occupation groups, relative to a person with 
complete secondary schooling115. The most substantial and consistent change occurs in 
the relationship between degree qualification and professional employment. A degree 
holder was 14.5 percent more likely, relative to one with secondary schooling, to be 
employed as a professional in 1995, and 25.4 percent in 2002. This coefficient dips to 
21.9 percent in 2004, but overall we may perceive an upward trend. Having a degree 
raises the probability of being employed in managerial occupations by 9.2 percent in 
1995, rising to 21.9 percent in 2002, then falling to 15.0 percent in 2004. This decline 
between 2002 and 2004 is more substantial than that of professional employment, 
although, over 1995-2004 the net change again remains positive. Over 1995-2004, the 
coefficient on diploma increases moderately but steadily for all occupation groups. We 
take special note of technicians, given that pre-university tertiary education is most 
germane to technical jobs (we should also note that this category includes associate 
professional work such as primary school teaching). Diploma-holders see an increase in 
probability of being employed as a technician from 9.0 percent in 1995 to 12.4 percent in 
2002, followed also by a slide to 10.7 percent in 2004.  
 
                                                 
115 We have assumed that the determinants of earnings also determine occupational attainment, 
hence we do not specify a selection model in these equations. The reasons for not adopting 
Heckman procedures are explained later in this chapter with regard to our earnings regressions, 
where such corrections for selection bias are conventionally applied. 
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Figure 4-1. Malaysia: Effect of tertiary education on probability of attaining a 
managerial, professional, or technical job (per complete secondary school) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
Tertiary education is broadly becoming more consequential for accessing the upper 
regions of the labor market. The expansion of tertiary education in Malaysia would be 
expected to facilitate Bumiputera entry into occupations where they have been previously 
under-represented, provided degrees and diplomas are of comparable content and quality 
compared to non-Bumiputera graduates and no negative discrimination prevails against 
Bumiputera labor market participants. We recall from Chapter 3 that Malaysian higher 
education burgeoned after the mid-1990s, especially over 1995-2000 when enrollment in 
degree programs in public universities grew by 17.7 percent per year (See Table 3-1). 
This development occurred across racial groups, but at a slightly faster rate among 
Bumiputera. Between 1995 and 2004, the average annual growth of tertiary educated 
labor force participants was 9.3 percent for Bumiputera, 7.6 percent for Chinese, and 8.5 
percent for Indians116. However, official data indicate that the momentum of affirmative 
                                                 
116 Author’s calculations from Labor Force Survey Report, various years. 
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action – in terms of Bumiputera entry into managerial and professional levels – waned 
since the mid-1990s. The share of Bumiputera among managers and professionals 
increased at a slower rate post-1995 compared to preceding periods, indeed, it remained 
static between 1995-2000 and 2000-2005, based on official statistics (See Tables 3-7 and 
3-8). These findings suggest that qualitative variations in tertiary education may be an 
increasingly important factor in upward occupational mobility.  
Our findings are corroborated by probit regressions on data from the 2000 Malaysian 
Population Census (Table 4-1). This dataset contains race variables, permitting us to test 
whether identifying with a racial group has any independent effect on the probability of 
attaining a job in the targeted occupation groups. Parallel to the above results from the 
HIS data, tertiary education exerts the largest impact on the prospects of employment in 
management, professional and technical jobs. The coefficients on our race variables, 
representing the change in probability compared to Bumiputera, are relatively small in 
magnitude, and in a few cases are not statistically significant. The most sizable 
coefficients pertain to the greater likelihood that Chinese will work in management and 
Indians in technical jobs – respectively, 2.3 percent and 1.6 percent.  
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Table 4-1. Malaysia: Probit regression for attaining a managerial or highly-skilled 
job, 2000.  
 Manager Professional Technician 
 Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Age 0.53* 25.1 0.03** 2.2 0.48* 13.3 
Age squared 0.00* -16.7 0.00* -2.4 -0.01* -11.7 
Female -1.83* -19.8 -0.19* -3.5 -1.66* -11.7 
0-8 yrs schooling -2.78* -25.3 -1.30* -14.8 -9.72* -53.4 
9-10 yrs schooling -1.49* -13.3 -0.94* -11.8 -4.93* -31.0 
13 yrs schooling 2.89* 9.9 3.36* 17.8 6.49* 16.7 
Diploma 5.97* 23.6 9.95* 50.6 12.39* 37.8 
Degree 13.18* 47.0 32.22* 101.4 -3.62* -17.6 
Urban 0.52* 4.4 0.27* 3.8 0.99* 5.8 
Chinese 2.33* 21.5 0.51* 8.1 0.07 0.4 
Indian -0.12 -0.7 0.52* 4.8 1.59* 6.1 
Pseudo R-squared 0.197 0.415 0.183 
Obs. 159,589 159,589 159,589 
Source: 2 percent tape of the 2000 Population Census. 
Notes:  Coefficients denote percentage point change in the probability of attaining the 
specified occupation; 
*Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level; Reference 
groups: schooling: 11 years, race: Malay; Regressions control for  
state and industry. 
 
 
These results indicate that, in the labor market as a whole, race only marginally 
accounts for differences in the prospect of getting employed in occupations targeted by 
affirmative action, after controlling for other factors. Bumiputera identity corresponds 
with only a slight disadvantage, when averaged over the national workforce. These 
findings impute much greater impact to tertiary education and relative unimportance to 
racial identity as determinants of attaining upper-level occupations. This result is not 
surprising, considering that racial representation is somewhat disproportionate among 
managers but fairly proportionate among professionals and technicians (See Table 3-8). 
However, analysis of the job attainment process at this aggregated level inadequately 
captures the transition from tertiary education to the upper occupational strata in the 
private and public sectors. More relevant to our interest is an investigation of 
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occupational mobility specifically among tertiary educated workers. The next steps in our 
enquiry, therefore, consider whether tertiary graduates of different races vary in their 
capacity to attain management or professional positions, whether differences in tertiary 
education quality affect job attainment prospects, and whether these processes differ 
across private and public sectors.  
 
4. 3. Occupational attainment among tertiary educated workers 
4. 3. 1. Analysis of 2000 Population Census data117 
The 2000 Population Census affords the data to explore the impact of qualitative 
variation in tertiary education on occupational attainment. The available disaggregation 
of institutions – local public, local private, and overseas – is rudimentary, but captures 
some broad and important differences, chiefly the medium of instruction (Malay in local 
public institutions, mostly English in other institutions), locus of affirmative action 
(enrollment quotas and Bumiputera-exclusive programs in local public institutions, 
scholarships for overseas study), and, less tangibly, reputation (overseas institutions are 
generally more highly regarded).  
Patterns of racial distribution in these three institutional categories are apparent. In 
2000, 61 percent of tertiary educated workers obtained diplomas or degrees from local 
public institutes, 21 percent from local private institutes, and 18 percent from overseas 
institutes. Within the Bumiputera tertiary educated working population, 81 percent 
                                                 
117 As a check on this sub-sample of tertiary educated workers from our 2 percent tape of the 
2000 Census, we compare its occupational composition against the corresponding sub-sample 
form the 1999 Household Income Survey. In the 2000 Census, tertiary educated workers 
comprised of 19 percent managers, 40 percent professional and 26 percent technicians. We 
observe similar proportions in the 1999 HIS: 23 percent managers, 37 percent professionals and 
27 percent technicians. 
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attended local public institutes, 8 percent attended local private institutes, and 11 percent 
studied overseas. For Chinese, the local public / local private / overseas breakdown was 
36 percent / 41 percent / 23 percent, and for Indians, 46 percent / 35 percent / 20 percent 
overseas. In general, smaller proportions of Chinese and Indian workers graduate from 
local public universities, and larger proportions carry degrees from overseas universities.  
We conduct probit regressions on a sub-sample of the tertiary (diploma or degree) 
educated working population, to test if graduation from a local private institute or 
overseas institute affects the likelihood of employment in managerial or professional 
occupations118 (Table 4-2). We would most prefer to conduct this study only on degree-
level graduates, since the vast majority of diploma graduates attend local institutes, but 
the resulting sample size is too small. We find that a person holding a diploma or degree 
from an overseas institute is 6.0 percent more likely than a graduate from a local public 
institute to be employed in management, and is 9.8 percent more likely to be a 
professional, ceteris paribus. Notably, graduating from a local private institute is found to 
considerably reduce the chances of employment as a professional, with statistically 
insignificant results for the other occupations. The coefficients on race variables show the 
expected signs, with Chinese more likely than Bumiputera to be employed in 
management and professional positions. Indians, relative to Bumiputera, are substantially 
                                                 
118 We should note that about 20 percent of the Census sample of tertiary educated workers does 
not report the location of their institute, and have to be dropped. We find a larger proportion of 
managers and professionals in the sub-sample that that we use, which may generate a bias 
towards job attainment in these occupations. However, we find that this pattern holds across the 
three main race groups (Bumiputera, Chinese and Indian). We also find that the proportion with 
missing observations is consistent within race groups, with all falling within a 19-21 percent 
range. Non-response to the institute location question does not indicate a systematic pattern by 
race. 
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more likely to be employed in professional jobs, but less likely to be employed as 
managers.  
 
Table 4-2. Malaysia: Tertiary educated workforce: Probit regression for 
attaining a managerial or professional job, 2000.  
 Manager Professional 
 Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Age 2.90* 12.5 0.74** 2.2 
Age squared -0.03* -9.3 -0.01* -3.1 
Female -5.22* -7.6 -0.23 -0.3 
Local private institute 2.58* 2.9 -10.07* -8.1 
Overseas institute 5.98* 6.8 9.77* 7.9 
Urban 6.08* 5.4 4.79* 3.5 
Chinese 3.36* 4.4 3.12* 2.9 
Indian   -3.00** -2.4 10.63* 5.7 
Pseudo R-squared 0.158 0.073 
Obs. 13,741 13,741 
Source: 2 percent tape of the 2000 Population Census. 
Notes:  Coefficients denote percentage point change in the probability of attaining the 
specified occupation; 
 *Statistically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level;  
Reference groups: tertiary education institute: local public institute;  
race: Bumiputera; Regressions control for state and industry. 
 
 
Labor market structure and implementation of affirmative action differ between 
public and private sectors, warranting separate analyses of the occupational attainment 
process. In 2000, the public sector workforce consisted of 85 percent Bumiputera, but 
only 2 percent of public sector jobs were at managerial level, compared to 7 percent in 
the private sector. On the other hand, professional and technical positions made up 17 and 
30 percent, respectively, of public sector jobs, against roughly 4 percent and 9 percent in 
the private sector119. Bifurcating our dependent variable by sector, we obtain markedly 
different results (Table 4-3). Compared to a local public institution graduate, an overseas 
graduate is more likely to attain a managerial and a professional position in the private 
                                                 
119 Author’s calculations from the 2000 Population Census. 
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sector by, respectively, 6.3 percent and 13.1 percent. Local public graduates are more 
likely to attain public sector jobs, especially in professional positions – presumably, 
mostly as teachers. Race figures prominently and broadly traces out similar patterns, with 
Chinese more likely than Bumiputera to be employed as managers and professionals in 
the private sector, and less likely in the public sector. The probability that an Indian 
attains a private sector professional job is substantially higher. Thus, in contrast to 
previous regressions on the entire workforce, where race is inconsequential, race exerts 
substantial effects on occupational attainment among tertiary educated workers. 
 
Table 4-3. Malaysia: Tertiary educated workforce: Probit regression for 
attaining managerial or professional job, by sector (public/private), 2000. 
 Manager Professional 
 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Age 0.16* 2.58* 1.43* -1.22* 
Age squared 0.00* -0.03* -0.02* 0.01* 
Female -0.26* -4.30* 2.11* -3.75* 
Local private institute -0.44* 2.88* -7.74* -1.41 
Overseas institute -0.15 6.29* -1.98* 13.14* 
Urban 0.00 6.86* -0.18 10.01* 
Chinese -0.69* 4.54* -4.12* 7.44* 
Indian   -0.41* -1.52 -1.99* 13.28* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.225 0.177 0.323 0.089 
Obs. 13,670 13,741 13,720 13,741 
Source: 2 percent tape of the 2000 Population Census. 
Notes:  Coefficients denote percentage point change in the probability of attaining the 
specified occupation; 
 *Statistically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 10% level;  
Reference groups: tertiary education institute: local public institute;  
race: Bumiputera; Regressions control for state and industry. 
 
 
Taking our analysis further, to test whether the effect of location of tertiary education 
on job attainment prospects varies across race groups, we reformulate our regression on 
tertiary educated workers. We interact race – simplified to binary Bumiputera/non-
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Bumiputera categorization – with the three institution location variables used above120. 
The relevant segment of the function appears as: 
1 2 3
4 5 6
(target job)
* * ...
probability Bumiputera localprivate
Bumiputera localprivate overseas Bumiputera overseas
β β β
β β β
= + +
+ + + +
 
The reference group is non-Bumiputera graduates from a local public institution, with the 
associated coefficients arranged as follows: 
β2 applies to Bumiputera graduates from a local public institution 
β3 applies to non-Bumiputera graduates from a local private institution 
β5 applies to non-Bumiputera graduates from an overseas institution 
β2 + β3 + β4 applies to Bumiputera graduates from a local private institution 
β2 + β5 + β6 applies to Bumiputera graduates from an overseas institution 
 
Table 4-4 summarizes the joint effects of race and institute location on the probability 
of attaining a managerial or professional position, relative to non-Bumiputera graduates 
of local public institutes (See Appendix Table 4-4 for regression results). We observe that 
Bumiputera graduates of local public institutes are slightly less likely to be managers or 
professionals in the private sector, but more likely in the public sector (first row of Table 
4-4). However, graduating from an overseas university raises the probability for 
Bumiputera of attaining a professional position in both sectors (third row)121. Non-
Bumiputera graduates from overseas institutes face relatively positive prospects of being 
                                                 
120 Ai and Norton (2003) point out some problems with this interpretation of interaction terms in 
logit or probit models, and recommend graphical analysis and presentation of findings. Further 
examination of interaction terms is thus warranted as an extension from this study. 
121 Not much has been researched about Malaysian students abroad, but available reports indicate 
that they may obtain qualifications that make for smoother transitions into professional 
employment. For instance, Faridah (2003: 165) reports that among Malaysian students studying 
abroad in 1995, 39.5 percent were Bumiputera, majoring mostly in subjects such as science, 
engineering, medicine, economics, business and management. 
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employed in management or as professionals in the private sector (fifth row). Graduating 
from a local private institute, for both Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera, notably 
corresponds with a considerable negative probability of attaining professional positions, 
presumably due to the high concentration of diploma-level qualifications among local 
private graduates (second and fourth rows).  
 
Table 4-4. Malaysia: Tertiary educated workforce: Probability of attaining a 
managerial or professional job, by sector (public/private), per non-Bumiputera 
graduate of a local public institute, 2000  
 Manager Professional 
 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Bumiputera local public 0.73 * -4.10 * 2.44 * -10.71* 
Bumiputera local private 0.07  -1.15  1.28 * -8.13* 
Bumiputera overseas 0.68  2.95  6.65 * 4.89* 
non-Bumiputera local private -0.36  2.58 * -8.75 * -3.90* 
non-Bumiputera overseas -0.16  4.81 * -4.25 * 8.23* 
Source: 2 percent tape of the 2000 Population Census. 
Notes:  Coefficients denote percentage point change in the probability of attaining the  
specified occupation;  
*Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
In addition to general disparities in quality of instruction and other factors 
distinguishing local and overseas tertiary education experiences, it is also plausible that 
selection processes and affirmative action programs impact on academic performance and 
subsequent labor market prospects of graduates. Many, if not most, of Bumiputera 
students abroad are funded by government scholarships and have thus been externally 
selected, while Bumiputera students in local public institutes may enter through a lower 
bar of academic requirements122. This assessment is consistent with our result that 
                                                 
122 The causes of academic achievement in universities are undoubtedly manifold and complex, 
but some outcomes raise serious concern. In 1999, it was reported that Malay students comprised 
1 out of 67 first-class honours graduates at the Science University (USM) and 10 out of 55 first-
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Bumiputera graduates with overseas degrees are more effectively transitioned into private 
sector professional employment. Additionally, even among graduates of local institutes, 
Bumiputera are considerably less likely than non-Bumiputera graduates to attain 
managerial or professional positions in the private sector. 
The question of tertiary education quality and its relation to affirmative action 
emphatically requires further research and richer data that differentiate graduates in more 
ways than available to this study123. The extent to which our findings reflect disparities in 
quality, or norms and preferences – Bumiputera are inclined toward public sector 
employment, regardless of education attained – cannot be determined within these data. 
The following section adds further, albeit still limited, information. Nonetheless, the 
results are pertinent to affirmative action, in view of the policy’s objective of facilitating 
Bumiputera participation across sectors, which evidently remains an unfulfilled objective.  
 
4. 3. 2. Employer and employee surveys  
Beyond income and labor force surveys, other sources add insight to the under-
researched area of graduate unemployment, and indicate that alumni of local public 
tertiary institutions, from which most Bumiputera graduates obtain degrees, experience 
greater difficulty in securing employment in occupations commensurate with their 
qualification. First, a 2002 World Bank investment climate survey of 902 manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                                 
class degrees at the National University (UKM), while all 70 of University of Malaya’s 1998 
engineering class were non-Malay (New Straits Times, 23 July 1999, cited in Zaid 2007). 
123 For instance, Ball and Razmi (2004) conduct an econometric exercise on the question of 
degree origin and language skills and their effects on income in the early years of employment. 
Interestingly, they find that location – whether an earner holds a degree from a local or foreign 
university – is not a statistically significant determinant of income, while gender, job duration, 
self-esteem, academic major and English proficiency, inter alia, exert significant effects. 
However, the small sample and usage of controversial stepwise regression, urge caution towards 
the findings. 
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and service firms in various Peninsular Malaysia regions asked employees to assess the 
most important skill that they lacked in conducting their job competently. By far, most 
respondents ranked English proficiency (47 percent), followed by professional and 
technical skills (14 percent). The problem of English deficiency was more acute on the 
demographically Malay-dominant East Coast. Asked to evaluate problems in the labor 
supply, 70 percent of managers responded that insufficient supply of capable university 
graduates is the most important cause of skills shortage, and 29 percent perceived 
professionals with Malaysian qualifications as less competent than professionals with 
foreign qualifications (World Bank 2005: 89-96). On the hiring process, a survey of 
managers conducted by Jobstreet in 2005 obtained a ranking of reasons for not recruiting 
fresh graduates. Of 3,800 respondents, the most widely cited factor, again, was poor 
command of English124. This disadvantage is presumably more widespread among 
graduates of Malaysia’s Malay-medium public universities.  
Quah et al. (2009) survey employer appraisals of their employees’ capacities on the 
job, principally to test for correlations with university location. They classify degrees 
threefold: conferred by a foreign university, local university, or twinning program. The 
latter refers to local private institutions that have not acquired university status but can 
confer degrees, under the aegis of a collaborating foreign institution or accreditation body. 
The programs burgeoned with the greater latitude for private education granted by the 
Private Higher Education Act of 1996, and in response to the 1997-98 crisis which made 
a full program abroad financially unviable for many families. By 2000, 24 percent of 
degrees and 63 percent of diplomas and certificate were granted by private institutions. 
                                                 
124 Document obtained at http://pesona.mmu.edu.my/~ytbau/tes3211/job_survey_2005.pdf  
(Accessed July 20, 2009). 
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The pace of expansion slowed down thereafter. In 2005, private institutions accounted for 
31 percent of degrees and 62 percent of diplomas. 
Employers ranked communication capabilities and confidence as the most important 
skills, and reported that foreign graduates demonstrate superior levels. Interestingly, 
graduates of local universities and twinning programs do not differ much in these areas, 
although on other criteria the twinning program graduates fare somewhat better by the 
estimation of surveyed managers. One possible implication of this finding is that many 
non-Bumiputera graduates may also see declines in their wage bargaining power on the 
basis of educational certification. Indeed, while public universities draw much attention 
for declining employability of their graduates, the quality of private tertiary institutions 
may also be on a downtrend. As the authors caution, the study has a small sample size 
(56 companies) and is confined to Northwestern region of Peninsular Malaysia. 
Nonetheless, the parallels of these findings with others suggests that larger samples and 
broader coverage will produce differences more in magnitude than in the over-riding 
conclusion. 
A question also looms concerning the extent to which university graduates absorbed 
into the ranks of teachers and nurses would, independent of expansive public sector 
employment, face difficulties finding work commensurate with their paper qualifications. 
The government has on occasion called for expedited recruitment of unemployed 
graduates, implicitly justifying the initiative on the grounds that the problem 
disproportionately affects Bumiputera125. The evidence of lesser private sector 
employment prospects for local university graduates discussed above suggests that the 
function of the public sector has persisted and expanded as an employer of last resort, and 
                                                 
125 The Star, July 12, 2006. 
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even as provider of permanent jobs to accommodate structural unemployment. This 
expansion of public sector employment has largely evaded questions over diminishing 
quality of local university graduates, and may perpetuate the negative ramifications of 
preferential selection and racially exclusive educational institutions. 
 
4. 4. Earnings determinants 
Earnings regressions inform the patterns of inequality outlined in Chapter 3. Few 
studies have been conducted along these lines, even fewer using the household income 
survey data encompassing the Malaysian working population. Previous econometric 
studies on household income data have applied different model specifications. Milanovic 
(2006) ran earnings regressions on 1984, 1989 and 1997 HIS datasets, with a framework 
to account for selection bias, using capital ownership as a determinant of labor market 
participation. His earnings regression controls for years of schooling, work experience, 
employment relationship (employee / employer / unpaid family worker), race (for 1997 
only), state, and occupation.  
This study differs from Milanovic (2006) on two main fronts. Methodologically, we 
do not incorporate Heckman or other techniques of accounting for selection bias, 
although convention prescribes their usage. The premise of reservation wage is 
problematic, and common usage of capital ownership and number of children as 
determinants of labor force participation is too simplistic. Additionally, labor force 
participation rates – for both men and women – have been remarkably consistent in 
Malaysia, despite large scale change in myriad social and economic variables, and 
household income data do not accurately identify unemployed labor force participants. 
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Second, in terms of our model specification, we use education certificate instead of years 
of education, in view of conceptual and policy shortcomings of framing education as a 
linear, year-by-year process of accumulating ‘human capital’, which omits its critical role 
as a credential system. We also omit controls for employment relationship, since the HIS 
data availed to this study do not differentiate employer from self-employed.  
 Importantly, Milanovic (2006) obtains rare access to race indicators for 1997, and 
reports some very important disparity statistics. He finds that, ceteris paribus, Chinese 
earn 23 percent more on average, relative to Bumiputera, while Indians earn 2 percent 
less, although this latter result is statistically insignificant. The addition of dummy 
variables denoting Chinese and Indian diminishes various parameter estimates, most 
substantially at the upper rungs of employment, with the managers’ premium dropping by 
15 percentage points, professionals’ by 18 percentage points, and technicians’ by 14 
percentage points. This is consistent with the disproportionately higher presence of 
Chinese in these occupation groups. 
 A few other studies incorporating earnings regressions warrant mention. On 1997 HIS 
data, Chung (2003) regresses log earnings against independent variables including age, 
education certificate, marital status, hours, gender, employment status 
(employer/employee), and area type (urban/rural) using heteroskedasticity-consistent 
OLS. Lucas and Verry (1999: 61-64) use 1988 Household Survey of Employment data on 
Peninsular Malaysia to test for the earnings returns of various individual characteristics in 
urban areas (5,717 observations). Their model controls for existence of a union at the 
work establishment, participation in training programs, plant size, part time status, 
schooling, age, race and public sector employment. Notably, Lucas and Verry (1999) find 
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a Chinese ‘premium’, similar to Milanovic (2006), of 23.2 percent, while Indians earn 
(statistically insignificant) 2.6 percent less.  
We ran earnings regressions using weighted OLS, presented in Table 4-5. In key 
areas of interest – tertiary education and managerial and professional employment – the 
trends outlined in Chapter 3 are broadly sustained. The parameter estimates representing 
the adjusted effects of educational levels and occupational positions on earnings are 
illustrated in Figures 4-2 and 4-3. From 1995 to 2004, the earnings premium of degree-
level education over secondary schooling (11 years), controlling for other determinants, 
falls from 70.6 percent to 50.5 percent. Over the same interval, premiums for occupying 
managerial and professional positions rise, respectively, from 66.7 percent to 77.5 
percent and from 35.4 percent to 53.1 percent.  
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Table 4-5. Malaysia: Earnings regressions, 1995-2004 
 Dependent variable: log monthly earnings 
 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Age 0.081 50.2 0.052 33.1 0.080 46.1 0.083 40.9 0.081 42.7 
Age squared -0.001 -46.1 -0.001 -29.9 -0.001 -41.6 -0.001 -38.0 -0.001 -37.6 
Female -0.411 -49.6 -0.230 -30.7 -0.397 -47.6 -0.383 -43.3 -0.368 -40.3 
Urban 0.126 10.1 0.123 17.0 0.134 11.3 0.247 27.2 0.221 19.1 
0-8 yrs sch. -0.254 -26.4 -0.259 -27.2 -0.264 -25.9 -0.282 -13.4 -0.298 -31.2 
9-10 yrs sch. -0.116 -10.9 -0.135 -12.6 -0.116 -11.6 -0.003 -0.3 -0.147 -14.6 
13 yrs sch. 0.098 6.4 0.086 4.8 0.111 7.0 0.165 8.4 0.087 4.7 
Diploma 0.299 15.6 0.246 15.4 0.308 21.0 0.341 19.9 0.235 17.2 
Degree 0.706 33.0 0.505 22.4 0.692 31.8 0.628 24.0 0.505 25.1 
Managers 0.667 39.5 0.374 20.9 0.634 33.5 0.694 34.3 0.775 41.4 
Professionals 0.354 19.8 0.233 12.1 0.290 17.4 0.541 22.1 0.531 25.3 
Technicians 0.299 22.7 0.192 13.4 0.251 19.1 0.389 24.0 0.352 25.2 
Clerks 0.128 11.7 0.118 9.3 0.153 12.2 0.316 20.1 0.233 16.3 
Crafts -0.050 -4.0 -0.055 -4.2 -0.042 -3.1 -0.082 -4.5 -0.045 -3.1 
Operators 0.007 0.6 -0.019 -1.6 -0.025 -2.0 0.056 3.6 0.058 4.3 
Elementary -0.216 -14.0 -0.180 -12.6 -0.185 -10.4 -0.144 -9.0 -0.106 -7.8 
Farmers -0.242 -10.2 -0.115 -5.4 -0.304 -11.4 -0.453 -13.2 -0.302 -12.2 
Constant 5.321 159.0 5.860 180.5 5.505 140.0 5.229 124.3 5.404 133.6 
 
R-squared 
 
0.508 
 
0.305 
 
0.515 
 
0.523 
 
0.533 
Obs. 62,608 60,069 59,991 64,455 62,713 
Source: Household Income Survey. 
Note: Regressions control for state and industry. 
 
Figure 4-2. Malaysia: Effect of education attainment on earnings, per complete 
secondary schooling (11 years) (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
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Figure 4-3. Malaysia: Effect of occupational position on earnings, per service 
workers (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
The above earnings regressions were conducted on the entire employed population, 
assuming that parameter estimates do not differ across subgroups, except for the 
intercepts corresponding to the dummy variable denoting that subgroup. The returns to 
holding a degree, by implication, are the same for managers, highly-skilled workers and 
lesser skilled workers. This assumption of the absence of structural differences is 
questionable, given that tertiary qualifications are irrelevant to some occupations and that 
the returns to education can very plausibly differ across occupational groupings, and give 
us conceptual grounds for separating our population into meaningful samples. In 
particular, based on Chapter 3’s findings, we are interested in structural differences 
between occupational and age groups. Chow tests provide statistical grounds for running 
these regressions separately. 
 Our key regression results – the premiums on holding a degree or a diploma – are 
displayed in Figures 4-4 to 4-7. Notably, the earnings regressions on managers and 
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highly-skilled (i.e. professionals and technical) workers obtain a less clear pattern in the 
adjusted earnings differential of degree-qualified persons relative to those who only 
completed secondary school. While there is a net drop in the premium between 1995 and 
2004, we do not observe a downward trend over time. For clerical and service workers, 
the degree premium also fails to indicate either an upward or downward motion. The 
premium on holding a diploma, which is the more appropriate level of certification, 
follows a downtrend over 1999-2004. Our investigation of labor market returns to tertiary 
education qualifications thus, on the whole, yields inconclusive results.  
Figure 4-4. Malaysia: Managers and highly-skilled workers: Effect of educational 
attainment on earnings, per secondary schooling (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
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Figure 4-5. Malaysia: Clerical and service workers: Effect of educational 
attainment on earnings, per secondary schooling (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
 
However, our separate regressions by age groups, with 30 years as a cutoff point, 
produce substantive results. Among employed persons 30 or younger, degree and 
diploma earnings premiums register a consistent and considerable decline (Figure 4-6). 
No trend holds in the older workforce (Figure 4-7). We may deduce that young labor 
market entrants with tertiary education are experiencing relatively greater decline in 
bargaining power, which recalls the issue of diminishing education quality and its 
differential impact across race groups. A large portion of the data we have been able to 
compile – unemployment rates, occupational attainment, and assessment of young 
graduates in the labor market – concur with our finding that the earnings capacity of 
young Malaysian graduates has declined more sharply than that of other young 
Malaysians. The evidence that Bumiputera graduates are encountering greater difficulty 
in employment and upward mobility suggests that Bumiputera may constitute a 
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disproportionately large portion of young graduates experiencing deteriorating earnings 
premiums. 
Figure 4-6. Malaysia: 30 years-old or less: Effect of educational attainment 
on earnings, per secondary school (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
Figure 4-7. Malaysia: Above 30 years-old: Effect of educational attainment 
on earnings, per secondary school (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
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4. 4. 1. Supplementary surveys 
 A major limitation of income data is that tertiary education variables are 
homogeneous, when in reality institutes vary widely in quality of instruction, reputation 
among employers, and other intangible characteristics that impact on an employee’s 
bargaining strength. Supplementary sources help disaggregate graduates by type of 
institution. Earlier, we discussed how graduates of local and foreign university graduates 
tend to face differing prospects of employment. These disparities appear to translate into 
earnings differentials as well. A 2008 survey by online recruitment company Jobstreet, of 
100,000 members of with bachelor’s degree currently working in Malaysia, found that 
graduates of overseas universities on average earn 12 percent more than local graduates. 
The gap is greater among young workers, although over time local graduates catch up to 
some extent. A similar study of 20,000 members in Singapore reported no significant 
difference between salaries of domestic and foreign graduates126.  
We have postulated that Bumiputera graduates, due to their high representation in 
local public universities, are disproportionately affected in this trend of diminishing 
earnings capacity – although local private institutions, where non-Bumiputera 
predominate, are not necessarily more reputable. The World Bank survey sheds some 
light on this matter. Employees were asked to evaluate the adequacy of their skills 
towards adapting to technical and labor market changes – which has implications on 
bargaining power and promotional prospects. The proportions of those indicating that 
their skills were inadequate vary by race and education level. The proportion of degree 
holders deeming themselves ill-equipped to handle change was 20 percent among 
Bumiputera, 11 percent among Chinese and 28 percent among Indians; the proportion of 
                                                 
126 Report obtained at http://my.jobstreet.com/aboutus/preleases83.htm (Accessed July 20, 2009). 
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diploma holders responding this way was 25 percent for Bumiputera, 22 percent of 
Chinese and 22 percent of Indians (World Bank 2005: 201). Significant differences 
obtain between Bumiputera, Indians and Chinese at the degree level – notably, a highest 
proportion of Indians express lack a sense of inadequacy. The figure is also markedly 
similar among diploma-holders of all race groups, a large section of whom presumably 
studied at private institutes. These findings are consistent with our contentions that 
tertiary educated Bumiputera encounter significantly greater decline in earnings capacity, 
although Indians are also considerably affected. 
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4. 5. Key findings and implications on affirmative action 
The evidence assembled in this chapter, as well as Chapter 3, points out the 
inadequacy of referring to inter-racial household income inequality, and underscores the 
importance of evaluating affirmative action beyond aggregated education outcomes and 
occupational representation. On the educational front, we observe quantitative increase in 
Bumiputera attainment, but we find that differences in quality of tertiary institution 
impact significantly on job attainment prospects. We note persistent disparities within the 
Bumiputera population, broadly between Malay and non-Malay Bumiputera, in the 
distribution of access to college or university. On the occupational front, we note that 
Bumiputera representation in management remains substantially lowest among 
occupation groups, and the Bumiputera share of professional and technical occupations 
has been sustained but not increased in recent years, and is continually reliant on the 
public sector, especially in teaching and nursing positions.  
In terms of earnings inequality, we see that inter-racial disparities of average 
household income fail to inform the inequalities most directly relevant to affirmative 
action. Our analysis of earnings disparity reports declining returns to degree-level 
qualifications, although data restrictions deprive us of substantive insight into the racial 
dimension. Nonetheless, we postulate that the young, tertiary-qualified workers are likely 
to experience disproportionate diminishment in their earnings capacity, and that this trend 
is likely more pronounced among Bumiputera workers. 
Our key findings warrant a concluding synthesis. First, rapid growth in the number of 
colleges and universities since the mid-1990s has increased access to tertiary education, 
but some differences between groups remain. Tertiary education attainment of the Malay 
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and Chinese labor forces consistently register comparable levels and exceed other groups. 
The Indians labor force lags slightly in this regard, while the non-Malay Bumiputera 
labor force trails substantially, especially at degree level. The increasing educational 
profile of the Bumiputera workforce can be attributed in large part to the burgeoning 
number of public tertiary institutions and affirmative action programs. However, these 
quantitative gains have not translated into increases in Bumiputera proportions in upper-
tier occupations. This, we posit, is due to the shortcomings in education quality, which 
has become increasingly important in differentiating the tertiary qualified labor force. 
Second, this chapter devotes substantial space to evaluating variations in tertiary 
education quality and determining whether there are differences in its effects across 
Malaysia’s race groups. We find a number of indications that Bumiputera tertiary 
educated workers are experiencing relatively greater difficulty in transitioning into the 
upper regions of the labor market. From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the labor force 
participation rate of tertiary educated workers declined significantly more among 
Bumiputera than among other groups, while the unemployment rate of tertiary educated 
persons rose within the Bumiputera, as well as Indian, labor forces. Our analysis of 
occupational attainment of the employed population finds formal qualifications, over the 
period 1995-2004, to grow increasingly important to attaining managerial and 
professional positions. We compute the effect of race on occupational attainment for 
2000, and find slight effects of racial identity on the likelihood of attaining managerial or 
highly-skilled occupations, while effects of tertiary-level formal qualifications 
predominate. However, a closer analysis restricted to tertiary educated workers indicates 
that, after controlling for a range of other determinants, Bumiputera are more likely to be 
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employed as managers or professionals in the public sector, while the converse holds in 
the private sector.  
To assess differences in quality of tertiary education, we designated degrees 
according to the location of institute – local public, local private, or overseas – and 
disaggregate occupational position into public and private sector. We find that 
Bumiputera graduates of local public institutes are substantially less likely to attain a 
management or professional position in the private sector, and slightly more likely to do 
so in the public sector. However, Bumiputera graduates of overseas institutes, relative to 
Bumiputera graduates of local public institutes, enjoy better prospects of attaining a 
professional position – especially in the private sector. Moreover, Bumiputera overseas 
graduates are only slightly less likely than non-Bumiputera overseas graduates to be 
private sector professionals. We also observe that holding a local private tertiary-level 
education certificate, relative to one from a local public institute, corresponds with a 
higher probability of attaining a management job but a lesser probability of attaining a 
professional job.  
In sum, we find that, after controlling for other factors, Bumiputera local public 
institute graduates are more predisposed to seek employment in the public sector, and are 
less confident or less inclined to engage in the private sector, even compared to non-
Bumiputera local public institute graduates. Differences in the competitiveness of 
selection into local university enrollment, partly deriving from the application of race 
quotas in student admissions, are underlying factors warranting further investigation. 
Bumiputera overseas graduates are more likely to be employed in the public sector, but 
show considerably higher prospects than Bumiputera local graduates of attaining 
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professional positions in the private sector. These findings suggest that local public 
degrees provide for a more tenuous transition into the labor market, especially for 
Bumiputera graduates. Bumiputera who study abroad, many under government 
sponsorship through affirmative action auspices, are better equipped for demands of 
professional work.  
Our results are consistent with a number of surveys of employers and employees that 
evaluate the capacities of employees, which find a difference between graduates of local 
and of overseas tertiary institutes. It is reported that basic skills, especially English 
proficiency, are exceedingly important factors in securing a job and performing skilled 
tasks. While these surveys do not identify respondents by race, the concentration of 
Bumiputera students in local public universities, where the medium instruction is Malay, 
makes them more likely to be under-equipped in these areas. Our findings on inter-racial 
earnings disparity are more tentative, but we obtain results suggesting that young 
Bumiputera workers, compared to young non-Bumiputera workers, are likely to have 
experienced greater decline in their earnings capacity. 
A few important implications on affirmative action follow from our key findings. 
First, racial disparities in tertiary educational attainment warrant deeper analysis. 
Segments of the non-Malay Bumiputera population are evidently marginalized from 
opportunities that should formally be available to them, as Bumiputera. The Indian 
population’s steady, albeit slightly lagging, progress in tertiary educational attainment, 
coupled with their robust representation in professional occupations, indicate that the 
forms of marginalization are manifest to a large extent in terms of basic schooling and 
semi-skilled labor than in access to tertiary education and upper-level occupations. 
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However, much more research is needed in this area, recalling as well Milanovic’s (2006) 
finding that average Bumiputera and Indian earnings are virtually equal, in contrast to 
official household income data, which report that Indian households receive 25-40 
percent more than Bumiputera households.  
 Second, our findings indicate that affirmative action in tertiary education has become 
less effective in recent years, specifically in its ultimate objective of cultivating a self-
sufficient professional and managerial class. On the whole, slower Bumiputera entry into 
management and professional positions outside of the public sector seems to stem 
significantly from differences in quality of tertiary education. Malaysia’s parallel, racially 
exclusive education system, from secondary schooling onwards, including the recently 
expanded matriculation colleges, warrants a thorough review. While we have found that 
Bumiputera graduating from overseas universities face significant prospects of upward 
occupational mobility, the policy of sponsoring students to study abroad deprives local 
universities of highly capable students. 
 Third, the persistent under-representation of Bumiputera in management, and in 
professional positions broadly – i.e. beyond the public sector – continues to pose the 
severest challenge to affirmative action. Malaysia’s interventions in employment and 
enterprise development, through the public sector, licensing and government procurement, 
may be inappropriate and/or inadequate measures towards cultivating an independent, 
self-sufficient and diverse professional and managerial class, which is effectively a 
prerequisite for beginning the process of dismantling preferential treatment. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SOUTH AFRICA: PATTERNS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY, 1998 – 2006 
 
5. 1. Overview 
This chapter assesses developments in the racial composition of tertiary education and 
upper-tier occupations in South Africa, and outlines patterns of inter-racial earnings 
inequality pertinent to affirmative action. Having access to complete labor force survey 
datasets – in contrast to the strictures imposed in Malaysia – we are able to directly 
scrutinize the racial dimension of inequality. Intra-racial inequality is a weighty subject in 
affirmative action discourses; hence, we present some broad findings of inequality within 
the black and white populations. This chapter chiefly aims to: 
1. Review the literature on income and earnings inequality in South Africa and locate 
this study in the context of this body of research; 
2. Outline changes in black representation in tertiary education and upper-level                                      
occupations, and compute inter-racial and intra-racial earnings differentials 
corresponding with educational and occupational categories; 
3. Assess the relative importance of the public and private sectors in facilitating upward 
mobility of blacks; 
4. Summarize main findings and raise questions for further analysis in Chapter 6. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we interact with the empirical 
literature on inequality in South Africa. It is widely reported that household income 
inequality has increased in the post-Apartheid era, and that inequality levels are highest 
within the black population. Studies tracking individual earnings distribution have also 
reported growing inequality in the early post-Apartheid era, with some stabilization in the 
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2000s. The bulk of the literature frames inequality in the broadest, national scope, and 
hence informs inter-racial inequalities across all earners, whether or not they are 
designated beneficiaries of affirmative action. Nonetheless, before branching away from 
the literature, we compute inequality indicators aggregated across the formal economy. 
We find that national earnings inequality declined from 1998 to 2000, then modestly 
increased until 2006. We observe a large, though slightly narrowing, gap sustained 
between black and white mean earnings. These findings underline the need to examine in 
greater depth the specific categories of persons targeted by affirmative action. 
 Second, we outline the expansion of tertiary education and patterns of earnings 
inequality corresponding with educational attainment. Black representation in public 
universities and in the tertiary educated workforce has steadily increased. We find that 
earnings disparities between workers with degrees and others grow on the whole, more 
substantially within the black population. We also observe a decline in the earnings gap 
between degree-qualified blacks and whites, while the disparity remains stable at other 
educational levels. These results indicate that degree holding blacks are well positioned 
to reap returns in the labor market, and are catching up with whites with commensurate 
formal qualifications.  
Turning to occupation categories, we survey evidence on racial representation in the 
upper strata of the labor market, as targeted by affirmative action. Labor force survey 
data show the proportion of blacks to have increased significantly among professionals 
and marginally among technicians, while remaining constant in management. Data from 
employment equity reports, another reference point, indicate slow but steady progress in 
black representation in top and senior management, with implausibly fluctuating 
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proportions of blacks in professional positions. We observe narrowing, albeit rather 
inconsistent, trends in inter-racial inequality within these occupation groups. A pattern 
emerges parallel to our findings on educational attainment: blacks in the upper strata are 
pulling away from blacks in other occupations. At the same time, inter-racial disparity 
within occupation groups traces out a downward, although considerably fluctuating, 
pattern in the ratio of earnings between black managers and white managers, and between 
black professionals and white professionals.  
Third, we evaluate the role of the public sector, encompassing the public services and 
state-owned enterprises, in facilitating black occupational advancement. The proportions 
of black degree holders, professionals and managers who work in the public sector 
declined over 2000-06, the period for which data are available. Correspondingly, the 
respective shares of blacks among private sector degree-holders and among private sector 
managers and professionals have increased. Inter-racial earnings gaps among degree 
qualified workers in the private sector also follow a downward trend. These patterns 
suggest that black entry into professional and managerial ranks is depending less on the 
public sector, and that employment equity is taking effect in the private sector.  
 Fourth, this chapter raises salient questions requiring further analysis. We witness 
growth among blacks in access to tertiary education and in movement into upper-level 
occupations. We next need to assess the independent effects of a set of determinants on 
the likelihood of attaining managerial and highly-skilled jobs, paying special attention to 
the joint effects of race and tertiary education. In particular, this study aims to focus on 
the prospects for tertiary educated blacks of attaining upper-level occupations. As much 
as possible, we should investigate differences in upward occupational mobility between 
 195 
the public and private sectors. Other research that captures the effects of employment 
equity, especially unemployment and mobility, will supplement our analysis of 
occupational attainment. We also test for the independent effects of a set of individual 
characteristics on earnings, focusing on race, education and occupation, and interactions 
of these variables. Again, our chief purpose is to compare the labor market experience of 
degree-qualified blacks and whites.  
 
5. 2. Review of empirical literature  
Empirical literature on inequality in post-Apartheid South Africa can be grouped by 
income variable: household income and individual earnings. One set of studies focuses 
on the distribution of income, including wages, property income and transfers, whether at 
the gross household or per capita household level. This research analyzes various data 
sources: the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) (Hoogeveen and 
Özler 2005), the 1996 and 2001 Population Censuses (Leibbrandt et al. 2005), or a 
combination of data from the income surveys (for estimation of intra-group distribution) 
and national accounts (for inter-group distribution) (van der Berg and Louw 2004). These 
studies find, to varying magnitudes, a broad trend of rising inequality from the mid-1990s 
until 2000-2001. Subsequent trends are less well mapped, although preliminary findings 
from the 2005/06 IES show further increases in inequality (Table 5-1). These trends are 
widely considered to reflect structural changes in the labor market and in capital and 
property ownership that broaden the gap between the upper and lower regions of the 
income distribution, especially within the black population. However, the IES data are 
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deeply problematic; inconsistencies in methodology and sampling raise serious questions 
on the comparability of the 1995, 2000 and 2005/06 surveys127.  
 
Table 5-1. South Africa: Gini coefficient for household income, from Census and 
Income and Expenditure Survey data. 
Data source Population Census1 IES2 IES3 
Income unit Household income 
Per capita 
household income 
 
Household income 
 1991 1996 2001 1995 2000 1995 2000 2005 
African 0.62 0.66 0.72 0.56 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.63 
Colored 0.52 0.56 0.64 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.59 
Asian 0.49 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.55 0.43 0.41 0.57 
White 0.46 0.50 0.60 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.56 
South Africa 0.68 0.69 0.77 0.65 0.70 0.56 0.57 0.72 
  Sources: 1Human Sciences Research Council 2004, 2Seekings and Nattrass 2005, citing 
  unpublished findings by Leibbrandt; 3Statistics South Africa 2002 and 2008. 
 
 
A second set of studies observe individual earnings or personal income of the 
employed population (Leite, McKinley and Osorio 2006, Allanson, Atkins and Hinks 
2002, Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary 2005). These studies consistently find 
inequality widening in the late 1990s. Leite, McKinley and Osorio (2006), who compute 
Gini and Theil-L indices over 1995-2004, report fairly stable inequality over 1995-98 
followed by a sharp escalation in 1999, before leveling off from 2000 – albeit with some 
fluctuation – within a higher band (see Appendix Figure 5-1). The abruptness of the 
increase and its coincidence with the transition from OHS to LFS raises a caveat to take 
the findings with caution. The pattern is broadly similar between time plots of the Gini 
and GE(0) indices, although the increase between the 1990s and 2000s is greater for the 
                                                 
127 In particular, the 2000 IES has been found to over-sample low income households due to an 
incentive provided to low-income respondents to participate, which would overstate poverty. The 
2000 IES contains an exceptionally high portion of employed persons indicating zero income or 
unspecified earnings (Yu 2007: 27). The 2005 IES adopted a wholly different methodology, 
based on households keeping a diary of incomes and expenditures. 
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GE(0), suggesting that relatively slower earnings growth among the poor constitutes a 
large part of distribution dynamics. The Leite, McKinley and Osorio (2006) findings 
concur with Hoogeven and Özler (2005), and corroborate the argument that low-skill 
workers have borne disproportionately higher costs of low economic growth and high 
unemployment. 
The inclusion of informal labor markets in these inequality estimates, however, 
exposes the findings to data inconsistencies, and encapsulates dimensions of inequality 
beyond the scope of affirmative action policies. Burger and Yu (2007: 8-9) maintain that 
the decline in real earnings in the late 1990s was largely driven by improved capture of 
low-paying informal activities in the OHS. The LFS marked a further improvement in 
consistency of definition and sample size, resulting from changes progressively 
introduced throughout the OHS years, including the vital clarification from 1997 of the 
formal/informal distinction and amendments in sampling design in the 1998 and 1999 
surveys. In the interest of consistency, some studies, notably Woolard and Woolard 
(2005), limit the sample to just the formal sector, winnowing the dataset to 15,000-17,000 
observations. Some studies have computed inter-racial earnings disparities while 
accounting for the formal/informal sector distinction. Notably, Rospabé (2002) finds a 
decline in the white-African earnings differential between 1993 and 1999, while 
controlling for the formal sector, and Burger and Jafta (2006) report a stable white-black 
formal sector wage gap at the mean, between 1995 and 2004, and declining gaps at the 
75th and 90th percentiles over 2000-2004. 
The All Media and Products Survey (AMPS), a regular survey of living standards and 
household consumption for marketing research purposes (conducted by the South African 
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Advertising Research Foundation), is another data source for computing inequality. 
These datasets comprise nationally representative samples and fairly large sample sizes 
(about 25,000 observations). However, all income is reported in brackets and hence must 
be transposed into point values, by assigning each observation an income amount. Based 
on the AMPS, van der Berg et al. (2005) maintain that blacks have increasingly joined 
middle and upper strata. Within the “higher middle class” category, defined as earning 
R3,333 per month in 2000 Rand (10 percent of the population), the black proportion 
doubled to almost a quarter between 1994 and 2004. In the “working and lower middle 
class” strata – earning between R2,083 per month and R3,333 per month – the share of 
blacks expanded from 21 percent to 33 percent. Other studies utilizing the AMPS have 
found parallel trends of increasing black presence in high income groups. Focusing on the 
upper middle class – the so-called ‘Black diamonds’ – identified as those earning beyond 
R12,000 per month, one study finds that the proportion of Africans to be 15 percent in 
2006 (numbering 322,000). Between 2004 and 2006, there was a 91 percent increase in 
the number of black people with these income levels128. While the lines demarcating 
income class vary by researcher, all studies find evidence of upward mobility and income 
growth in the black population. 
Different methodologies have been used to analyze the estimated levels and  
changes in inequality. One set of research deploys decomposition techniques. Bhorat, 
Leibbrandt and Woolard (2000) disaggregate income components and compute their 
respective contributions to overall inequality. Allanson, Atkins and Hinks (2002), Burger 
and Jafta (2006) and Rospabé (2002) conduct variations of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
                                                 
128 Schlemmer, Lawrence. 2005. South Africa’s New Middle Class, in The Next Decade: 
Perspectives on South Africa’s Growth and Development, Ann Bernstein and Sandy Johnston 
(eds.), Johannesburg: Centre for Development and Enterprise, 112-140 (cited in SAIRR 2007a). 
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decomposition, attributing wage disparities between groups to either differences in 
characteristics or in returns. Another approach utilizes non-parametric methods, such as 
Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary (2005), who explain inequality patterns based on 
endowments, returns and selection. A third method involves detailed and careful 
presentation of descriptive statistics (Woolard and Woolard 2005, Bhorat 2000). This 
approach follows a more inductive process of examining inequalities between individual 
traits of consequence to earnings distribution and economic policy, e.g. differentials by 
educational attainment or occupational position, or cross-tabulations of such 
characteristics. 
This study’s focus on aspects of inequality related to affirmative action orients our 
empirical investigation around individual earnings, and locates our analysis in the formal 
economy labor market. Employment equity legislation and public sector employment 
policies operate only in the formal economy. We may also safely assume that 
beneficiaries of affirmative action in tertiary education preponderantly engage in formal 
employment. Profiles of average employed persons in the formal and informal economies 
encapsulate these structural differences129. Perhaps most importantly, the racial 
composition of the informal economy is overwhelmingly – i.e. 96 percent – black. In 
view of these marked institutional and empirical differences, aggregating informal and 
formal employment obscures or biases the inequalities between blacks and whites, and 
within the black population, that correlate with affirmative legislation and policies.  
                                                 
129 In 2006, 24 percent of employed persons in the formal economy had tertiary education; 
compared to just 4 percent in the informal economy. The proportion of the employed population 
working as managers and professionals was 16 percent in the formal economy and 4 percent in 
the informal economy. 
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Woolard and Woolard (2005) is highly germane to this study; a few of their main 
findings are worth reporting here. They observe a widening skills gap among men, in 
pair-wise comparisons of semi-skilled workers (i.e. service workers, craft workers, and 
operators), highly skilled workers (i.e. professionals), and managers, between 1995 and 
2003, and find evidence suggesting inequality increased between semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers (i.e. elementary workers) over a shorter period (2001-2003). Among 
managers, the African-white and male-female gaps narrowed. African managers with 
tertiary education enjoy a jump in relative earnings after 1998, possibly attributable to 
employment equity policies. The inter-racial earnings gap is smaller among highly-
skilled workers compared to skilled workers. However, there was little change in inter-
racial earnings differentials among highly-skilled and skilled jobs.  
 
5. 3. Findings from October Household Surveys and Labor Force Surveys 
This chapter’s presentation of inequality patterns will follow the basic outline of 
Chapter 3 on Malaysia. The ability to account for race augments our scope for mapping 
and discussing inter-racial and intra-racial inequalities. First, we plot aggregate inequality, 
according to the Gini coefficient and percentile ratios. We survey changes in the 
representation of disadvantaged persons among the employed, using the OHS and LFS, 
and supplement these findings with information from other data sources on higher 
education and employment. This is followed by an examination of changes in relative 
earnings of the employed population according to the main channels of affirmative action 
– education and employment. 
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 Inter-racial comparisons are generalized to averages between the black and white 
working populations, since the samples of Indian and Colored whittle down to 
unmanageably small numbers. Earnings patterns pertaining to Africans are arguably of 
interest to be studied independently. However, the African population, by its dominant 
numbers, in most cases drives earnings outcomes for the black population. Hence it is 
unnecessary to separate the two, and simpler to report only results for combined category 
of blacks.  
 
5. 3. 1. Data considerations 
The October Household Survey (OHS) and September Labor Force Survey (LFS) 
constitute nationally representative employment and income surveys, and thus serve as 
the best available datasets for this study. Nonetheless, two main problems need to be 
addressed in using these sources as an earnings series. First, substantial and non-random 
portions of the earnings data in the OHS and LFS are captured in income brackets instead 
of point values. Second, changes in questionnaire and sampling design raise concerns 
regarding consistency over time.  
The questionnaire since 1996 has been designed to avert loss of information due to 
inability or unwillingness of respondents to state their income, which results in zero or 
missing values, by allowing them to select a bracket within which their income falls 
(Bhorat 2000, Posel and Casale 2004). The earnings of these observations need to be 
imputed, either by predicting or assigning a value. Posel and Casale’s (2004) methodical 
analysis on the 2002 LFS reveals that respondents who opt to report income in brackets 
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have a higher average number of schooling years and are predominantly urban. Less than 
half are self-reporting, and disproportionately high numbers are self-employed and white.  
The occurrence of bracket reporting is clearly non-random. It is therefore 
inappropriate to use the randomly-sample reported point earnings as a pool for predicting 
incomes of those who report in brackets. Simpler options include assigning the mid-point 
of brackets, which Posel and Casale’s (2004) literature survey finds to be the most 
commonly used technique (e.g. Leite, McKinley and Osorio 2006). Alternatively, one can 
assign the mean of reported point value earnings that fall within brackets, or randomly 
generate an earnings value within brackets (Woolard and Woolard 2005). For simplicity, 
and given the proximity of the within-bracket calculated means to the mid-point, we 
employ the mid-point method. Unavoidably, however, this will produce density spikes at 
these midpoints, which will affect certain results. 
 A second caveat in using the OHS and LFS stems from amendments in questionnaire 
and sampling design. As discussed above, the surveys in the late 1990s progressively 
improved their accounting of informal sector employment and earnings. The decision to 
include only observations located in the formal economy, in addition to focusing on the 
labor markets that fall under the jurisdiction of affirmative action policy and related 
legislation, helps obviate the discrepancies resulting from the survey method and 
sampling. Burger and Yu (2007) demonstrate how the OHS and LFS can be used to 
construct a reasonably consistent earnings series. Yu (2007) addresses the comparability 
of the OHS and LFS through a detailed presentation of demographic, employment and 
income characteristics beyond the income variable which has been subjected to more 
intense scrutiny. He concludes that inconsistencies due to questionnaire design and 
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sampling processes have been reduced over time, especially in the LFS. These specific 
data concerns aside, it is also worth noting that data quality and reliability problems are 
endemic to surveys. The problems that arise in South African data are faced in national 
survey data in any setting (Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary 2005).  
 We analyze the 1998 and 1999 October Household Surveys and the 2000-2006 Labor 
Force Surveys. The formal/informal distinction for all employed persons begins in 1997; 
however, that dataset was not obtainable in time. In the 1995 and 1996 OHSes, only self-
employed were asked about the registration status of their organization (Yu 2007: 19-20). 
It turns out that the data since 1998 also finds greater consistency when referenced to the 
Survey of Employment and Earnings, an independent data source. Burger and Yu (2007: 
11-12) note that the post-1998 formal sector employee total earnings runs reasonably 
parallel to household survey findings, moreso than in preceding OHSes130. While it 
would be preferable for our data series to span a substantial period prior to affirmative 
action legislation, the Employment Equity Act came into effect in 1999, allowing us to 
observe inequality one year before formal enforcement of employment equity.  
 
5. 3. 2. Earnings levels and overall inequality 
 Figure 5-1 displays average earnings of various groups and of South Africa over the 
period 1998-2006. Real monthly earnings for South Africa declined slightly, from about 
R6,000 in 1998-99 to R5,500 in 2000, and hovered at that plateau for the following few 
years before rising back to R6,000. Within the black employed population, however, we 
can note that the earnings of Indians are consistently higher than coloreds and Africans, 
                                                 
130 We should note that Oosthuizen (2006: 8-9) critiques the SEE’s low coverage of small, 
medium and micro enterprises, and the omission of some sectors. 
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and register rapidest growth over the 2000-2006 period. Unfortunately, the samples of 
persons in the Indian and Colored categories, as noted above, are small and prone to 
outlier effects when sub-divided into socio-economic categories. Hence, we are unable to 
scrutinize with confidence earnings growth among the sub-groups subsumed under the 
category of blacks. Gains in real earnings to Africans and Coloreds are more modest, 
although they recover and by 2006 slightly exceed 1998-99 levels. Among whites, the 
decline in earnings from 1998 to 2000 is substantial, and not recovered by 2006. On the 
whole, the delineation of earnings levels in Figure 5-1 suggests that inter-racial earnings 
differentials did not change much over our timeline of enquiry, with a slight decline in 
the white: black average earnings ratio.  
 
Figure 5-1. South Africa: Monthly earnings, by race (2008 Rand) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 displays the disparity ratios between the mean, median, and 95th percentile 
of the black and white employed populations. We find some indication that the 
differential between mean white earnings and mean black earnings declined over this 
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period, while the disparity at the median fluctuates, not outlining any pattern. The inter-
racial gap at the 95th percentile is follows an uneven but somewhat downward pattern, 
consistent with the various studies surveyed above that report rapid growth in black 
income at the upper reaches of the distribution. These findings provide a preliminary 
glance at inequality, but do not yet inform disparities relevant to affirmative action. 
  
Figure 5-2. White: Black earnings ratio at mean, median and 95th percentile 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
National inequality traces out a significant decline in the Gini from 1998 and 1999 
into 2000, then maintains a constant level until 2006 (Figure 5-3). Within the two main 
race groups, we find that inequality among blacks followed a downward trend from the 
late 1990s to 2001, then shifted upwards until 2006, while inequality among whites 
declined markedly over 1998-2000, then fluctuated considerably over 2000-2006. The 
decline in inequality that we find in the late 1990s stands in marked contrast to Leite, 
McKinley and Osorio (2006), who report an increase in inequality from 1997 to 2000, 
and a declining trend from 2000 to 2004. Their aggregation of both formal and informal 
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economies may account for part of this difference, given the changes in accounting for 
informal economic activities in the LFS. This study’s results for the LFS period are more 
concordant with Leite, McKinley and Osorio (2006), perhaps in line with the LFS’ 
consistency in designating formal and informal economies.  
 
 
Figure 5-3. South Africa: Gini coefficient, within race groups 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
5. 3. 3. Educational attainment 
5. 3. 3. 1. Inequality in representation  
 We first consider the educational profile of South Africa’s workforce in terms of 
years of schooling and other benchmarks. We find that the distribution is rather evenly 
dispersed, with similar percentages of workers with 3 to 11 years of schooling (Appendix 
Figure 5-2). This stands in contrast to the profile in Malaysia, where there are 
concentrations at years corresponding with primary school, middle secondary and 
complete secondary school examinations (see Appendix Figure 3-1), and possibly reflects 
the socio-political instability or economic sluggishness in Apartheid and post-Apartheid 
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South Africa and their disruptive effects on education, causing students to drop out before 
reaching certain schooling milestones. The correspondence between schooling years and 
earnings shows a virtually flat line between 0 and 9 years, followed by an increase at 10 
years (mid-secondary school), then a drop at 11 years (Appendix Figure 5-3). Dropping 
out one year before completing secondary school – i.e. before attaining 12 years – 
evidently impacts negatively on earnings. However, earnings climbs steeply as years of 
education accumulate beyond secondary school. The trends therefore point to the greater 
relevance of attainment levels as indicators of education, which, as shown in Appendix 
Figure 5-4, increase steadily through the primary, secondary and tertiary benchmarks.  
 The employed population of South Africa saw a general increase in educational 
attainment, but a persisting wide gulf between whites and blacks. The main changes at 
the national level occur in terms of a declining proportion of those with primary 
schooling or less (28.0 percent in 1998, 15.9 percent in 2006), and an increasing 
proportion of those who completed secondary schooling (25.1 percent in 1998, 31.8 
percent in 2006). The share of tertiary educated workers also increases, although less 
substantially according to our survey data, from 18.9 percent in 1998 to 22.9 percent in 
2006 (Appendix Figure 5-5). Within the black employed population, the share of tertiary 
educated increased from 13.3 percent to 17.4 percent, with degree-holders constituting 
3.2 percent and 5.2 percent. Those who attained complete secondary school education 
grew from 19.3 percent to 29.1 percent, while those with primary schooling or less 
shrank from 34.7 percent to 19.9 percent (Appendix Figure 5-6). The educational 
composition of the white employed population fluctuates considerably, evidently due to 
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the smaller number of observations. Nonetheless, the statistics derived here show an 
expected increase in the percentage of tertiary qualified workers (Appendix Figure 5-7).  
 These developments in educational provision, coupled with labor market entry, 
translate into increases in the proportion of blacks among employed persons at secondary 
school level and above (Figure 5-4). The most notable difference occurs among 
employed persons who complete secondary school, where black representation steadily 
increases from 58.7 percent in 1998 to 74.6 percent in 2006. Black representation among 
diploma holders increases over 2000-03, but remains stationary over 2003-06 at around 
65.0 percent. At the degree level, the proportion of blacks increases from 39.5 percent of 
employed persons in 2000 to 51.0 percent in 2006. 
Figure 5-4. South Africa: Proportion of blacks among employed, by highest 
education attained 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
The entry of tertiary educated blacks into the labor force correlates with affirmative 
action programs in public education institutions. Public higher education enrollment 
figures in Table 5-2 reflect expansion of access to blacks. Indeed, gross and proportional 
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white enrollment both decline between 1995 and 1999. Private tertiary education has 
grown to absorb increasing demand from all race groups, and to accommodate the 
decreased enrollment of whites in historically white institutions. Total enrollment in 
public higher education shrank by 0.2 percent per year over 1995-99 – corresponding 
with the drop in gross white enrollment – but grew by 3.9 percent per year over 1999-
2006. The number of enrolled blacks increased by 3.1 percent per year over 1995-99, 
then by 4.7 percent over 1999-2006. Within the black category, the proportion of 
Africans increased most substantially, from 50.3 percent in 1995 to 61.0 percent in 2006, 
although they remain under-represented.  
 
Table 5-2. South Africa: Public higher education headcount enrollment 
 1995 1999 2002 2006 
 Enrollment per year 
African 287,000 332,000 404,000 451,100 
Colored 33,000 31,000 39,000 48,500 
Indian 37,000 40,000 49,000 54,900 
White 214,000 163,000 182,000 184,700 
Total 571,000 566,000 674,000 739,200 
 Percentage of total 
African 50.3 58.7 59.9 61.0 
Colored 5.8 5.5 5.8 6.6 
Indian 6.5 7.1 7.3 7.4 
White 37.5 28.8 27.0 25.0 
Sources: Commission for Higher Education (2004), Department of Education  
  (2002 and 2006). 
 
 
 
Participation rates, indeed, have not changed substantially for the African and colored 
populations. African enrollment in public higher education enrollment per 20-24 year-old 
population was 9 percent in 1993 and 11.5 in 2004, while that for coloreds was 13 
percent in 1993 and 12.1 percent in 2004. The corresponding figures for whites were 70 
percent in 1993 and 59.5 percent in 2004, and for Indians, 40 percent and 50.2 percent 
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(Subotzky 2003: 361 and Breier and Mabizela 2008: 283). These figures do not reflect 
the overall levels of tertiary education attainment since they exclude private higher 
education, which has grown in recent years. Nevertheless, given the greater dependence 
of the black population on public education, the statistics indicate that, while tertiary 
education access has expanded, the number of Africans and coloreds who reach 
university remains a small fraction of the relevant age group.  
The growth in enrollment, moreover, does not translate directly into increased 
numbers of diploma or degree qualified workers of equal standing. Systematic 
stratification of education required attention not only to increase access and make 
campuses representative of society, but also to remedy the Apartheid legacy of disparities 
in quality of education among formerly racially separated institutions. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, post-Apartheid education policy pursued twofold objectives of increasing 
black presence in historically white institutions (HWIs) and narrowing the quality gap – 
real, but also perceived or reputed – between HWIs and historically black institutions 
(HBIs). As purposed, a growing proportion of black students have enrolled in HWIs, and 
a declining proportion in HBIs. In 1993, 49 percent of black students were in HBIs and 
13 percent in HWIs; by 1999, 33 percent were in HBIs and 39 percent in HWIs (with the 
remainder in distance learning). This trend continued, though at a slower pace, such that 
in 2003, 32 percent enrolled in HBIs and 42 percent in HWIs (National Higher Education 
Plan 2001 and Education Statistics at a Glance 2003).  
The black population’s access to the more prestigious and better equipped HWIs has 
therefore expanded, although large numbers are enrolled HBIs. Since 2003, South Africa 
has phased out the HBI/HWI distinction and merged and reorganized various institutes. 
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Nonetheless, we may reasonably project that the trends above have continued, and 
stratification of the education system persists, and possibly intensifies, as racially 
diversifying urban middle and upper classes increasingly enjoy the advantages of being 
educated in previously white schools and HWIs (Morrow 2008: 282-283). Beyond entry 
into higher education, graduation rates – i.e. the number of graduates per headcount 
enrollment – and success rates are concerns related to the efficacy of education and 
capacity of students to engage academically. South Africa posted a 15 percent graduation 
rate over 1993-98, which is considered very low by relevant international standards 
(National Plan for Higher Education 2001). Among students enrolled in 2000, the 
proportion that dropped out by 2004 was 38 percent in universities, 58 percent in 
technikons and 71 percent in distance education (Kraak 2008). Much concern was 
expressed in 2001, but improvements have not transpired subsequently – graduation rates 
remained at 15 percent in 2002 and 2006 (Education Statistics at a Glance, 2002 and 
2006).  
While these data disaggregated by race are not available, we may deduce from 
enrollment and graduation differentials that black students contribute relatively more to 
the low graduation rate. Blacks constituted 62.5 percent of enrolled students (Table 5-2) 
and 50.4 percent of graduates in 1995 (Table 5-3), and 73.0 percent of enrolled students 
and 65.1 percent of graduates in 2002. These figures suggest the black students are more 
likely to not complete higher education, although this gap is narrowing. Correspondingly, 
improvements in the undergraduate success rate between 2002 and 2006 are gradual but 
positive (Table 5-4). Another point of note pertains to variations in the fields pursued, 
where again, racial disparities prevail. In 2000, Africans constituted 51 percent of all 
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graduates, but their proportion varies across fields, from 85 percent in education, 74 
percent in public administration and 58 percent in social science, to 39 percent in 
business and commerce and 32 percent in science, engineering and technology (Subotzky 
2003: 370). 
 
Table 5-3. South Africa: Racial composition of tertiary graduates 
 1995 1998 2002 
 Percentage of total 
African 38.6 49.7 52.8 
Colored 5.2 5.1 5.3 
Indian 6.6 4.7 7.0 
White 49.6 40.5 34.9 
Total number of graduates 81,764 79,725 101,410 
 Source: Commission for Higher Education (2004) 
 
 
Table 5-4. South Africa: Undergraduate success rate 
 2002 2006 
African 68 72 
Colored 74 76 
Indian 80 79 
White 85 85 
Overall 74 76 
Source: Education Statistics at a Glance, 2002 and 2006. 
Note: full-time equivalent passes per full-time equivalent enrollment 
 
 
 
5. 3. 3. 2. Inequality in earnings 
How do these developments in prospective labor market entrants’ educational 
attainments interact with earnings outcomes? From our OHS and LFS series, we consider 
the earnings differential by highest education attained relative to persons with complete 
secondary schooling. We find that the earnings ratio of degree holders to secondary 
school completers rose most rapidly, from 2.23 in 1998 to 3.17 in 2006 (Figure 5-5). 
Diploma holders also saw their relative earnings follow an upward trend, from 1.33 in 
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1998 to 1.70 in 2006. Within race groups, only the differential between degree holders 
can be said to follow an upward trend. The increase in this raw measure of returns to 
tertiary education is higher and growing for blacks. The relative earnings of degree-
holders rise from 2.52 in 1998 to 3.53 in 2006 (Figure 5-6). The differential among 
whites is notably lower, and the increase is also smaller, from 1.76 in 1998 to 2.18 in 
2006 (Figure 5-7).  
 
Figure 5-5. South Africa: Earnings by highest education, per complete secondary 
schooling 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Figure 5-6. Blacks: Earnings by highest education, per complete secondary schooling 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Figure 5-7. Whites: Earnings by highest education, per complete secondary schooling 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
The dominant trend of an increasing effect of higher education translates, as expected, 
into declining inter-racial inequality among graduates. Figure 5-8 compares earnings of 
blacks and whites in the same category of educational attainment. The racial earnings gap 
between employed persons of similar education is being bridged at the upper end, among 
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degree holders, from a white-black ratio of 1.8 in 1998 to 1.4 in 2006, while lesser 
qualified blacks trail their white counterparts by larger margins that show little sign of 
narrowing. 
 
Figure 5-8. White: Black earnings ratio, within educational attainment group 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
5. 3. 4. Occupational position 
5. 3. 4. 1. Inequality in representation 
 Occupational profiles of the employed, similar to the educational attainment statistics 
above, plainly depict the persistent racial divisions in the labor market. The contrast 
between the occupational compositions of the black and white employed populations is 
especially striking at the upper and lower rungs (Appendix Figures 5-8 and 5-9). Whereas 
the black working population was comprised of about 8 percent managers and 
professionals and 40 percent production workers, these occupation groups respectively 
constitute 35 percent and 5 percent of the white working population. We do not observe 
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any major inter-temporal change, over 1998-2006, in the proportions of occupation 
categories for South Africa as a whole and within black and white populations.  
The proportion of blacks within occupations increased in a few categories (Figure 5-
9). In professional employment, blacks increased their proportion from around 50 percent 
over 1999-2001 to 58 percent over 2004-2006. However, the relative share of blacks in 
management positions did not suggest any perceivable trend. These trends are not 
surprising, given that entry into professional positions follows more sequentially from 
formal tertiary education, whereas experience, seniority and other factors influence entry 
into management. 
Figure 5-9. South Africa: Proportion of blacks within occupation group 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
  
Employment Equity Reports offer an alternate data source and reference point. The 
Employment Equity Commission’s Annual Report provides summary statistics from the 
reports it receives. Table 5-5 exhibits racial composition of management and 
professionals. The years coincide with the schedule of EE reports for large companies, 
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who are required to submit annually, and for medium-scale companies, which submit 
every two years. Black representation in top management and senior management 
increased from 2000 to 2006. Notably, the proportion of blacks in these high-level 
positions is substantially lower than in middle management and professional positions. 
These results are not surprising, and comparable with other firm-based surveys131.  
The figures for professionals and middle management, however, are too inconsistent 
to be relied upon as an indicator of change over time. Such improbable swings may be 
due to the breadth of interpreting which jobs qualify as professional and middle 
management, or more likely, as a result of variations in the sample of EE reports 
analyzed. Table 5-6 summarizes some key features of employment equity reports 
received by the Department of Labor. In particular, the considerably smaller average firm 
size in reports analyzed in 2002 and 2006 coincides with lower black representation at 
professional and middle management positions. As firm size increases, in most cases the 
number of professional and middle management positions would grow at a higher rate 
than the number of senior and top management positions. Smaller firms offer lesser 
opportunity for horizontal expansion of employment at these levels, and hence fewer 
positions in which preferential selection can be accorded to blacks.  
 
                                                 
131 Of note, the Breakwater Monitor survey computes proportions of blacks in management of 7.0 
percent in 1994, 12.7 percent in 1998, and 20.3 percent in 2000. However, blacks constituted 35 
percent of management recruits in 2000 (Horwitz and Bowmaker-Falconer 2003: 616-622). Two 
caveats are attached to this survey: first, participation is voluntary, and respondents are 
disproportionately large firms. 
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Table 5-5. South Africa Employment Equity Reports: Racial 
composition of managerial and professional positions 
 2000 2002 2004 20061 
Top management 
African 6.2 10.0 11.8 11.3 
Colored 2.7 3.4 3.7 4.7 
Indian 3.8 5.0 5.6 6.2 
   Black 12.7 18.4 21.1 22.2 
   White 87.5 81.5 78.9 74.9 
Senior management 
African 8.7 10.8 13.1 13.4 
Colored 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.8 
Indian 4.9 6.3 7.2 7.7 
   Black 18.5 22.2 25.7 26.9 
   White 81.6 77.9 74.4 70.9 
Professionals and middle management 
African 32.8 16.2 38.8 20.2 
Colored 5.5 8.2 6.5 8.0 
Indian 5.8 7.0 5.9 8.3 
   Black 44.1 31.4 51.2 36.5 
   White 56.1 68.5 48.9 62.2 
 Source: Employment Equity Report, various years. 
 Note: 1Figures do not sum to 100 due to a fraction of non-South Africans. 
 
These findings must be also handled cautiously, in view of the non-random sampling 
– contingent on submission of complete EE reports, in which compliance has declined – 
and questions over representativeness of the data. Nonetheless, the EE reports do find 
support in non-published surveys of market research firms that have found similar levels 
of African representation. Human resource consultancy P-E Corporate Services reports 
that, from 2004 to 2008, Africans comprised 25 percent of senior managers in its salary 
and working conditions survey, covering 850 companies that employ over 1.5 million 
people. This marks an increase from 5 percent in 1994, but also reflects a slowdown of 
the rate of black entry into such positions132. No dataset is definitive, but information 
from the EE reports concurs with the expected difficulties in penetrating upper-level 
                                                 
132 “Black women getting top management”, Business Day, December 8, 2008. 
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management, both from the perspective of inadequate experience among blacks and 
disincentives among employers. 
 
Table 5-6. South Africa: Employment Equity Report samples 
 Received Analyzed 
Number of 
employees covered 
Average 
firm size 
2000 12,980 8,250 3,336,784 n.a. 
2002 6,990 6,990 2,605,729 373 
2004 9,389 5,554 2,534,525 1,088 
2006 6,876 4,394 1,641,179 374 
Source: Employment Equity Report 2006-2007 
 
 
  
The educational and industrial composition of managerial and high-skilled 
occupations is also relevant to our consideration. Figure 5-10 shows that South African 
managers, professionals and technicians are highly qualified. The proportions with 
tertiary education exceed the corresponding figures for Malaysia (see Figure 3-1). These 
numbers are similar within black and white working populations, for professionals and 
technicians, while the proportion of managers with degrees is higher among whites than 
blacks. However, we find improbable fluctuations, and no noticeable patterns of 
increasing percentages of tertiary educated personnel, reflecting the problems of small 
samples133. This cautions us against taking the findings of each year in isolation, and 
underscores the utility of placing emphasis more on observable trends over time, less on 
precise estimates in any particular year.  
 
                                                 
133 For instance, the number of observations of managers range between 800 and 1,000 in the 
OHS and LFS of South Africa, compared to 3,000-3,500 in the Malaysian Household Income 
Surveys. 
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Figure 5-10. South Africa: Proportion of managers, professionals and technicians 
with tertiary education 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
We also observe the occupational profile of tertiary educated workers (Figures 5-11 
and 5-12). Here we find considerable variance between race groups. Within the black 
tertiary educated workforce, the proportion working as technicians is highest, but 
declining (to 30 percent in 2006) as the proportion working in management rises, 
although by 2006 it is still substantially lower, at 12 percent. The proportion working as 
professionals lies in between, at 22 percent. Within the white workforce, the share of 
managers, professionals and technicians are each between 20 to 30 percent. These data 
suggest that tertiary education on average correlates with higher rate of entry into 
management for whites than for blacks, and the converse for entry into technical 
occupations. We are unable to compute these figures reliably for degree-holders and 
diploma-holders separately, due to insufficient sample size. However, we would expect 
that parallel differences between race groups to hold. 
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Figure 5-11. Blacks: Proportion of tertiary educated workforce employed as 
manager, professional or technician 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 5-12. Whites: Proportion of tertiary educated workforce employed as 
manager, professional or technician 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
The industrial composition of management and highly-skilled personnel are worth 
briefly outlining. Although affirmative action targets group representation within 
occupations and not explicitly within industrial sectors, differences across sectors reflect 
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barriers to and shortcomings of the process of broad transformation. Over 1998-2006, 
based on the OHS and the LFS we find that 33 percent of black managers worked in 
trades, 18 percent in services, 14 percent in manufacturing, 12 percent in finance and 14 
percent in transportation. Among white managers, 30 were in trades, 10 percent in 
services, 18 percent in manufacturing, 22 percent in finance and 6 percent in 
transportation. The two major differences are the higher proportions of black managers 
engaged in services and transportation, and higher share of white managers employed in 
finance. In professional occupations, blacks are more concentrated in services (73 percent, 
largely teachers) and less in finance (15 percent). In contrast, 48 percent of white 
professionals are in services, and 32 percent are in finance.  
Data on registered professionals and trainees serve as useful reference points. In 2004, 
90.3 percent of chartered accountants were white, 2.1 percent were African, 6.0 percent 
Indian and 1.4 percent colored. Among trainees, 15 percent were African, 4 percent 
colored, 14 percent Indian and 66 percent white. These figures reflect both persistent 
racial gaps and slight progress towards redressing disproportionalities (van Zyl 2008: 
380). The data above highlight the importance of looking beyond aggregated 
occupational groups, and of controlling for industrial sector when assessing the effects of 
race on employment and earnings.  
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5. 3. 4. 2. Inequality in earnings 
 Turning now to inter-occupational earnings differentials, our findings draw attention 
to the managerial and professional levels (Figure 5-13). In the economy as a whole, the 
earnings of managers moved notably, with its ratio to service workers falling marginally 
from 4.0 in 1998 to 3.8 in 2000, then rising considerably to 5.0 in 2006. Relative earnings 
of professionals climbed upward from 1999 to 2003, but flattened thereafter. Technicians 
saw relative earnings slightly but steadily grow over 1998-2006. These trends are also 
manifest, with generally greater magnitude of change, within the black employed 
population. The earnings of managers relative to service workers increased from 2.4 in 
1998 to 4.4 in 2006, and the relative earnings of professionals followed a fluctuating but 
upward movement from 2.4 in 1999 to 3.7 in 2006 (Figure 5-14). The earnings gap on 
upper level occupations is therefore widening within the black population, while inter-
occupation inequality ratios within the white population do not suggest any patterns, 
except a relative increase in managerial earnings from 2002 (Figure 5-15).  
 
Figure 5-13. South Africa: Earnings ratio by occupation, per service workers 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Figure 5-14. Blacks: Earnings ratio by occupation, per service workers 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Figure 5-15. Whites: Earnings ratio by occupation, per service workers 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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The differentials of white to black earnings within occupation groups trace out few 
perceivable upward or downward trends (Figures 5-16 and 5-17). The gap between white 
and black is perhaps narrowing among professionals, from a peak of 1.96 in 1999 to 1.39 
in 2006, although with substantial fluctuations between 1998 and 2003 – probably due to 
reporting of incomes in brackets. The ratio among managers indicates a precipitous drop 
between 1998 and 1999; however, this pattern is at odds with the rest of the series, over 
which we may not conclude any trend. In the technician category, we note a slight but 
steady decline from 1.89 in 2000 to 1.62 in 2006. In the next set of occupational rungs, 
we find a fairly constant inter-racial gap among clerks, and no clear pattern among 
service workers and craft workers.  
 
 
Figure 5-16. White: Black earnings ratio, by occupation (managers, professionals 
and technicians) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Figure 5-17. White: Black earnings ratio, by occupation (clerks, service workers 
and craft workers) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
 
5. 4. Public sector employment 
The public sector has served as a major employer of disadvantaged persons and, 
importantly, as a facilitator of blacks into managerial/administrative, professional and 
technical jobs. Public employment data are available to check the representativeness of 
these sub-sample of public sector we extract from the Labor Force Surveys. Table 5-7 
allows us to compare the racial compositions obtained in the LFS 2001 with public 
service employment based on payroll data. In terms of racial composition, the LFS is 
reasonably representative of the actual public service working population134.  
 
                                                 
134 We also find compatibility of racial composition in 2006. Naidoo (2008: 111-112), from 
public service payroll data, reports African shares of 57 percent at senior management and 73 
percent overall, while according to the LFS, Africans constitute 57.3 percent of managers and 
71.2 percent of government employees. 
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Table 5-7. South Africa: Racial composition of the public service  
 Total employment Management Non-management 
 
Public 
service 
payroll 
(2001) 
LFS 
Sept 
2001 
Public 
service 
payroll 
(2001) 
LFS 
Sept 
2001 
Public 
service 
payroll 
(2001) 
LFS 
Sept 
2001 
African 71.5 68.6 51.1 46.8 73.0 69.1 
Colored 8.9 10.1 5.7 6.6 9.0 10.2 
Indian 3.6 3.5 6.6 7.5 3.5 3.4 
White 16.0 17.7 36.6 39.0 14.5 17.1 
Sources: Woolard and Thompson 2002; September 2001 Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
The discussion to follow considers employment and earnings statistics of the public 
sector – encompassing government departments and state-owned enterprises –from 2000 
to 2006. Our timeline is reduced because the OHS did not reliably identify public and 
private sectors. We first explore the extent to which blacks of advanced qualification are 
employed in the public sector. Survey reports of graduates have found a high incidence of 
public sector employment among African graduates (Moleke 2005). We consider the 
proportions of blacks and of whites with tertiary education who are working in the public 
sector, followed by the corresponding proportions of persons occupying managerial or 
professional positions.  
Our calculations reveal high proportions of degree-qualified, managerial and 
professional blacks working in the public sector, in concurrence with expectations and 
related studies135. Over 2000-2006, 60-65 percent of blacks with degrees, and 40-50 
percent of black managers and professionals, were employed in the public sector (Figure 
5-18). Importantly, we also observe the share of the public sector among these categories 
diminishing over our time period. The corresponding figures for white employed persons 
are noticeably lower, and less clear in indicating any trend (Figure 5-19).  
                                                 
135 The survey reported by Moleke (2005) finds that 77 percent of black graduates work in the 
public sector. This is based on respondents who worked between 1990 and 1998. 
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Figure 5-18. Blacks: Public sector share of degree holders, managers and professionals 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 5-19. Whites: Public sector share of degree holders, managers and professionals 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
The entry of highly educated and upwardly mobile blacks into private sector 
employment proceeded in the early- to mid-2000s. Black representation among degree 
holders and among managers and professionals increased across the board, but by greater 
margins in the private sector (Figure 5-20). The continual inclination of blacks toward 
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public sector employment is undoubtedly motivated by various factors, including the 
concentration of tertiary-qualified blacks in services, especially education, and the greater 
latitude for employment equity enforcement in government departments or government-
owned entities. Nonetheless, the increasing proportion of blacks among private sector 
managers and professionals, rising from 35 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in 2006, and 
among private sector degree holders (24 percent to 36 percent) is possibly capturing 
effects of compliance with employment equity. The correspondence of race with 
selection into these occupations and sectors will therefore need to be isolated.   
 
Figure 5-20. South Africa: Proportion of blacks among degree holders, managers 
and professionals, by sector 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
Turning now to inter-racial earnings disparities, we compute racial earnings 
disparities among degree-qualified workers and among managers and professionals, 
separately for public and private sectors (Figures 5-21 and 5-22). We obtain a declining 
white-black ratio for degree holders in the private sector, but no evident pattern for the 
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other categories. The increase in black representation among degree-qualified workers in 
the private sector thus corresponds with a decrease in racial earnings inequality.  
Figure 5-21. White: Black earnings ratio of degree holders, by sector 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 5-22. White: Black earnings ratio of managers and professionals, by sector 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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5. 5. Main findings 
Our analysis of inequality in this chapter started at the aggregated level, where we 
find that over 2000-2006 national earnings inequality remained quite stable, while intra-
black inequality grew. The white to black earnings ratio perceivably declines at the mean 
and 95th percentile. Declining inter-racial inequality at the upper regions of the 
distribution and growing inequality within the black population suggest possible effects 
of affirmative action, and set the stage for further exploration of educational and 
occupational dimensions of inequality. 
Education statistics and labor force surveys indicate growth in tertiary educational 
attainment in the general working population, although the most salient development is 
the growth in secondary school completion among blacks. Tertiary educated workers still 
constitute a small section of the black employed population. Higher education is an 
increasingly important factor in earnings inequality among blacks; we find increasing 
disparity especially between degree-qualified workers and others. The white-black 
earnings gap has declined most sharply among the tertiary educated, again, most 
pronouncedly at the degree level.  
South Africa’s labor market has witnessed substantial change in the upper echelons. 
We find that blacks are entering management and highly skilled jobs, especially 
professional positions, although different data sources provide varying estimates of the 
extent of progress. However, the small number of observations in these categories lends 
to high dispersion in earnings, causing exceptionally larger fluctuation in inter-racial 
disparities. Among professionals, we can trace out a downward trend in the white-black 
earnings ratio, but among managers we observe no narrowing pattern. The low 
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representation of blacks in senior and top management may contribute to the continual 
white-black gap under the aggregated category of ‘managers’. In terms of intra-racial 
inequality, high earnings growth of black managers and professionals has widened the 
divide between these occupational rungs and the rest, while within the white employed 
population, the disparity grew between managers’ earnings and the rest.  
Public sector employment has been central to the absorption of highly qualified and 
upwardly mobile blacks. We find that the majority of tertiary educated blacks, and black 
professionals and technicians are employed in the public sector. However, we also 
observe a growing trend in black representation among professionals and tertiary 
qualified workers in the private sector, and note that inter-racial earnings have declined 
notably more within these groups. In sum, we find some indication that the dependence 
on the public sector for employment of highly qualified and upwardly mobile blacks may 
be declining, which is in line with the enforcement of employment equity across all 
sectors. 
This chapter’s findings project a few directions for further study. In terms of job 
attainment, the effects of various simultaneous developments need to be controlled for to 
obtain more precise estimates of the relationships between race, education and occupation 
that are central to this study. The continuing disparities between blacks and whites in 
educational attainment, industry, geographic location, and other characteristics 
underscore the need for testing the correspondence of race with occupying a high-level 
job while controlling for other determinants. We want to focus specifically on the 
prospects for tertiary educated blacks of attaining managerial and professional jobs. We 
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also consider some corollaries of employment equity, specifically unemployment and 
mobility, to supplement our analysis of occupational attainment. 
In terms of earnings inequality, the narrowing of racial inequality among degree-
qualified workers and among managers and professionals warrants further analysis. We 
will therefore estimate the independent effects of a set of individual characteristics on 
earnings, focusing on race, education and occupation, and interactions of these variables. 
Again, our chief purpose is to compare the labor market experience of degree-qualified 
blacks and whites.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SOUTH AFRICA: DETERMINANTS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY AND 
IMPLICATIONS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
6. 1. Overview  
This chapter evaluates the causes of inequality in racial representation and earnings in 
South Africa, further investigating the patterns of racial representation and earnings 
inequality outlined in Chapter 5. We focus on the main beneficiaries of affirmative action, 
blacks with tertiary education or in management or highly skilled occupations, subject to 
sample size constraints. This chapter, along the lines of Chapter 4’s analysis of Malaysia, 
ventures to: 
1. Estimate the independent and joint effects of race and educational attainment on 
attaining upper-level occupations; 
2. Evaluate earnings determinants, with particular attention to the joint effects of race 
and educational attainment or occupational position; 
3. Estimate the independent effects of tertiary education and occupation on earnings 
inequality within race groups; 
4. Discuss implications of our findings on affirmative action programs. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we briefly survey the relevant literature, 
largely comprised of research based on decomposition exercises that quantify the 
proportionate contributions to inequality from ‘productivity’ and ‘discrimination’. This 
body of research, while informative, evaluates inequality and discrimination between 
entire working populations of race groups, which is too broad for our purposes. We lay 
out the approach adopted in this study, which draws partly on some studies that 
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incorporate occupational attainment and earnings functions but mostly formulates 
functions that specifically evaluate labor market returns to blacks with tertiary education 
and blacks in upper-tier occupations. 
Second, we present findings from logit regressions for occupational attainment, where 
we estimate the effects of a set of determinants on the probability of occupying a 
management or professional job. Focusing on the dimensions of inequality most directly 
relevant to affirmative action, we interact race with education variables to separately test 
for the impact of educational qualifications on whites and blacks. We find that degree-
qualified blacks are more likely than degree-qualified whites to attain managerial or 
professional jobs, ceteris paribus. We obtain different results between sectors, with 
degree-qualified blacks are more likely than degree-qualified whites to attain managerial 
or professional jobs in the public sector, but the converse for the private sector. We also 
consider the transition from tertiary education to labor market participation and job 
mobility, two developments inter-related with affirmative action. The unemployment rate 
among degree-qualified blacks has declined substantially. At the same time, employee 
surveys find that tertiary institute type and command over language and basic skills 
differentiate the employment prospects of graduates, and that blacks are 
disproportionately adversely affected.  
 Third, we run earnings regressions to estimate the independent effects of educational 
attainment, occupational position and race on earnings. In our regressions on the entire 
population, we find rising returns to degree qualifications and managerial and 
professional premiums, as observed in Chapter 5. The overall black earnings penalty 
fluctuates, but registers a slight net decrease, over our time period. However, when we 
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interact race with education, we find the earnings of degree-qualified blacks are gaining 
ground more substantially than less qualified blacks. The inter-racial earnings gap in 
upper-tier occupations yields sporadic results, hence we are less confident in deducing 
that black-white earnings disparities among managers and professionals have declined.  
To account for structural differences between different occupational strata, we run 
separate regressions on two occupational groupings, i.e. managers and highly skilled 
workers, and service and production workers. We find increasing earnings premiums on 
degree qualification in both sub-groups, but a marginally more significant narrowing of 
the black earnings penalty among managers and highly-skilled workers. These findings 
corroborate our earlier observation that the effect of race on earnings is declining at the 
upper occupational rungs, even after controlling for other factors. 
 Fourth, we analyze earnings inequality within the black and white populations, by 
running separate earnings regressions on both race groups. We find that the gulf between 
the black and white population in terms of disparities associated with educational 
attainment and occupational position, as reported in Chapter 5, is reduced once we 
control for other determinants. Variations across geography and industry account for a 
large portion of inequality within the black population, which has higher proportions in 
provinces and industries registering lower average earnings. The education and 
occupation categories with concentration of AA beneficiaries have enjoyed relatively 
rapid earnings growth, but the higher and increasing inequality within the black 
population is also substantially explained by structural factors unrelated to AA policies. 
 Finally, we summarize our findings and discuss implications on affirmative action. 
Results indicate that degree-qualified blacks reap some advantage in attaining managerial 
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and professional positions, and substantiate the view that preferential policies are 
implemented more vigorously in the public sector. Based on our analysis of labor force 
surveys and evidence compiled from other sources, we arrive at the broad conclusion that 
the earnings of black degree holders are catching up with that of white degree holders. 
Our analysis of intra-racial inequality obtains rising disparities between degree qualified 
workers and others, and between managers and professionals and others, within both the 
black and white population. Inequality within the black population remains higher, but 
the contribution of higher education and occupational premiums is considerably reduced 
after we control for other determinants. 
A few implications are salient. First, while affirmative action appears to have realized 
some of its objectives, questions have arisen regarding its breadth and sustainability. The 
evidence we obtain, of preferential selection favoring degree-qualified blacks and 
narrowing inter-racial disparities between black degree-holders and white degree-holders, 
in combination with indications that tertiary education among blacks remains lagging in 
terms of the quantity supplied and quality of training received, suggest that the emphasis 
of affirmative action should shift away from escalating employment equity mandates, 
towards broadening and improving education institutions. Second, the slower entry of 
blacks into managerial positions and relative dependence on the public sector for 
employment of blacks in upper-level positions, underscore the difficulties, also faced in 
Malaysia, of cultivating an independent and self-sufficient managerial and professional 
class. These areas warrant further analysis and policy focus.  
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6. 2. Existing studies and methods 
 A large segment of studies on inequality in South Africa deploy Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition techniques to obtain some measure of ‘discrimination’. Those that situate 
analysis in the context of affirmative action contend that progress in AA corresponds 
with decline in the discrimination portion – i.e. unexplained differences in returns to the 
same productive characteristics – of inter-racial occupational or wage disparities. 
Rospabé (2002) estimates occupation functions, estimating the effects of a set of 
explanatory variables on the probability of attaining a high-skill job. The study uses an 
aggregated outcome variable, encompassing management, professionals and technicians, 
due to the small sample size of Africans in these occupational groups. After running 
regressions separately for African males and white males, the study decomposes the gap 
between the two groups, with one group as reference point.  
The basic framework is applied to estimate racial discrimination in earnings as well. 
Rospabé (2002) finds that, although the gap between groups decreased, the share of the 
‘discrimination’ component increased. Occupational and earnings discrimination 
increased between 1993 and 1999, respectively, from 32 percent to 37 percent, and from 
23 percent to 27 percent. Using a similar basic framework, but referencing all race groups 
against a non-discriminatory wage obtained from the pooled sample, Allanson, Atkins 
and Hinks (2002), find that the discrimination factor eroded over the long term, between 
1980 and 1997. In 1997, the average white worker benefited from a discrimination 
premium of 47 percent while blacks on average bear a discrimination penalty of 12 
percent.   
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Burger and Jafta (2006) conduct decompositions every year over 1995-2004, and akin 
to Allanson, Atkins and Hinks (2002), incorporate both white advantage and black 
disadvantage into their framework, referenced to the overall mean. Their decompositions 
of inter-racial differences in highly-skilled employment and in wages find that the 
discrimination portion was not steadily and sizably reduced. The results of 
decompositions are thus varied, and Burger and Jafta (2006: 20) are cautious in 
concluding that the lack of a decline in the unexplained portion of inequality reflects 
persistent racial discrimination, since they are unable to control for variation in education 
quality.  
There are grounds to believe that differences in quality of education are increasingly 
important in determining employment in high-level occupations and influencing 
bargaining power over wages. In general, expansion of access to secondary and tertiary 
education widens the scope for differentiating between persons with similar paper 
qualifications. Specific to South Africa, disparities between urban and rural schools, and 
between schools inside and outside urban gentrified areas and between historically black 
institutions and historically white institutions, may have become even more pronounced 
in recent years. The available income data, unfortunately, do not provide the means to 
measure or proxy for education quality. Chamberlain and van der Berg (2006) uniquely 
contribute to this lacunae, using test scores from the 1993 PSLSD dataset136 to predict 
education quality in 1995 OHS. Their decomposition exercise finds increases in the 
contribution of observable characteristics to the racial wage gap once education quality is 
                                                 
136 The Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development survey was conducted in 1993, 
prior to the democratic transition, and sampled the entire country except for the former 
Bantustans. 
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accounted for. However, the technique has not been replicable on subsequent OHSes or 
LFSes.  
Few studies have applied earnings functions as a principal tool for analyzing 
inequality. Bhorat, Lundall and Rospabé (2002: 20-22) run earnings regressions on the 
1995 and 1999 OHSes. Their findings for 1999 are worth a brief mention. Relative to 
whites, Africans on average earn 63 percent less, coloreds 46 percent less, and Indians 31 
percent less. The average earnings of a worker possessing higher education are 1.33 times 
those of a worker with secondary schooling. These estimates are similar to our findings, 
as reported in the course of this chapter. Hlekiso and Mahlo (2006) run earnings 
regressions for 2001 and 2005, finding evidence of declining racial disparity, growing 
tertiary education premiums, and widening occupational gaps, particularly between 
managers and professionals vis-à-vis service workers. Again, the findings are consistent 
with ours, and hence serve as basic reference points. However, the earnings functions 
specified of these studies do not venture beyond standard earnings regressions and do not 
account for interactions between variables. 
This study opts for employment and earnings regressions that incorporate interaction 
terms for race and education, and for race and occupation. The continuing scarcity of 
tertiary qualified blacks and persisting barriers to upward mobility for the vast majority 
of blacks renders comparisons of overall black and white averages less appropriate than 
the relative occupational and earnings attainment of similarly qualified blacks and whites. 
Additionally, we want to focus our empirical enquiry on the main categories targeted by 
affirmative action – black graduates, managers, and professionals.  
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Our primary interest rests in particular disparities, less in notional and aggregated 
measures of discrimination as obtained through decomposition procedures. For our 
purposes it will be more instructive to estimate interacted effects of race and tertiary 
education on employment and on earnings, and interacted effects of race and occupation 
on earnings. Moreover, affirmative action centers on tertiary education, and this study 
emphasizes the effect of diplomas and degrees as a credential in labor market 
participation, in contrast to the model specification of education as a continuous variable 
(years of schooling) in occupation and earnings functions that form the basis for 
decomposition. These specific aspects of inequality cannot be distinguished in aggregated, 
Oaxaca-Blinder-based decomposition exercises.  
 
6. 3. Attainment of managerial or professional positions  
6. 3. 1. Effects of race and education 
This section follows on observations noted in Chapter 5 of racial and educational 
composition of targeted occupations. We recall that black representation increased 
significantly in professional positions, and slightly in managerial positions. We also 
found that the workforce in these occupations is highly educated. This section estimates 
the independent effects of education and race on the probability of attaining jobs targeted 
by affirmative action.  
We construct our function with a binary variable for holding a management or 
professional job as the outcome variable. We specify age, gender, education, race, 
occupation, location (province), and industry as explanatory variables. From our baseline 
equations we obtain estimates for the independent effect of our key variables – race and 
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education – on the probability of attaining the targeted occupations. We extend the model 
to include interaction terms for race and education, in which there are two categories for 
race (black and white) and three categories for education (degree, diploma, and without 
tertiary education). We therefore obtain five interaction terms for six categories, and 
designate ‘white without tertiary education’ as the reference group. The relevant segment 
of the function appears as: 
1 2 3 4
5 6
(target job) *
* ...
probability black degree black degree
diploma black diploma
β β β β
β β
= + + +
+ + +
 
The reference group is white without tertiary education, with the associated coefficients 
arranged as follows: 
β2 applies black without tertiary education 
β3 applies to white with degree 
β5 applies to white with diploma 
β2 + β3 + β4 applies to black with degree 
β2 + β5 + β6 applies to black with diploma 
For ease of reading and to focus on changes over time in particular variables, we 
present the results in graphic instead of tabular format. Missing points denote statistically 
insignificant results. We first ran the occupation regressions separately for management 
and professional positions. However, this produces a high incidence of statistically 
insignificant or implausibly dispersed results, due to the small number of observations, 
leading us to combine the occupation groups into one category, roughly corresponding 
with “highly skilled” workers as delineated in other studies (e.g. Rospabé 2002). We 
obtain more stable and statistically significant findings, although we lose some important 
differentiation between managerial and professional/technical employment.  
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In the baseline regressions, we observe no clear pattern over time in the effects of 
race on attaining a management or professional job, after controlling for other 
determinants (Figure 6-1). Over 1998-2006, among workers who are identical in all other 
relevant characteristics for which data are available, blacks are on average 7-9 percent 
less likely than whites to be managers or professionals (with 2000 apparently an outlier). 
We find no trend towards eliminating this gap. Significant change takes place in the 
educational dimension. Degree qualification raises the probability of attaining a 
management or professional position, relative to secondary school completion, by 42 
percent in 1998 and by 53 percent in 2006 (Figure 6-2). We conduct this regression 
restricted to the tertiary educated employed population, as we did in Chapter 4. The 
resulting small sample yields dispersed results, but on the whole, tertiary educated blacks 
are less likely than tertiary educated whites to attain a position in management or as a 
professional (Figure 6-3).  
 
Figure 6-1. South Africa: Effect of race on the probability of attaining a management or 
professional position 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Figure 6-2. South Africa: Effect of educational attainment on the probability of attaining 
a management or professional position, per complete secondary school 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 6-3. Tertiary educated workers: Probability of blacks (per whites) attaining a 
managerial job or a professional job 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
A question that follows is whether this effect varies for black graduates against their 
white counterparts. Figure 6-4 presents results of regressions incorporating the race and 
education interaction terms. We find that a degree-holding black on average has a higher 
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likelihood of being a manager or professional compared to a degree-holding white. This 
finding suggests that blacks with degree-level education are conferred some preference in 
hiring or promotion decisions in the upper occupational rungs, and are thus benefiting 
from employment equity considerations. We noted in Chapter 5 that the majority of 
degree-qualified blacks work in the public sector. To test if the effect of joint effect of 
race and tertiary education differs between public and private sectors, we bifurcate the 
dependent variable. We find that degree-holding blacks are more likely than degree-
holding whites to attaining a management or professional position in the public sector 
(Figure 6-5). However, we find the converse to hold in the private sector (Figure 6-6).  
 
Figure 6-4. South Africa: Joint effect of race and educational attainment on the 
probability of attaining a management or professional position, per white without tertiary 
education 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Figure 6-5. South Africa: Probability of attaining public sector managerial or professional 
job, per white without tertiary education 
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  Source: Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 6-6. South Africa: Probability of attaining private sector managerial or 
professional job, per white without tertiary education 
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  Source: Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
These results are consistent with the view that employment equity is thus more 
enforceable in the public sector. We also refer back to the observation in Chapter 5 that 
increasing proportions of degree-qualified, managerial and professional blacks are 
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working in the private sector. This chapter’s findings imply that the increasing proportion 
of blacks among private sector managers and professionals is due more to the growing 
supply of skilled persons than to selection processes favoring blacks. However, the 
generality of our findings omits important dimensions, especially the possible effect of 
qualitative differentiation in tertiary education. The better prospects for degree-qualified 
whites to attain private sector management and professional jobs may derive from 
differences in the quality of education not captured in the data. We are also unable to 
account for differences within the tertiary-educated black population, such as between 
HWI and HBI graduates.  
 
 
6. 3. 2. Graduate unemployment and lateral mobility  
We have found that degree qualifications enhance the prospects of attaining highly 
skilled occupations, and have taken this finding as an indication that affirmative action is 
making an impact on selection, particularly in the public sector. It is also important to 
consider the transition from tertiary education to labor market participation in a more 
general sense. The issues of graduate unemployment, and of qualitative differences 
between graduates that impact on ‘employability’, are integral to discussions surrounding 
affirmative action. Another related matter concerns the debate over lateral mobility of 
black skilled workers, purportedly due to the employment equity mandate which induces 
job-hopping and inflates bargaining power, especially in areas with skills scarcity. Data 
on unemployment and lateral mobility merit a specific discussion at this juncture. 
South Africa’s unemployment rate is markedly differentiated by race and education 
level. As shown in Figure 6-7, the broad unemployment rate for the black labor force as a 
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whole is exceedingly high, although steadily declining from about 45 percent in the early 
2000s to 40 percent by 2006. Unemployment in the white population was sustained in the 
6-9 percent range, with slight variance between the diploma- and degree-qualified labor 
force. White degree holders register exceptionally low unemployment rates, of generally 
2-3 percent, with an increase to 5 percent in 2006. Among diploma-holding blacks, 
unemployment is unusually high, persisting above 20 percent, although it drops between 
2001 and 2004. Degree-holding blacks enjoy the most substantial decline in 
unemployment, from 15 percent in 2001 to 5 percent in 2006, which corresponds with a 
lower rate than the overall white unemployment rate from 2004 to 2006.  
 
Figure 6-7. South Africa: Unemployment rate (broad), by education attained and 
race, and overall 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Clearly, degree-level graduates experience lower unemployment rates, and black 
degree-level graduates have realized the most gains in employment prospects in recent 
years. It is plausible, and generally posited, that qualitative differences between graduates 
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increasingly matter, particularly within the black population. The OHS and LFS datasets 
are unequipped to inform these matters; hence, we refer to studies that differentiate 
graduates by type of institution. Moleke (2005) reports on a survey of 2672 graduates 
regarding their employment experiences between 1990 and 1998. At a basic level, the 
occupational profile of graduates varies by race. Among whites, 22.6 percent were 
managers, 57.2 percent professionals, 4.4 percent supervisors, and 10.4 percent in 
administrative positions. Among Africans, 10.8 percent were managers, 59.9 percent 
professionals, 7.7 percent supervisors, and 13.1 percent administrators. A considerably 
larger proportion of white graduates are in managerial positions, and moderately larger 
proportions of black graduates hold supervisory and administrative jobs. However, a 
much higher share of African graduates secured their first job in the public sector – 76.7 
percent, compared to 39.0 percent of white graduates. The survey also found major 
differences between graduates of historically white institutions (HWIs) and historically 
black institutions (HBIs) in the length of time taken to secure a job after graduation and 
in the share of unemployed (across all study disciplines), with HBI graduates registering 
slower transitions into employment.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, black tertiary students in general, and African students in 
particular, record lower graduation rates and are over-represented in education, public 
administration, and humanities fields, while being under-represented in engineering and 
sciences. Differences in progress in these latter disciplines are even more acute, and must 
affect to some extent the suitability of graduates for labor market participation, 
particularly in specialized skilled occupations. The inter-racial gap is substantial in 
completion rates, but even greater in terms of length of time taken, which may partly 
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reflect disparities in aptitude. For example, Kraak (2004: 19) reports on engineering 
student progress rates, from a six-year longitudinal study conducted over 1995-2000. 
African and white students registered completion rates of, respectively, 55 percent and 75 
percent. However, the percentage graduating within the minimal period was just 6 
percent among Africans, compared to 51 percent among whites. The proportion 
graduating within six years was 41 percent for Africans and 72 percent for whites.  
 Employers’ assessments of graduates provide a window into the compatibility of 
tertiary education with the skills and capacities demanded of them. Griesel and Parker 
(2009) outline the findings of a survey of employers spanning the public sector and large 
companies in the private sector. The study was framed with the objective of evaluating 
the alignment of graduates’ capabilities against employers’ expectations. The pilot status 
and small sample (99 respondents) of the study are stressed; however, these preliminary 
findings are instructive and unsurprising. English proficiency and basic skills (technical 
abilities and computer literacy) are conspicuous areas of shortfall, in which African 
students are, presumably, more disadvantaged.  
Scarcity of black graduates with in-demand skills, coupled with employment equity 
imperatives, has given rise to perceptions that job-hopping is more prevalent among 
black workers, who concomitantly command high wage premiums to be recruited or 
retained (e.g. SAIRR 2007a). Three studies shed some light, but the matter remains 
under-researched. First, Moleke (2005), drawing on the survey discussed above, finds a 
higher percentage of Africans still in their first job compared to whites. This outcome is 
significantly due to a higher proportion of Africans in the public sector, mostly teachers, 
who tend to retain their jobs over the long term. Nonetheless, the results do not support 
 251 
generalized assessments about the incidence of job-hopping in the African labor force, 
while leaving open the possibility that highly-qualified Africans are exceptionally mobile. 
The survey, it should also be noted, was conducted before passage of employment equity 
legislation. 
Second, and more recently, Khanyile and Maponga (2007) conduct a survey of 
professionals to investigate the contention of higher turnover among blacks. The sample 
comprises 2,000 respondents, the majority of which earn above R10,000 a month. They 
found that 52 percent of African respondents remained in the same company since 
starting their career, compared to 25 percent of white respondents. However, black 
professionals are more inclined to move, with 41 percent looking for another job, against 
16 percent of whites. This survey also enquires, through discussions with groups of black 
professionals, the sources of job satisfaction and reasons for wanting to change jobs, 
finding that push factors – being denied responsibilities or appraised unequally – play a 
prominent role.   
A third source of information addresses questions over staff turnover in the public 
sector. Computing public service payroll data, Naidoo (2008) reports high mobility rates 
in public services over 1998-2002, specifically at the senior management level. The high 
vacancy rate on average (22.3 percent in 2004-05) stems more from mobility than from 
creation of new posts, and most of the turnover involves internal movement – between 
departments within the public service137. This lends support to the view that job-
switching derives from competition between government departments to meet 
employment equity targets amidst a scarcity of qualified and experienced candidates 
                                                 
137 For example, between 1998 and 2002, 91 percent of mobility of senior managers in national 
government occurred within the public services (Author’s calculation from Naidoo 2008: 120). 
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(Chipkin 2008). However, mobility of white managers is also high. Over 1998-2002, 
among senior management that changed job within national government, 46 percent were 
African and 40 percent white, both of which are close to the groups’ shares of employed 
senior management (Naidoo 2008: 120-121). High turnover in public sector employment 
correlates with employment equity and skills shortages, but, as the above surveys also 
suggest, appears to be part of more systemic and under-researched problems of 
workplace relations and combinations of push and pull factors.  
 
6. 3. 3. Firm-level factors 
The efficacy of South Africa’s employment equity regime largely hinges on the 
extent to which firms undertake affirmative action in their hiring, training and promotion 
decisions. Firm-level analysis can add some insight here. One set of studies worth 
reporting here survey black economic empowerment, of which employment equity and 
executive representation are elements relevant to this study. Schreuder, van Heerden and 
Khanya (2007), surveying compliance along the lines of the BEE codes and the seven 
BEE objectives, offers some useful information. The study finds generally low levels of 
engagement in BEE, with 39 percent of respondents reporting that they have neither 
made progress, or have not even formulated a plan for transformation. Small firms face 
greater difficulty or show more reluctance in pursuing BEE. The study also reports skills 
shortages, the existence of a small black elite, and high turnover as the most cited 
perceived impediments to BEE.  
The survey evaluates firm performance relative to the BEE Code targets. Respondents 
fall short least of all in the ownership element of the BEE scorecard (60.3 percent of the 
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target level), ahead of skills development (43.8 percent) and employment equity (36.7 
percent), demonstrating the primacy of equity transfers in practice and concentration of 
wealth under the auspices of BEE, but also some degree of involvement in preferential 
training, hiring and promotion of disadvantaged persons. At the same time, respondents 
on average performed poorly in the categories of preferential procurement and enterprise 
development, which pertain more to broadening of black ownership and participation in 
business. Other studies (e.g. Sanchez 2008) confirm the conspicuously slow progress of 
blacks in establishing and operating small and medium scale enterprises.  
 Mohamad and Roberts (2008) paint a sobering picture of BEE in their sector-specific 
survey. They sample 25 firms in metals and engineering industries, evaluating progress in 
three main areas of BEE: procurement, employment equity and skills training. They find 
limited or absent progress, with blacks continually excluded from decision-making 
positions, and concentrated in human resource or public relations departments. There is 
even a decline in black representation in top management in the sample. In addition, 
surveyed firms procured minimal technical or material products from BEE firms, and a 
number of transactions involved ambiguous or misleading classification of BEE status. 
On the whole, firm-level studies find progress of BEE in the private sector to be slow, 
and constrained by a range of factors. 
 
6. 4. Inter-racial earnings inequality 
Our baseline earnings regression consists of log earnings as the outcome, with age, 
gender, education, race, occupation, union membership, province, and industry as 
explanatory variables. We apply interaction terms of education and race, as we did in the 
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occupational attainment regressions (with whites without tertiary education as the 
reference group), as well as occupation and race (with white service workers as the 
reference group). We also estimate separate baseline regressions for black and white 
employed populations to observe dynamics of inequality within race groups.  
From the baseline regression, we find that the rising trend in returns to degree-level 
qualification to be generally sustained, after controlling for other determinants. The 
increase in the adjusted earnings ratio of degree-holders to secondary school completers, 
which we observed in Chapter 5, holds, although the premium is flat over 1998-2004 
before rising towards 2006, in contrast to the steadier rise in the raw, unadjusted ratio 
(Figure 6-8; see Figure 5-5). We obtain a slight narrowing of the adjusted racial earnings 
gap; on average, the black earnings “penalty” has declined across the labor market 
(Figure 6-9). We also test for structural difference in our earnings regression, and find 
grounds to run separate regressions for occupation groupings. The results, however, do 
not demonstrate any major difference in trends over time (See Appendix Figures 6-1 and 
6-2).  
 
 255 
Figure 6-8. South Africa: Effect of educational attainment on earnings, per 
complete secondary school (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 6-9. South Africa: Black per white average earnings (adjusted 
for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
The extent to which the above outcomes derive from affirmative action requires a 
closer observation of the policy’s target groups – blacks with degrees, blacks in 
management and professional positions. Interacting race and tertiary education on the full 
sample, we find substantial gains among degree-qualified blacks and degree-qualified 
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whites, relative to whites without tertiary education (Figure 6-10). By 2005 and 2006, 
degree-holding blacks were narrowing the gap with degree-holding whites, and earning 
more than or as much as whites with diploma, all else equal. The portion of earnings of 
diploma-qualified blacks that is explained by race and education, however, continues to 
trail that of diploma-qualified whites. 
Figure 6-10. South Africa: Joint effect of race and education attainment on 
earnings, per white without tertiary education (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
  
In terms of inequality attributable to occupation, we observe a clear rising trend in the 
earnings premium for managers, holding all else constant (Figure 6-11). Professionals 
and technicians on average also see their relative earnings boosted, especially if we 
interpret the drop in 2006 as an anomaly, which is reasonable given the preceding upward 
trend. As we consider the joint effects of race and occupation, parameter estimates 
decline in statistical significance (Figure 6-12). We obtain a sporadic series showing that 
the earnings gap between white and black manager remains high, although it is possibly 
narrowing if we compare the large difference in 1998 with a smaller margin in 2004. The 
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differential between white and black professionals is high in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, but narrows substantially by the mid 2000s, although this is very tentative given 
that the series, with three points, is even less complete.  
 
Figure 6-11. South Africa: Effect of occupational position on earnings, per service 
worker (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 6-12. South Africa: Joint effect of race and occupational position on 
earnings, per white service worker (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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6. 5. Intra-racial earnings inequality 
We noted in Chapter 5 the growing stratification within race groups, especially 
among blacks, along educational and occupational lines. After controlling for other 
determinants, earnings disparities based on education remain higher within the black 
workforce (Figures 6-13 and 6-14). The degree premium climbs from the early 2000s to 
the mid-2000s for blacks, and over a shorter interval (2004-2006) for whites. The 
difference between the raw, unadjusted earnings ratio and these regression coefficients is 
larger within the black population. In 2006, the raw degree-holder per secondary school 
ratio is 3.5 among blacks and 2.2 among whites (see Figures 5-6 and 5-7), whereas the 
adjusted ratio is about 1.8 for blacks and 1.6 for whites. Evidently, the large earnings 
differential within the black population is explained by other factors correlated with 
tertiary education, especially location and industry.  
 
Figure 6-13. Blacks: Effect of educational attainment on earnings, per complete 
secondary school (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Figure 6-14. Whites: Effect of educational attainment on earnings, per complete 
secondary school (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
 
We obtain similar results on inequalities due to occupational position. Within the 
black workforce, the adjusted earnings premium for managers rises steeply and reaches a 
higher level by the mid-2000s. The premium also increases within the white workforce, 
but by a smaller margin and at lower levels overall (Figures 6-15 and 6-16). The earnings 
premiums for occupying a professional position within both black and white populations 
rest between 1.4 and 1.6 relative to service workers, and indicate a possible upward trend 
between 2000 and 2005. As in the case of inequality by educational attainment, the raw 
earnings differentials between occupation groups are much higher within the black 
population, due to absence of controls for other determinants correlated with occupation, 
including unionization, industry and location. The unadjusted earnings ratio of managers 
to service workers in 2006 was 4.4 for blacks and 3.2 for whites, while that of 
professional per service worker was 3.7 for blacks and 2.5 for whites (See Figures 5-11 
and 5-12). It is also worth noting that the adjusted relative earnings of white managers 
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chart an upward trend, in contrast to the fluctuating pattern observed in the raw manager 
to service worker ratio (Figure 5-15). Thus, the growing management premium is a trend 
that prevails within the employed populations of both race groups. 
 
Figure 6-15. Blacks: Effect of occupational position on earnings, per service 
worker (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
Figure 6-16. Whites: Effect of occupational position on earnings, per service worker 
(adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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In sum, the black working population has become more stratified by education and 
occupation levels, and sustains larger disparities between these categories, compared to 
the white working population. However, and importantly, the premiums on higher 
education and upper occupations are much reduced once we control for other 
determinants, due in large part to differences between provinces, in which blacks are 
dispersed while the white population is concentrated in urban areas and major cities. We 
also note that over time, the premiums on degree qualification and managerial position 
have increased within both black and white employed populations.  
 
 262 
6. 6. Key findings and implications on affirmative action  
Chapters 5 and 6 have presented assessments of the over-arching objectives of 
increasing black representation in tertiary education and upper-level occupations, and 
analyses of the determinants of these outcomes. First, we noted the expansion of access to 
tertiary education and entry into upper-level occupations for South Africans in general, 
and specifically for the black population. Public universities, in particular, have increased 
enrollment of blacks, and the proportion of the black employed population with tertiary-
level qualifications rose steadily. Notwithstanding the gains, tertiary educated persons 
remain a much smaller proportion of the black workforce than the white workforce, and 
disparities persist in terms of inferior facilities, instruction and reputation of historically 
black institutions (HBIs), and in lower graduation rates among blacks, especially 
Africans. Black representation increased in professional positions but remained fairly 
constant in management. Blacks with tertiary-level qualifications, and blacks in 
management or professional positions, are more dependent, although perhaps 
decreasingly, on public sector employment. Affirmative action therefore appears to be 
progressing at a moderate but steady pace, while facing challenges in sustaining tertiary 
education quality and facilitating entry into upper-level occupations in the private sector. 
Second, we evaluated the transition from tertiary education to employment. We found 
that degree-qualified blacks experience positive prospects of attaining managerial or 
professional jobs. Black degree-holders are more likely than white degree-holders to 
attain managerial or professional positions, ceteris paribus. These results differ between 
the public and private sectors, with degree-qualified blacks maintaining higher 
probability of being a manager or professional in the public sector, and the converse in 
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the private sector. These results concur with the view that the public sector remains the 
main locus of employment equity. Blacks constitute an increasing proportion of graduates 
and professionals in the private sector. Nonetheless, white graduates continue to face 
better prospects of attaining private sector management or professional jobs, which can 
partly be attributed to differences in quality of tertiary qualifications. 
Another aspect of employment equity concerns the lateral mobility of highly qualified 
blacks, whose turnover is arguably augmented by the mandate to increase black 
representation amidst scarcity of highly skilled blacks. Available literature observes that 
job-hopping is more systemic than specific to black graduates or professionals, and that 
turnover in managerial ranks in the public sector is high for both blacks and whites. At 
the same time, it is plausible that qualified blacks in specific industries are highly sought 
out and may tend to change jobs more frequently.  Data on this subject are sparse and the 
results tentative, but the widely documented problems of skills shortages (e.g. Kraak 
2003 and 2008, SAIRR 2007b) underscore the assessment that, while employment equity 
has made an impact on black representation, it is facing supply constraints – and perhaps 
generating productive losses in terms of unfilled vacancies, high turnover, and other 
problems. 
Third, this study computed inter-racial and intra-racial earnings gaps. We found that 
the overall white-black earnings ratio traced out a slight net decline over our time period. 
We observed more consistent and sizable decreases in inter-racial inequality among 
degree-holders and professionals. We followed up on these findings from Chapter 5 by 
estimating earnings regressions, in which the above patterns are sustained. The black 
earnings ‘penalty’ declines, after controlling for other determinants. More pertinent to 
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this study, we find that degree-qualified blacks close the racial earnings gap more 
substantially. Earnings regressions on separate racial populations compute the earnings 
premiums on holding a degree or on occupying a managerial or professional position, 
within black and white populations. We observe that premiums corresponding with 
degree-level education and upper-level occupations are higher and more substantially 
rising among blacks. Higher inequality within the black population is partly associated 
with gains accruing to affirmative action beneficiaries. However, a large portion of intra-
black inequality corresponds with geography, industry and other sets of variables not 
related to affirmative action. 
Our findings feed back into affirmative action in a few ways, of which four are salient. 
First, the amount and quality of tertiary education are both lacking, and these constraints 
may be augmented in the labor market by employment equity mandates. The supply of 
capable graduates has been lagging in general but more acutely in the black population, 
especially in technical and professional fields, while deficits in tertiary education quality 
and student performance disproportionately affect blacks, particularly Africans. The 
reputable standing of historically white institutions (HWIs) provides a base for uplifting 
black students through existing tertiary institutions, although challenges persist in terms 
of maintaining academic standards – especially in the context of implementation of 
employment equity in university staff – and in narrowing racial differentials in academic 
performance. For affirmative action to progress further, disparities between institutes and 
between students representing different race groups must be more rapidly redressed. It is 
becoming increasingly apparent that the emphasis of affirmative action should shift away 
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from escalating employment equity mandates, towards broadening access and improving 
the quality of education institutions. 
Second, while we have found evidence of the efficacy of employment equity in 
raising the educational and occupational profile of the black population, this study has 
also surmised the significant risks and pitfalls of overly accelerating proportional group 
representation. Employment equity has been institutionalized in South Africa, on 
reasonable grounds. However, within its parameters, there is room for maneuver and 
discretion in policy implementation. The targeted result of increasing black 
representation in positions previously denied to them must be tempered by recognition of 
negative concomitants or misleading outcomes, including the promotion of persons to 
positions of responsibility they are under-equipped to handle, inflated premiums paid on 
account of scarce skilled blacks, as well as grievance of suitably qualified whites denied 
employment or promotion opportunities. Nonetheless, the net result stands, that the inter-
racial earnings gap has narrowed consistently and substantially among the strata targeted 
by affirmative action – degree-qualified workers and professionals. 
 Third, the slower entry of blacks into managerial positions and relative dependence 
on the public sector for employment of blacks in upper-level positions, underscore the 
difficulties of cultivating an independent, self-sufficient and diverse managerial and 
professional class. Slow progress in raising black representation in management stems 
from an undoubtedly complex set of factors, including shortage of qualified and 
experienced black candidates, lukewarm commitment and structural impediments to 
transformation within firms, inadequate access to credit and lacking support for small to 
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medium enterprise, most of which are not directly deducible from our data. Nonetheless, 
these implications are important, and will be discussed in our concluding chapter. 
Fourth, inequality has increased in South Africa, and within the black population, but 
the role of affirmative action policies in these outcomes is not clearcut. The raw earnings 
differentials between degree-qualified and less educated workers, and between managers 
and professionals and rest of the labor hierarchy, have widened considerably in South 
Africa, and by wider margins in the black employed population. The concentration of 
affirmative action beneficiaries in these categories enjoying faster earnings growth stirs 
criticism that the policy exacerbates the already high inequalities in South Africa. Our 
findings draw attention to the fact that black workers are more dispersed geographically, 
which entails that relatively larger proportions of the black population are located in 
provinces and industries offering lower average earnings. The beneficiaries of affirmative 
action are undeniably more likely than most workers to reap labor market rewards, but 
after controlling for these locational effects, the adjusted premiums paid on holding a 
degree or occupying a managerial or professional position cease to be exceedingly higher 
in the black population, and show parallel widening trends in the white population as well. 
In sum, affirmative action has coincided, and is to a significant extent correlated, with 
higher earnings inequality, but the causal relationship is more moderate than aggregated 
descriptive statistics suggest. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
This study grew from the premises that systemic disadvantage of a majority 
population group poses a profound national problem, and that efforts to redress such 
conditions are politically imperative. Colonialism in Malaysia and Apartheid in South 
Africa systemically excluded a majority race from the economic mainstream. In these 
countries’ respective post-colonial and post-Apartheid eras, persistent under-
representation of the Bumiputera of Malaysia and blacks of South Africa in positions of 
social significance and economic influence induced Constitutional provisions and 
established policy platforms for affirmative action, buttressed by the political dominance 
of these groups. The majority-favoring, expansive and intensive character of affirmative 
action regimes in Malaysia and South Africa markedly distinguish them from the 
majority of countries implementing some form of AA. 
We ventured to contextualize, compare and contrast the experience of these countries 
in their formulation and implementation of affirmative action. We have highlighted 
commonalities between both countries, but also recognize and appreciate their singular 
circumstances and the bounds to comparison. Accordingly, this study has sought to 
outline affirmative action programs and political economic contexts and to assess 
affirmative action outcomes of both countries independently as well as comparatively. 
This concluding chapter summarizes the major concepts and policies of affirmative 
action outlined in Chapter 2. We then condense, compare and contrast the main findings 
presented in Chapters 3 to 6. Finally, we discuss in comparative perspective the 
implications of our findings on affirmative action policies.  
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7. 1. Summary of framework and country context 
Chapter 2 set out our theoretical underpinnings and conceptual parameters, and 
surveyed the policy framework and political economic context of affirmative action in 
Malaysia and South Africa. We began with emphasis on the centrality of racial disparity 
and its roots in historical exclusion and discrimination, which fundamentally shape socio-
economic conditions and policy priorities. Orthodox theoretical approaches, which 
assume market tendencies to eliminate discrimination and stress individual choice in 
accumulating human capital, are deeply flawed in their omission of deep-seated, 
structural disparities between population groups’ human development and their access to 
resources for socio-economic advancement. Inter-racial inequalities, and barriers to one 
group’s upward mobility, can perpetuate or fail to progress with sufficient pace and 
visibility under market self-regulation, particularly where the disadvantaged constitute a 
majority.  
This study surveyed conceptions of affirmative action and discussed major 
contentious issues. Upon consideration of a sample of the literature, we arrived at a 
definition of affirmative action that accounts for both historical and continuing forms of 
group disadvantage and balances the broad scope with a specific justification. To reiterate, 
affirmative action in this study refers to “preferential measures to redress systemic 
disadvantages faced by a population group that is under-represented in socially esteemed 
and economically influential positions”. Affirmative action negotiates complex and 
contested issues, which we collated around three themes: market versus state solutions, 
race-based versus class-based policies, and the questions of merit, effort, efficiency, and 
dependency. After considering the conceptual debates and pragmatic constraints, we 
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found that race-based affirmative action, complemented by class- or need-based 
distribution of benefits within the beneficiary group, offers a reasonably consistent and 
practicable framework for coordinating a state-sponsored effort at redressing disparities 
in group representation. Indubitably, racial preference comes with some pitfalls, chiefly 
its potential to curtail effort, generate dependency on state protection and sponsorship, 
and detract from equal opportunity to non-beneficiaries. Affirmative action, like any 
developmental program involving a period of preference and protection, must balance the 
positives against negatives and attain substantial progress that it may be scaled back or 
reconstituted, and perhaps be dismantled.  
 We proceeded with an overview of affirmative action in Malaysia (See Table 2-4). 
The Constitution provides for reservation or quotas for Bumiputera, on the basis of their 
special position, in education, public sector employment and licensing. Bumiputera 
political dominance and preference has been institutionalized from Independence in 1957, 
underscored by the group’s stark under-development, and lack of geographical and social 
mobility. Affirmative action would momentously burgeon in scale and intensity from 
1971, under the New Economic Policy. Concomitantly, the executive branch of 
government also expanded its discretionary authority. To increase Bumiputera access to 
education and upper-level occupations, Bumiputera-exclusive secondary and tertiary 
academies were established and enrollment quotas were introduced in public universities, 
while public sector employment was rapidly increased and inclined to hiring Bumiputera.  
Toward the cultivation of a Bumiputera managerial and entrepreneurial class, 
Malaysia promoted state-owned enterprises and heavy industries, followed by massive 
privatization of state assets. The collapse of many privatized entities led to their 
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renationalization and reconfiguration as government-linked companies from the late-
1990s, through which the government exerts influence through holding majority stakes. 
Licensing, contracting and public procurement have been continuously utilized to 
promote Bumiputera business. As noted above, most of these programs have operated on 
a discretionary basis. 
 In South Africa, the transition away from Apartheid posed exceedingly complex 
challenges, most pertinently, democratization, white dominance in every economic 
sphere, and the legacies of systemic discrimination and repression of the majority black 
population (See Table 2-5). The 1996 Constitution provides for measures that promote 
equality for persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. However, the magnitude of 
racial disparity and mass poverty, compounded by the concurrent demands to formulate a 
democratic constitution, to unify and restructure government, and to negotiate the 
tensions between equality and racial redress, placed constraints on affirmative action. In 
tertiary education, the racial redress mandate applied to increasing enrollment of black 
students in historically white institutions (HWIs) and narrowing the gap between HWIs 
and historically black institutions (HBIs).  
On the employment and enterprise development fronts, a range of interventions 
unfolded. Landmark employment equity legislation was passed in 1998, encompassing 
both public and private sectors (except small firms), to spur growth in the proportions of 
suitably qualified blacks, women and disabled persons in positions where they are under-
represented. Black economic empowerment (BEE) was formally initiated in the late 
1990s, and gained momentum from 2003, with the passage of the Broad-based BEE Act. 
This provided a framework for leveraging government procurement, contracting and 
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licensing to induce firms to attain benchmarks in promoting blacks in ownership, 
managerial control, employment equity, skills development, and vendor/subsidiary 
development.  
Chapter 2 concluded by discussing affirmative action policies and contexts in 
comparative perspective (See Tables 2-6 and 2-7). Malaysia’s institutional framework is 
characterized by the exercise of discretionary authority and ad hoc policies, consonant 
with the underlying assertion of Malay political power and consolidation of the executive 
branch of government. In contrast, South Africa followed a more formalized and 
statutory route anchored on laws, codes, and formal procedures, in line with the precedent 
set by the negotiated democratic transition and the new black-led government’s strategy 
of assuming a more conciliatory posture toward white interests, given their dominance 
across all economic sectors. These marked contrasts must be integrated into discussion on 
the mutual lessons of Malaysia’s and South Africa’s respective experiences with 
affirmative action. 
Malaysia and South Africa adopted differing approaches to increasing Bumiputera 
and black tertiary education attainment. Malaysia rapidly expanded tertiary education 
provision and implemented enrollment quotas in public universities, while also creating a 
parallel system of secondary and tertiary institutions exclusive to Bumiputera. A 
substantial proportion of degree-level students, mostly non-Bumiputera, obtain degrees 
from private and overseas institutions. South Africa intervened to increase enrollment of 
blacks in historically white institutions (HWIs) and to bridge the gap between HWIs and 
systemically inferior historically black institutions (HWIs). Access to tertiary education 
has demonstrably increased. However, the disproportionate number of Bumiputera and 
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blacks in less well-regarded institutions, and the possible adverse consequences of their 
preferential selection into public universities, raise questions about long-term 
ramifications of affirmative action in tertiary education.  
Measures for raising the occupational profile of affirmative action beneficiaries also 
differ between our two countries. Malaysia facilitated Bumiputera entry into managerial 
and professional positions principally through public sector employment, and did not 
institute any general regulation or policy impacting on composition of workforces in the 
private sector. South Africa legislated employment equity to compel affirmative action 
considerations across all sectors in hiring, training and promotion decisions. The public 
sector, falling directly under government oversight, expectedly executes employment 
equity to greater effect. However, the program faces the pitfalls of advancing the 
beneficiary group too rapidly or placing undue weight on racial representation, which can 
trigger a host of complications, including the hiring of under-qualified persons, as well as 
the grievance of overlooked candidates outside the designated group. Also, long-term 
dependence on this affirmative action instrument detracts from the original objective of 
developing self-sufficient professionals and managers. 
The steepest challenge to affirmative action in Malaysia and South Africa resides in 
the quest to develop Bumiputera and black managerial and entrepreneurial involvement 
in the production of goods and services. Malaysia’s measures in this regard have been 
more aggressive, but the context has also been more conducive, given the large presence 
of foreign ownership, the established government influence over finance, and the 
availability of administrators trained in the civil service. Nonetheless, Malaysia has fallen 
short in its objective of cultivating a self-sufficient Bumiputera managerial and 
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entrepreneurial class. The challenges faced by South Africa were exceedingly greater, 
including high industrial concentration and powerful white-owned conglomerates, a 
hitherto white-dominated bureaucracy, lack of access to capital and severe shortage of 
administrative experience. These constraints notwithstanding, efforts to develop black 
enterprise have not met expectations. The checkered track record of both countries, pose 
serious questions on the feasibility and utility of this arm of affirmative action.  
We also discussed cross-country empirical research of AA in Malaysia and South 
Africa. This study finds very little in the literature to draw on. Appraisals of Malaysia’s 
experience with redressing racial inequality are sparse, and tend to conflate affirmative 
action – programs specifically involving racial preference – with all redistributive 
institutions or the New Economic Policy. The generality partly stems from lack of access 
to education and labor market data and the consequent inability to observe outcomes 
directly associated with affirmative action. The vast bulk of research has inferred the role 
of affirmative action from household income data, the only available inter-temporal 
income series. Racial inequality in South Africa has been more widely studied; data 
access is unhindered. However, most research observes inter-racial inequality in highly 
aggregated terms, or focuses on measuring notional discrimination through 
decomposition exercises. This study thus aims to contribute to the field by informing the  
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dimensions of inequality directly relevant to affirmative action – racial representation and 
racial earnings disparities among tertiary educated workers and in the upper occupational 
rungs. 
 
7. 2. Findings in comparative perspective 
Chapters 3 to 6 reported our findings of racial inequality pertaining to affirmative 
action. Table 7-1 condenses the key points and places them in comparative perspective. 
Variations in data availability and quality restrict the comparability of findings between 
Malaysia, which tightly controls access, and South Africa, which allows freer 
informational flow.  
 
Table 7-1. Malaysia and South Africa: Key findings in comparative perspective 
Outcome Malaysia (1995-2005) 
 
South Africa (1998-2006) 
 
Tertiary 
education 
 
 
§ Rapid expansion of enrollment; 
Malay attainment on par with 
Chinese, but non-Malay 
Bumiputera lagging 
 
§ Bumiputera mostly in local public 
institutions, substantially enrolled 
in Bumiputera-exclusive programs 
 
 
§ Steady expansion of enrollment; 
black – especially African – 
attainment lag remains 
considerably large, but closing 
 
§ Increase in black representation in 
historical white institutions 
(HWIs)  
 
 
Facilitation 
of graduates 
into  
upper-level 
occupations 
 
 
§ Increase in unemployment rate 
among degree-qualified and 
young Bumiputera 
 
§ Bumiputera graduates are more 
dependent on public sector 
employment  
 
 
§ Decline in unemployment rate 
among degree-qualified blacks 
 
 
§ Black graduates are more 
dependent on public sector 
employment  
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Table 7-1 (continued) 
Outcome Malaysia (1995-2005) 
 
South Africa (1998-2006) 
 
Facilitation 
of graduates 
into  
upper-level 
occupations 
 
 
§ Differences in quality of degree-
level qualifications are 
consequential  
 
§ Bumiputera public university 
graduates face lesser prospects of 
attaining managerial or 
professional positions in private 
sector; Bumiputera overseas 
graduates face good prospects of 
attaining a professional position in 
the private sector 
 
 
§ Differences in quality of degree-
level qualifications are 
consequential  
 
§ Blacks with degrees face slightly 
better prospects of attaining 
managerial or professional jobs in 
the public sector, lesser prospects 
in the private sector 
 
§ Disparities between graduates of 
HWIs and HBIs 
 
 
Tertiary 
education 
earnings 
premium 
 
 
§ Decline in premium on degree-
level qualifications 
 
§ Larger decline for young workers 
overall, Bumiputera and Indian 
workers possibly affected worse 
 
 
§ Increase in premium on degree-
level qualifications, especially 
within black population 
 
§ Declining black-white earnings 
disparity among degree-holders 
 
Representa-
tion in 
upper-level 
positions 
 
 
§ Almost no change in Bumiputera 
representation at management and 
professional levels 
 
§ Increasing black representation 
among professionals, unclear 
patterns at managerial level 
 
Managerial/ 
professional 
earnings 
premium 
 
§ Increasing premiums, but racial 
aspect is indeterminate 
 
 
 
§ Increasing premiums, especially 
within black population 
 
§ Possibly declining black-white 
disparity  
 
 
Enterprise 
development 
 
§ Substantial Bumiputera 
participation in operating 
government-linked companies 
 
§ Shortage of Bumiputera 
participation across industries and 
in SMEs 
 
§ Substantial black participation in 
operating public enterprises 
 
 
§ Shortage of broad black 
participation across industries and 
in SMEs 
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7. 2. 1. Tertiary education attainment and racial earnings inequality 
Bumiputera in Malaysia and blacks in South Africa have made substantial progress in 
expanding tertiary education access and in raising the proportion of their workforces that 
have attained tertiary, especially degree-level, certification. However, disparities persist 
within the beneficiary group; the attainments of non-Malay Bumiputera in Malaysia and 
Africans in South Africa are lagging. 
We note a contrast in the inter-temporal unemployment rate of the tertiary educated 
labor force, which increased from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s among Bumiputera in 
Malaysia, but decreased among degree-qualified blacks in South Africa. For Malaysia, 
we deduce that declining quality of graduates significantly accounts for the increase in 
the unemployment rate of the tertiary educated Bumiputera labor force. In South Africa, 
expansion of access for blacks to tertiary institutions, especially reputable HWIs, coupled 
with employment equity legislation, correspond with the decreasing unemployment rate 
of the black degree-qualified workforce. These processes are, of course, more complex, 
as discussed in the next section. 
 The earnings premium for holding a degree, over the time period of this study, 
declines in Malaysia but rises in South Africa. We are unable to directly evaluate the 
correspondence of race with this trend in Malaysia. However, we find that the decrease in 
the degree premium is consistent and substantial among young workers (below 30 years). 
The relatively higher unemployment rate of tertiary educated Bumiputera, especially non-
Malay Bumiputera, as well as reported deficiencies in the capabilities of local public 
university graduates, suggest that young Bumiputera graduate-qualified workers may 
have experienced a relatively greater decline in their earnings capacity. In marked 
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contrast, degree-qualified blacks in South Africa have seen a steady increase in their 
earnings premium, and a narrowing of their earnings gap relative to white degree holders. 
Growing black representation thus corresponds with declining inter-racial inequality 
among graduates in the employed population. 
 
7. 2. 2. Racial representation and earnings differentials in upper-level positions 
Malaysia and South Africa have raised representation of the designated group in 
targeted occupation groups, more sizably in professional positions than in management. 
Unsurprisingly, the challenge of cultivating a managerial class proves most difficult. In 
Malaysia, Bumiputera representation in professional and technical occupations increased 
considerably over the 1970s and 1980s, but slowed down in the 1990s and registered 
little change between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. In managerial positions, the 
Bumiputera share has consistently been lowest compared to other occupation groups, and 
only marginally increased between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. In South Africa, black 
representation in professional occupations rose steadily from the late-1990s to the mid-
2000s. Statistics on the proportion of blacks among managers vary by source, but on the 
whole indicate little progress in increasing black representation. Both countries have also 
relied on the public sector to increase Bumiputera and black proportions at managerial 
and professional levels. Although South Africa’s employment equity law encompasses all 
sectors, it has expectedly been enforced more extensively in the public sector. 
A crucial element in affirmative action, where education and employment policies 
merge, is the facilitation of graduates into upper-level occupations. We find that in both 
countries, holding a degree on average increasingly augments the likelihood of attaining a 
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managerial or professional job. The racial aspect is more complex. We are able to 
account for race in Malaysia using census data only for the year 2000. We find that, 
across the employed population, Bumiputera in Malaysia are slightly less likely to be 
employed as a manager or professional. Being black in South Africa corresponds with a 
considerable negative probability of attaining these positions. These differences partly 
reflect the further progress of affirmative action in Malaysia – with over 30 years of 
implementation – compared to its relative incipience in South Africa.  
However, it is more germane and important to compute these job attainment 
probabilities with race and education interacted, specifically to compare degree-qualified 
AA beneficiaries against degree-qualified non-beneficiaries, and with the outcome 
bifurcated into public and private sector, given the differences in operation of AA across 
sectors. Where possible, we also pursue ways to observe the effects of qualitative 
differences in education received. In Malaysia, we observe variations in occupational 
prospects between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera graduates of institutions 
differentiated by location. Bumiputera graduates of local public institutions are more 
dependent on the public sector for attaining managerial or professional jobs. Non-
Bumiputera graduates of overseas institutes face significantly better prospects of being a 
manager or professional in the private sector. Notably, Bumiputera graduates of overseas 
institutions are more likely than Bumiputera graduates of local institutions to attain 
private sector professional jobs. In South Africa, we find that black degree-holders are 
more likely than white degree-holders to attain managerial or professional positions in the 
public sector, and the converse for the private sector. Thus, dependence on the public 
sector for occupational advancement of the beneficiary group holds in both countries. 
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These findings imply that selection processes and institutional quality have an effect 
on occupational outcomes. Bumiputera studying abroad – largely on publicly funded 
scholarships – are presumably assessed more stringently, while many enter domestic 
universities and colleges through programs exclusive to, or accessible predominantly to, 
Bumiputera. Along these lines, we note that Bumiputera graduates of public university 
are substantially less likely than non-Bumiputera graduates of public university to attain 
management or professional positions in the private sector. In South Africa, labor force 
data do not provide any means for qualitatively disaggregating graduates. Nonetheless, 
other surveys have found differences between graduates of HWIs and HBIs, with the 
latter generally faring poorer in the labor market. 
Management and professional earnings premiums have risen in both countries. We 
lack data to make any inferences on racial inequality within these occupation groups in 
Malaysia. In South Africa, we find some indication that the black-white earnings gap 
declines within these occupations, albeit with considerable fluctuation attributable to 
small samples, while in other occupations we observe the inter-racial gap to increase or 
indicate no particular trend. Employment equity likely magnifies the bargaining power of 
black managers and professionals. 
One likely corollary of this phenomenon is higher lateral mobility among black 
managers and professionals, whose labor demand is amplified by the scarcity of skilled 
and capable graduates, especially in specialized fields. We considered available surveys 
and studies addressing the argument that black professionals are more mobile due to 
employment equity. While relatively rapid turnover and inflated premiums surely occur 
to some extent, existing – albeit limited – empirical research finds mobility to be high 
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across all race groups, in both private and public sectors. The bargaining power of highly 
qualified blacks may be augmented in specific sectors where the scarcity is especially 
acute, although available research has not provided this level of detail. The problems 
surrounding high mobility are also more complex and heterogeneous, encompassing both 
pull factors (e.g. better job offers) and push factors (e.g. workplace relations). 
 
7. 2. 3. Managerial and enterprise development 
Our investigation of this branch of affirmative action – i.e. increasing the 
participation of the disadvantaged group in managerial and executive positions involving 
production of goods and services – is less substantive and more indirect, due to this 
study’s omission of the ownership dimension of affirmative action. Nonetheless, this 
subject is relevant to our assessment of racial representation in management on the whole. 
We find that Bumiputera and black representation, in Malaysia and South Africa 
respectively, are lowest at the managerial level, and that a large proportion of these are 
working in government-linked companies (in Malaysia) and public enterprises (in South 
Africa), and presumably in large, foreign-owned corporations as well. However, 
participation remains low on the whole, and especially in small and medium-scale 
enterprises (SMEs).  
 
7. 3. Implications on affirmative action in comparative perspective 
7. 3. 1. Constitutional foundation and conception of affirmative action 
An exceptionally distinguishing feature of affirmative action in our two countries is 
the fact that their respective founding Constitutions set out the justification and scope of 
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affirmative action. These provisions manifest the political imperative of redressing racial 
economic disparities, while at the same time delimiting the concept of affirmative action. 
Malaysia and South Africa differ in their constitutional foundations for affirmative action. 
Malaysia’s Constitution stipulates safeguarding Bumiputera “special position”, while 
South Africa’s Constitution premises its provision for measures to protect or advance 
persons on their disadvantaged position due to unfair discrimination. 
These Constitutional provisions present two weighty implications. First, affirmative 
action is often seen as permanent and inexorable, although the scope and duration are, 
literally, not unlimited in both Constitutions. In Malaysia, measures to safeguard 
Bumiputera special position are issued not as a mandate in absolute terms, but as 
something to be prosecuted “as may be necessary”. South Africa’s legal basis for AA is 
judiciously worded to incorporate the incidence of disadvantage, which, if it is being 
redressed, must be waning. Thus, in both countries, the Constitution authorizes the 
pursuit of AA, but not necessarily its perpetuity. Of course, political interest and societal 
inertia will resist efforts to scale back preferential measures. Emphatically, the second 
major implication of constitutional provisions for affirmative action is the paramount role 
of political leadership and societal change in shifting away from viewing such policies as 
permanent and unbounded, and to initiate processes of reduction and reform.  
The manner in which beneficiaries are designated is also problematic in two 
important ways. First, the specification of one group excludes or supercedes other groups. 
This applies saliently to the Indian population in Malaysia, who have historically been 
marginalized and continue to lag in access to opportunities for advancement. Although 
South Africa’s classification of persons disadvantaged through unfair discrimination 
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subsumes blacks, women and disabled persons, race effectively supercedes the other 
categories. Second, the institutionalization of preference can breed a sense of entitlement, 
and can be distorted to disproportionately benefit particular ethnic or other sub-groups 
within the designated group. Unequal distribution of benefits among those equally 
classified as beneficiaries is documented in Malaysia, between Malay and non-Malay 
Bumiputera, and is perceived to occur in South Africa within the composite classification 
of black persons, i.e. between Africans, Coloreds, and Indians, and between ethnic groups 
that fall under the African category. These inequalities underscore the importance of 
incorporating progressive and egalitarian elements into the distribution of benefits. Again, 
political will is pivotal to engender changes that ultimately make affirmative action 
constructive, equitable and impermanent. 
 
7. 3. 2. Affirmative action regime: Discretionary versus statutory authority, centralized 
versus decentralized political structure 
This study’s outline of overarching political economic regimes for affirmative action 
– and for economic policy overall – has drawn attention to some generalized institutional 
contrasts: Malaysia’s exercise of discretionary and centralized authority, against South 
Africa’s deployment of statutes and codes in a more decentralized political structure. 
These differences impact on the suitability and feasibility of mutually deriving lessons 
from the other’s experience. The relative degree of centralization and emphases on modes 
of state authority are products of political moments and precedents that maintain their 
trajectories, specifically, the consolidation of state power from the early 1970s, in the 
wake of the 1969 political crisis in Malaysia, and the negotiated transition to a 
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democratic and neoliberalism-oriented South Africa that started in the 1980s and 
solidified in the mid-1990s. 
The differences in overarching political economic regimes circumscribe the 
compatibility of policies with country-specific contexts. Malaysia preceded South Africa 
chronologically and advanced further in redressing racial disparity. Research on these 
countries has typically positioned Malaysia as a case study for South Africa to emulate or 
avert, with no consideration of the converse. We will discuss affirmative action designs 
and outcomes in the following section. The point to be stressed here is that South Africa’s 
affirmative action regime, being embedded in a democratic system with more balanced 
legislative and executive influence, offers pointers for Malaysia to draw on, in light of 
shortfalls in policy attainments arising from the latter’s executive-dominant system.  
Of course, these generalized implications differ across socio-economic spheres. In the 
education sphere, Malaysia intervened more aggressively to expand Bumiputera access, 
through centrally administered public university quotas and creation of racially exclusive 
institutions – i.e. mechanisms incompatible with conditions in South Africa. However, 
university autonomy in South Africa, which devolves oversight of AA to institutes, offers 
valuable insights to Malaysia, in light of the problems with the transition of public 
university graduates to the labor market. To cultivate a managerial and entrepreneurial 
class, Malaysia also intervened more extensively, with takeovers of some large foreign 
companies, massive establishment of state-owned enterprises and heavy industries, to 
privatization and public enterprises. The clash between the state-centricity of these 
programs and South Africa’s safeguards on private capital primacy and mobility render 
the policies institutionally incompatible. Malaysia, having implemented its system of 
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procurement, licensing and contracting without clear and transparent guidelines on the 
terms of engagement and monitoring, can potentially benefit from some form of 
codification of incentives and rules. At the same time, the processes of formalization and 
codification may be insufficient to generate and coordinate productive activities, which 
historical experience has shown to depend to some extent on an active “developmental 
state” – a concept that characterizes Malaysia more than South Africa. 
In the employment sphere, South Africa might by virtue of its broad statutory 
framework for employment equity be perceived as presenting options for Malaysia, 
which lacks such legislation. However, various conditions in Malaysia arguably preclude 
employment equity laws, including the tremendous quantitative gains in Bumiputera 
occupational mobility, lack of past systemic discrimination against Bumiputera, and 
longstanding Bumiputera dominance in the public sector. Nonetheless, a policy of 
reversing non-Bumiputera under-representation in the public sector might set a precedent 
for policies that pursue equitable representation, perhaps by leveraging public sector 
procurement, contracts and licensing to induce multi-racial participation and 
collaboration. 
 
7. 3. 3. Potential, limits, and pitfalls of affirmative action 
7. 3. 3. 1. Tertiary education 
In the education realm, we document substantial quantitative gains made under 
affirmative action programs in Malaysia and South Africa. We also find indications that 
qualitative aspects of tertiary education differentiate graduates’ prospects of upward 
mobility, and that affirmative action may have adverse side-effect on its beneficiaries in 
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this regard. The scope for expansion of tertiary enrollment and mechanisms for 
redistributing opportunities are broader and simpler, and hence potentially more 
quantitatively attainable, as evidenced by the increases in the proportion of graduates in 
the Bumiputera and black workforces.  
However, while affirmative action programs can increase numerical growth in the 
degree-qualified labor force, it does not necessarily improve – and may well compromise 
– education standards. The experience of Malaysia demonstrates the possible adverse 
effects of preferential treatment on academic outcomes, although the extent this is due to 
quality of instruction, selection procedures, or student effort remains to be determined. 
The lesser employment prospects of Bumiputera public university graduates and 
dependence on the public sector arguably derive from the effects of enrollment quotas 
and racially exclusive programs, coupled with extensive scholarships to study abroad, on 
buffering AA beneficiaries from more competitive settings and depriving local public 
institutions of capable students. 
Malaysia needs to seek out solutions to the problems of its public universities, while 
South Africa should take note to avoid the pitfalls perceptible in the Malaysian education 
system, especially the perpetuation of a parallel system for AA beneficiaries. South 
Africa has indeed reconfigured the tiered structured inherited from Apartheid and 
formally phased out the HWI/HBI distinction. However, many institutions are 
overwhelmingly black, and should their quality gap vis-à-vis the leading and more 
integrated institutions persist or widen, it will be continually difficult to attain the further 
objective of cultivating self-sufficient black professionals, managers and enterprises.  
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Unquestionably, disparities among graduates are substantially carried forth from the 
preceding stages of education. Deficiencies in primary and secondary schooling feed into 
tertiary institutions, which may raise contentions that countries should close these gaps in 
schooling standards and eliminate any policies that strive for an equitable racial 
representation in universities. This study maintains that narrowing disparities in 
schooling is a pre-requisite for redress, whether or not there is affirmative action, and 
hence serves as a complement, not a substitute, to affirmative action in tertiary institutes. 
Technically, universities can apply simple procedures to make entry contingent on 
meeting qualifying thresholds. Of course, resistance to such policy, which moderates the 
pace of promotion of the disadvantaged group, can be immense and politically motivated. 
Nonetheless, the importance of integrating school-leaving cohorts with university 
entrants is highly important, especially in South Africa, which has recorded some 
exceedingly low basic competency among secondary school leavers.  
A number of other considerations are worth a brief mention. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Malaysia and South Africa operate contrasting mechanisms for 
affirmative action. In light of the higher standing of South African universities, its setup 
of autonomous universities and devolved affirmative action seems to offer constructive 
insights into managing the dual objective of facilitating equitable representation while 
maintaining academic standards. Another confluence of objectives – targeting the 
neediest within the designated race group – finds its most potent instrument in tertiary 
education. The assessment of entry into university can take family background into 
consideration much more than we can expect of hiring or promotion decisions. The extent 
to which tertiary education serves to bridge both racial and class divides, of course, 
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depends on the distribution of benefits. The more progressive it is, the more it facilitates 
vertical mobility. Scholarship and financial aid data, however, indicate that this aspect of 
redress is not performing as well as desired138. A further challenge concerns the lack of 
Bumiputera and black enrollment in specialized technical and professional fields139. 
These outcomes demonstrate the need for the affirmative action policy process to assess 
specific shortcomings, besides tracking group representation on the whole. 
 
7. 3. 3. 2. Employment in upper-level occupations 
On affirmative action in the labor market, this study finds, as expected, that the public 
sector plays a prominent role. In Malaysia, this follows directly from the confinement of 
affirmative action in employment to the public sector. In South Africa, although 
employment equity mandates apply to both the public sector and private sector, upward 
occupational mobility for blacks has proceeded further in the former. Malaysia’s policy 
has engendered Bumiputera over-representation, exceedingly little interest in government 
jobs among non-Bumiputera140, and continual dependence on government to absorb 
Bumiputera graduates into technical and professional positions. The case can be made for 
                                                 
138 In Malaysia, available, albeit dated, research shows a disproportionately small segment of 
scholars coming from poor families (Mehmet and Yip 1985). South African tuition fees increased 
93 percent between 2000 and 2004, while National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) 
allocations increased by just 48 percent. This lag in financial aid attenuates tertiary education 
opportunities disproportionately for students of low-income families (Breier and Mabuzela 2008: 
290). 
 
139 In South Africa, among accounting majors, 2.2 percent were African, 1.1 percent colored, 5.6 
percent Indian, and 88.8 percent white in 1991. By 2001, these shares were 9.0 percent African, 
2.7 percent colored, 9.7 percent Indian, and 76.5 percent white. Private sector programs have 
been initiated to address these racial disparities, but their impact is necessarily limited, while 
shortfalls in the public higher education and training system persist (van Zyl 2008: 379-383). 
 
140 Applications for jobs by non-Bumiputera have dwindled over time to miniscule proportions; in 
2006, 1.8 percent of applications were from Chinese, and 2.5 percent from Indians (Public 
services department Director-General, cited in The Star December 25, 2007). 
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reorienting public sector employment policy towards a more balanced racial composition, 
through inducing more interest and hiring of non-Bumiputera and aligning upper-level 
occupations and administrative positions closer to proportional representation. This can 
also lay foundations for initiatives to increase Bumiputera representation outside the 
public sector. Although hiring mandates on a national scale are difficult to envisage in 
Malaysia, as noted in the previous section, variations of employment equity may be 
adopted into public procurement and other public-private sector transactions. 
The implications of affirmative action in the labor market along the lines of South 
Africa’s employment equity laws warrant critical evaluation. Employment equity is 
fraught with many difficulties, yet it is harder to pose the counterfactual and to envisage 
markets more vigorously redressing systemic disadvantage. At a fundamental level, this 
endeavor to obligate profit-seeking firms to comply with a social purpose entails real 
costs, and will be met with some reluctance or indifference. In the late Apartheid period, 
some companies increased hiring of blacks in supervisory and managerial capacities, due 
in part to scarcity of white skilled workers and to political pressures, but this amounted to 
a rising color bar that rarely breached middle management. Given the precedent, it is 
doubtful that black upward mobility would advance robustly, even under the increased 
scrutiny and moral suasion of the post-Apartheid milieu.  
However, execution of employment equity through a monitoring and punitive system 
has its limits. Alongside the statistical objective of increasing representation of 
disadvantaged groups, the program strives for workplace transformation and cross-racial 
interactions. The law cannot intervene to force meaningful racial integration, and 
compelling firms to hire more blacks may soften or harden racial perceptions and 
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stereotypes. These dilemmas cannot be resolved simply, but must be acknowledged as 
part of the package of potential and limits of employment equity. 
Employment equity also faces immense practical challenges. Credibility and efficacy 
of government oversight hinges on informational, monitoring and enforcement capacity. 
However, the relevant government departments lack substantive data and analysis to 
inform target-setting, to adjudicate compliance and to punish non-compliant firms. 
Information is most acutely lacking on the crucial issues of labor market discrimination 
and scarcity of skills and suitable qualifications. South Africa’s law stipulates preferential 
selection of blacks, women and the disabled, contingent on the availability of ‘suitably 
qualified’ persons of those designated groups. Much debate surrounds the interpretation 
of this term, specifically over employers’ claims that formal certification does not suffice 
to reflect actual capabilities and hence to merit being ‘suitably qualified’. The evidence 
we have compiled showing the importance of tertiary education quality substantiates the 
insufficiency of looking solely at paper qualifications in assessing the availability of 
persons from the disadvantaged group for entry into upper occupational echelons. 
The capacity to increase representation of disadvantaged persons in upper-level 
occupations hinges on the availability of capable tertiary educated workers, particularly 
in specialized fields. In the same way that affirmative action in tertiary education is 
constrained by the breadth and capacity school-leaving cohorts, affirmative action in 
employment can only effectively proceed apace with the growth of suitably qualified 
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persons of the designated group. In both our countries, many of the technical and 
professional fields with severe under-representation are highly specialized141.   
The above challenges and dilemmas notwithstanding, affirmative action has 
coincided with increased black entry into positions previously denied to them, and has 
discernibly played an important part in compelling employers to hire or promote blacks 
who would otherwise be overlooked, as well as to absorb some training and other 
transitory costs that would otherwise be avoided. Its implementation, however, can be 
fine-tuned. As a salient example, the official targets for black representation, notably in 
public sector management, have been exceedingly ambitious, and often detached from 
objective assessment of the supply of suitably qualified black candidates. Employment 
equity targets tend to outpace the supply of capable graduates, leading to hiring or 
promotion of formally credentialed but practically under-qualified personnel. Pressures to 
accelerate transformation in South Africa must therefore be tempered with the realities of 
lagging supply of skilled and experienced labor, and with the realization that effectual 
and sustainable occupational mobility takes time.  
In sum, our findings demonstrate that the potential for increasing the proportion of 
blacks where they are under-represented, especially outside the public sector, rests more 
with developments in education than with employment equity legislation. Both countries 
stand to benefit from shifting the emphasis of affirmative action from representation in 
occupations and ownership, towards broadening participation and improving the quality 
of education institutions. Moreover, the racial earnings disparity in South Africa narrows 
                                                 
141 In Malaysia, Bumiputera representation was markedly low in 2005 among professionally 
registered accountants (20.8 percent), doctors (36.7 percent) and lawyers (38.0 percent). For 
corresponding data on South Africa, see footnote 2 above.  
 291 
more consistently and substantially among degree-holders than among managers or 
professionals.  
 
7. 3. 3. 3. Managerial and enterprise development 
The development of a managerial and entrepreneurial class has proven most difficult 
among affirmative action efforts in both Malaysia and South Africa. Government-linked 
companies in Malaysia and public enterprises in South Africa continue to be assigned the 
tasks of employing and training managers and professionals, and of applying racial 
preference to procurement and contracting decisions. Due to their limited scale and 
concentration in public monopolies, the capacity for state-owned entities to cultivate an 
independent and broad entrepreneurial class is quite circumscribed142.  
Allocation of government procurement, licensing and contracting constitutes another 
instrument for developing entrepreneurial capacity. Malaysia’s procurement scheme has 
operated within an opaque scheme with ownership as the decisive criterion, while South 
Africa’s formalized BEE regime technically provides incentives for firms to compete, 
with greater transparency, in terms of advancing black interests on a range of fronts. The 
pitfalls in these schemes can be immense, especially where lucrative contracts and fast 
windfall profits are at stake, and are compounded by corruption and dearth of regulatory 
oversight that have come to the fore in both countries. Fronting, rentier behavior, 
political patronage and graft, which are documented or perceived to be rife, demonstrate 
                                                 
142 The capacity for South Africa to emulate Malaysia in developing a managerial class through 
state-owned or state-affiliated companies is also constrained by certain factors, notably the 
existence of a bureaucratic elite in Malaysia that transferred skills acquired in public 
administration to management in the corporate sector in the 1980s and 1990s, notably in 
plantation companies, banking, and privatized entities (Southall 1997: 23). 
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the checkered track record of these schemes and highlight the imperative of transparency 
and integrity in governance. 
 This branch of affirmative action remains a vast and largely under-studied field, one 
that is also inextricable from the issue of capital and wealth ownership that this study has 
not empirically investigated. Much more information and analyses is required to 
formulate substantive policy considerations. However, it is patent enough that affirmative 
action in cultivating enterprise must be pursued with caution and restraint, especially to 
avert being vitiated by unproductive wealth accumulation and political patronage (Jomo 
2004, Southall 2005). The principle of proportional representation is also highly 
problematic. The adverse consequences of executing preferential policies until the 
designated group owns a share of wealth proportionate to its share of the population are 
conceivably more severe than the pursuit of group representation in education and 
employment. In this light, a case can be made for rolling back preferential policies upon 
attaining a sufficient level of representation of the disadvantaged group – a benchmark 
subject to debate and compromise – instead of strictly proportionate ownership. 
 
7. 3. 3. 4. Overall regime of affirmative action  
It is worth reemphasizing that historical and country-specific contexts of deep-seated 
and self-perpetuating inequalities gave rise to the political imperatives driving affirmative 
action. The initial and continual problems are far more vast and complex than we have 
managed to address in this study. The list of such contentious yet under-researched 
subjects is long, but most saliently includes labor market discrimination, impacts of 
affirmative action on quality of education, effects of employment equity on migration and 
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alienation of whites and on devaluation of achievements of blacks, benefits of racial 
diversity in workplaces, multiplicity of barriers to Bumiputera/black enterprise (access to 
capital, skills shortage, inadequate experience, etc.). More empirical scrutiny of these 
topics will broaden and enrich our understanding of affirmative action and its potential, 
limits and pitfalls. 
All in all, however, this study’s conception and findings are adequate to lay out a few 
principles for undertaking affirmative action, particularly where it favors a majority 
group: 
1. Affirmative action foundations and policies must be precisely conceptualized and 
formalized, to avoid being conflated with general problems of inequality and 
redistributive policies.  
2. Schedules for advancing representation of the beneficiary group must be gradual and 
prudent, balancing political imperatives for rapid change against the limits set by 
prevailing levels of socio-economic development. Allocation or target-setting of 
positions in tertiary education and upper-level occupations should correspond with the 
availability of candidates with appropriate qualification or capacity to progress.  
3. Distribution of affirmative action benefits must be conducted in an equitable manner, 
to facilitate inter-generational class mobility and to expand beyond middle- and upper-
class households who are best positioned to reap the opportunities.  
4. While affirmative action makes quantitative progress, tendencies for declining 
standards must be mitigated so that differences in capability do not become a source of 
disadvantage to beneficiaries, notably the potential adverse effects of preferential 
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selection through stifling tertiary education performance or hiring effectively under-
qualified persons. 
5. Affirmative action must be implemented with a timeline or benchmarks for it to be 
scaled back, perhaps to be reduced and reconstituted as programs promoting racial, 
gender and other forms of diversity143. 
The fifth and final principle is undoubtedly the most difficult, yet it is crucial and 
perhaps decisive. Institutionalized policies favoring a majority group are seemingly 
immutable, as demonstrated by Malaysia’s near four decades of implementation and 
continued ambivalence towards dismantling racial preference. However, the perpetuation 
of programs that this study finds to have lost momentum also underscores the imperative 
of executing affirmative action effectively and of laying out plans for eventual 
reconstitution or removal. This process requires transformations in the political 
imperatives – and vested interests – driving affirmative action that lie beyond the scope 
of this study. More pertinent to our consideration, and to the present context of Malaysia 
and South Africa, is the onus on affirmative action to sufficiently consolidate the 
economic security of the disadvantaged group, which is imperative for future political 
settlements around fundamental change or elimination of programs. 
                                                 
143 The orientation and overarching purpose of affirmative action has generally not occupied a 
prominent space in public and academic discourses, although it can affect the design of policies 
and their effects on social relations. One noteworthy approach distinguishes between affirmative 
action that is primarily concerned with compensation for past discrimination (backward looking), 
correction of ongoing discrimination (present looking), or diversification and multiculturalism 
(future looking) (Tierney 1997, Dupper 2005). 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia 
Article 153.  
Reservation of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc., for Malays and natives of any 
of the States of Sabah and Sarawak. 
1. It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special 
position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the 
legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article. 
2. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, but subject to the provisions of Article 
40 and of this Article, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions under 
this Constitution and federal law in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the 
special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak 
and to ensure the reservation for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and 
Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public 
service (other than the public service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions and 
other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities given or accorded 
by the Federal Government and, when any permit or license for the operation of any 
trade or business is required by federal law, then, subject to the provisions of that law 
and this Article, of such permits and licenses. 
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Constitution of South Africa 
Article 9. Equality  
1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law.  
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken.  
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.  
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to 
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.  
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless 
it is established that the discrimination is fair.  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
TERMINOLOGY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa’s affirmative action discourse is not only complex in the problems and 
inequities needing redress, but also in the varieties of definitions and institutions. The 
most common approach restricts AA to interventions that redress past unfair 
discrimination in employment, perhaps stemming from the intensity of discriminatory 
laws in the labor market, the routine incidence of white-black hierarchy and conflict in 
the workplace, and the immediate availability at the transition of qualified blacks 
previously denied advancement. Early- and mid-1990s discourses on affirmative action 
were heavily focused on past discrimination in labor market relations (Nzimande and 
Sikhosana 1996). Chapter 3 of the Employment Equity Act, which carries the heading 
‘Affirmative Action’, outlines the hiring regulations designed to increase access of 
historically disadvantaged persons to positions in which they are under-represented. 
Employment equity is indisputably an AA program. However, AA as conceptualized in 
this study is not confined to employment equity. 
Black Economic Empowerment, as a program for redressing systemic disadvantage, 
also fits within our rubric of AA. However, BEE is often differentiated from 
AA/employment equity, whether due to ideological connotations of the term, or to 
dissociate BEE from AA as practiced in other countries, or to distinguish BEE as a larger 
program than employment equity. While these distinctions are valid, they do not detract 
from the relevance and sufficiency of subsuming BEE as a broad AA program dealing 
with historical inequalities, especially in capital ownership and executive control, which 
employment equity does not directly impact on. In this regard we are in agreement with 
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Constitutional Court justice Sachs (2007), who maintains BEE as a subset of affirmative 
action. 
Transformation and redress are broader terms denoting the processes of correcting 
inequalities and injustices of the past, including but not limited to measures to attain 
racial and gender proportionality in education, employment, management and ownership. 
To the extent that transformation or redress programs aim to increase the representation 
of disadvantaged groups, they will fall under our umbrella of affirmative action. This 
point is most pertinent to the education sector, where AA is conspicuously absent in 
policy discourse, although the mandate to transform historically white universities and 
uplift historically black universities has been made clear. Absence of the term, of course, 
implies neither absence of positive discrimination nor its presence by another name. 
Indeed, the point is precisely that we must examine policies with affirmative action intent 
and that involve some form of preferential selection premised on historical disadvantage, 
even if South African convention applies different classifications. 
 As with many aspects of the South Africa’s multiple transitions, affirmative action 
appeared with a spread of meanings in a range of forums. We focus on documents most 
closely associated with the ANC-led transitional bodies. Affirmative action first appeared 
in ANC lexicon its 1998 Constitutional guidelines (Mandaza 1996: 31). The ANC’s 
Department of Economic (DEP) Ready to Govern (1992) delineated an expansive 
approach to AA, stating that, “[w]hile taking on a variety of forms, affirmative action 
means special measures to enable persons discriminated against on grounds of colour, 
gender and disability to break into fields from which they have been excluded by past 
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discrimination.”144 In terms of specific proposals, in the short to medium term, “the ANC 
is committed to the active implementation of affirmative action strategies as part of a 
code of employment practice, to redress historically disadvantaged groups and regions”. 
Ready to Govern also expressed a commitment to “vigorous affirmative action and 
restructuring programme for the public service to reflect the national composition of our 
population in order to meet the needs of all South Africans”. The Reconstruction and 
Development Program (1994), prepared soon before the April 1994 elections and carried 
as a manifesto, referred to affirmative action in rather sweeping and ambiguous terms, 
subsuming all measures in education and employment for redressing racial, gender, and 
regional discrimination145. However, the White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development of November 1994, ostensibly translating the RDP into a government 
program of action, circumscribed affirmative action to the public service, which would be 
“broadly representative of the South African community”. 
 
 
                                                 
144 The document continues: “The ANC proposes affirmative action with a view to establishing a 
law-governed, progressive and equitable way of ensuring advancement without on the one hand 
freezing present privileges or on the other going over to arbitrary compulsion. The issue has to be 
handled with both firmness and sensitivity”. It underscored that “unless special interventions are 
made, the patterns of structured advantage and disadvantage created by Apartheid and patriarchy 
replicate themselves from generation to generation”. 
 
145 The RDP was in substance and tenor more a manifesto than policy blueprint. Marais (2001: 
239) writes: “In the context of the transition, the RDP has become a form of shorthand for the 
values and principles that animated the anti-Apartheid struggle, thereby signifying continuity. 
The fact that government references to it have grown rarer and more selective only highlights this 
function.” Nevertheless, its orientation and vision are reflective of political priorities, not unlike 
Malaysia’s NEP. 
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Appendix Table 3-1. Malaysia: Public sector employment, number and 
percentage of total (public and private sectors), by occupation group. 
 2000 2005 
Management and professionals 
Public sector (’000) 130.4 218.4 
Total employed (’000) 1,150.6 1,287.3 
Public sector per total (%) 11.3 17.0 
Other occupations 
Public sector (’000) 760.3 813.5 
Total employed (’000) 7,373.4 7,829.8 
Public sector per total (%) 10.3 10.4 
All occupations 
Public sector (’000)      890.7     1,031.9  
Total employed (’000) 8,524.0 9,117.1 
Public sector per total (%) 10.4 11.3 
Sources: Author’s calculations from the Personnel List of Government Ministries and 
Departments in the Federal Budget Estimate and Annual Statistical Yearbook. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 3-1. Malaysia: Education profile of employed population by 
number of years schooling, 1995 and 2004  
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
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Appendix Figure 3-2. Malaysia: Education profile of employed population by 
education certificate, 1995 and 2004 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 3-3. Malaysia: Mean earnings (Ringgit per month), by years 
of schooling, 1995, 1999, and 2004 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
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Appendix Figure 3-4 Malaysia: Mean earnings (Ringgit per month), by 
education certificate, 1995, 1999, and 2004 
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  Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Table 4-1. Malaysia: Weighted logit regression for attaining management 
job, 1995-2004  
 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 
 Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Age 0.48 16.1 0.53 18.8 0.57 18.2 0.84 19.5 0.68 16.1 
Age squared 0.00 -12.9 0.00 -14.6 -0.01 -14.4 -0.01 -15.4 -0.01 -12.6 
Female -0.99 -10.5 -1.69 -16.9 -1.61 -14.5 -2.24 -15.1 -1.64 -12.3 
0-8 yrs sch. -1.80 -15.5 -2.50 -20.9 -1.98 -14.6 -2.13 -12.1 -1.79 -13.1 
9-10 yrs sch. -0.89 -8.1 -1.11 -10.0 -1.19 -10.5 -1.07 -5.8 -1.09 -6.7 
13 yrs sch. 4.05 8.4 4.44 8.8 4.59 7.4 5.37 6.6 3.37 5.5 
Diploma 5.81 9.0 7.75 12.9 8.17 11.3 10.22 12.9 8.25 12.5 
Degree 9.23 9.9 12.53 15.0 12.31 13.2 21.54 14.9 14.86 13.1 
Urban 0.67 6.2 0.83 7.8 0.71 4.8 0.60 3.0 0.87 5.5 
F-stat. 90.9 165.7 142.1 134.9 106.9 
Obs. 66,471 65,343 63,647 67,484 65,228 
Notes: Coefficients denote percentage point change in the probability of being a manager; 
     Reference for schooling: 11 years; all regressions control for state and industry. 
Source: Household Income Survey. 
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Appendix Table 4-2. Malaysia: Weighted logit regression for attaining professional 
job, 1995-2004 
 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 
 Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Age 0.04 3.2 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.6 0.03 1.3 
Age squared 0.00 -1.6 0.00 0.8 0.00 0.8 0.00 -0.7 0.00 -1.0 
Female 0.20 3.4 0.14 2.5 0.30 4.6 -0.07 -1.4 -0.12 -1.8 
0-8 yrs sch. -1.49 -14.0 -1.56 -14.8 -1.32 -13.0 -0.85 -7.7 -1.10 -9.8 
9-10 yrs sch. -0.61 -9.5 -0.77 -11.4 -0.75 -10.2 -0.54 -5.7 -0.69 -6.3 
13 yrs sch. 1.20 5.6 1.37 6.5 1.61 6.7 1.82 4.3 2.18 5.0 
Diploma 2.04 7.3 2.51 9.1 2.22 7.4 5.31 8.2 4.77 9.5 
Degree 14.53 12.6 15.31 13.7 16.12 14.2 23.59 11.9 20.60 13.3 
Urban 0.04 2.7 0.01 3.0 0.01 0.6 0.02 3.2 0.03 4.2 
F-stat. 177.0 218.5 153.7 122.1 125.0 
Obs. 66,471 65,343 63,647 67,484 65,228 
Notes: Coefficients denote percentage point change in the probability of being a professional; 
     Reference for schooling: 11 years; all regressions control for state and industry. 
Source: Household Income Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Table 4-3. Malaysia: Weighted logit regression for attaining technical job, 
1995-2004 
 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 
 Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat 
Age 0.70 13.0 0.62 13.0 0.66 12.7 0.56 7.8 0.54 8.6 
Age squared -0.01 -12.9 -0.01 -12.7 -0.01 -12.2 -0.01 -7.3 -0.01 -7.9 
Female -2.01 -11.5 -2.32 -14.7 -2.02 -11.2 -2.71 -11.0 -2.45 -10.0 
0-8 yrs sch. -6.46 -25.3 -6.87 -29.1 -6.09 -25.3 -7.79 -26.3 -7.74 -27.5 
9-10 yrs sch. -2.59 -16.0 -2.99 -17.4 -2.73 -14.5 -4.14 -16.2 -4.45 -17.9 
13 yrs sch. 2.65 5.9 1.47 3.7 3.35 7.0 6.47 7.8 3.82 6.6 
Diploma 9.04 12.0 8.28 14.8 10.03 14.0 12.48 15.1 10.70 14.4 
Degree -2.59 -12.0 -3.49 -17.7 -2.32 -9.3 -4.36 -15.3 -3.60 -10.7 
Urban 0.70 3.2 0.62 3.2 0.66 2.9 1.14 4.6 1.44 5.3 
F-stat. 106.6 141.0 115.1 144.1 125.9 
Obs. 66,471 65,343 63,647 67,484 65,228 
Notes: Coefficients denote percentage point change in the probability of being a technician; 
      Reference for schooling: 11 years; all regressions control for state and industry. 
Source: Household Income Survey. 
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Appendix Table 4-4. Tertiary educated workforce: Probit regression for attaining 
managerial or professional job (with education and race interaction), 2000 
 Manager Professional 
 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Age 0.16* 2.57* 1.35* -1.27* 
Age squared 0.00** -0.03* -0.02* 0.01* 
Female -0.28* -4.17* 1.96* -3.76* 
Bumiputera 0.73* -4.10* 2.44* -10.71* 
Local private -0.36 2.58* -8.75* -3.90* 
Bumiputera*local private -0.29 0.38 7.59* 6.48* 
Overseas -0.16 4.81* -4.25* 8.23* 
Bumiputera*overseas 0.11 2.24 8.45* 7.37* 
Urban 0.00 6.88* -0.29 9.88* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.223 0.175 0.326 0.088 
Obs. 13,670 13,741 13,720 13,741 
Source: 2 percent tape of the 2000 Population Census. 
Notes:  *Statistically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 10% level;  
Reference groups: tertiary education institute: local public institute;  
race: Bumiputera; Regressions control for state and industry. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 5-1. South Africa: Gini and GE(0): Earnings of total 
employed (formal and informal) 
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
GE(0)
Gini
 
  Source: Leite, McKinley and Osorio (2006)
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Appendix Figure 5-2. South Africa: Distribution of employed by years of 
schooling 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 5-3. South Africa: Average earnings by years of education (Rand 
per month) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Appendix Figure 5-4. South Africa: Average earnings by educational 
attainment (Rand per month) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 5-5. South Africa: Composition of employed by highest education  
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Appendix Figure 5-6. Blacks: Composition of employed by highest education  
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 5-7. Whites: Composition of employed by highest education  
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Appendix Figure 5-8. Blacks: Composition of employed by occupation 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 5-9. Whites: Composition of employed by occupation 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
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Appendix Figure 6-1. South Africa: Managers and highly-skilled workers: Effects 
of tertiary education and of race on earnings (adjusted for other determinants) 
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  Sources: October Household Survey and Labor Force Survey. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-2. South Africa: Service and production workers: Effects of 
tertiary education and of race on earnings (adjusted for other determinants) 
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